

Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee

Date: Thursday, December 26, 2024, 4:00 p.m.

Location: Reception Hall, Office of the President

Chair: Convener Lai Ching-te

Recorder: Ministry of the Interior (MOI)

Attendees: Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao, Deputy Convener Pan Men-an (潘孟安), and Deputy Convener Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), Advisor Robert Tsao (曹興誠) (on leave), Advisor Master Jing Yao (淨耀法師) (on leave), Advisor Huoh Shou-ye (霍守業), and Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung (林敏雄) (on leave).

Committee Members: Wellington L. Koo (顧立雄), Kuo Jyh-huei (郭智輝), Chen Shih-kai (陳世凱), Chen Junne-jih (陳駿季), Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源), Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), Wang Pao-tzong (王寶宗) (on leave), James Liao (廖英熙), Chen Hsin-liang (陳信良), Enoch Wu (吳怡農), Kuo Chia-yo (郭家佑), Tseng Po-yu (曾柏瑜), Liu Yu-hsi (劉玉皙), Tu Wen-ling (杜文苓), Hsiao Hsu-chun (蕭旭君), Yen Po-wen (顏博文), Hsiau Ya-wen (蕭雅文), Liu Wen (劉文), Bob Hung (洪偉淦), Tina Lin (林雅芳), Kenny Huang (黃勝雄), Wu Jong-shinn (吳宗信), and Dai Chen-yu (戴辰宇).

Non-voting Participants: Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng (季連成), Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳), Deputy Executive Secretary Chang Tun-han (張惇涵) (on leave), Deputy National Security Council Secretary-General Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆), Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧).

I. Chair's Remarks

Our three deputy conveners Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, Secretary-General to the President Pan Men-an, and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Joseph Wu; all of our advisors and committee members, our dear friends watching live online: Good afternoon.

Today, we are convening the second meeting of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, implementing the conclusions reached at the last meeting, conducting tabletop exercises, and verifying the preparedness of government agencies to address extreme situations.

Looking back over the past year, circumstances at home and abroad have changed rapidly. Authoritarian states around the world continue to converge, threatening the rules-based international order, and they now present a collective challenge to the peace and stability of the entire first island chain.

To address threats, whether natural disasters or ambitions for authoritarian expansion, we believe that as long as the government and all of society are prepared, we can respond. With determination, there is no need to worry. With confidence, our people can rest assured. This is the goal of whole-of-society defense resilience. Of course, these preparations are not easy. Taiwan's society must race against time, and work together to build capabilities to respond to major disasters and threats, and deter enemy encroachment.

Therefore, the goal of this committee is to formulate action plans through the five key areas: civilian force training and utilization, strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution, energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance, social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facility readiness, and

information, transportation, and financial network protection, thereby verifying central and local government capacities to respond in times of disaster, and enhance overall resilience in terms of national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy.

This morning at the Presidential Office, we conducted the first-ever cross-disciplinary tabletop exercises involving central and local government officials as well as civilian observers. Participating teams from central government departments were all led by deputy ministers, Tainan City Deputy Mayor Yeh Tse-shan (葉澤山) led a team, and Tainan Mayor Huang Wei-che (黃偉哲) also came to participate, demonstrating cooperation between central and local governments to jointly enhance social resilience.

The exercises were based on Taiwan's mature disaster prevention and relief system's response to comprehensive threats. We had scenarios, but no scripts, so the participating units did not prepare notes in advance, but reacted on the spot. When presented with a problem, they proposed countermeasures, which is closer to a real crisis situation.

To address the continued threat of authoritarian expansion to regional stability and order, in the first scenario we simulated that a high-intensity gray-zone operation occurred; in the second scenario, we simulated a state of being on the verge of conflict. The most important core objectives of the exercises were to ensure that people could carry on their daily lives and that society could function normally.

I would like to thank our three deputy conveners for serving as exercise commanders, Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang and Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng for serving as deputy exercise commanders, and Deputy Secretary-

General to the President Chang Tun-han as well as National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Lin Fei-fan for serving as chief officials. I also want to thank all our advisors, committee members, and colleagues from government agencies at both the central and local levels for coming together to complete tabletop exercises aimed at testing out components of the five key areas.

After conducting numerous exercises in the past, many government agencies improved their emergency response capabilities, and I want to recognize those achievements. However, I also want to emphasize that we must identify problems in our current systems, and then make improvements. Whether it be the central or the local level, we cannot just talk about the good things and sweep the unpleasant things under the rug. We have to rigorously ascertain numbers and make sure just how accurate the sources of our information are, because it is always a good thing when we discover problems in our exercises, and find places where improvements are needed. This means that our testing has achieved its purpose, and that there is much room for progress and improvement.

I also want to report to you all that, over the past few years, due to the global pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, countries throughout the world have been bolstering their defense resilience. NATO and the European Union, for example, have both adopted guidelines aimed at strengthening whole-of-society resilience. This shows that Taiwan is not a special case. The task of whole-of-society defense resilience is being addressed throughout the world. Taiwan's ongoing efforts to strengthen its whole-of-society defense resilience is something the international community at large is wanting to see.

This month I visited the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Palau, all of which are Pacific allies of Taiwan, and I made transit stops in the United States islands of Hawaii and

Guam. Friends in each of these places expressed firm support for Taiwan and repeatedly said they hope for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

We must continue taking action to respond to the international community's support. Taiwan must have the capability to defend its own security. As president, I want to take this opportunity to emphasize to the international community that Taiwan is determined to defend regional peace and stability. We will accelerate the pace of efforts to build a more resilient Taiwan.

I therefore wish to announce that our existing Wan An and Min An Exercises, which are air raid drills and disaster response drills, respectively, beginning from next year will be combined, and we will hold the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises. This new nomenclature matches up with that of similar exercises carried out overseas, making it easier for others to understand the efforts that Taiwan is putting forth.

In addition, the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises will feature absolutely no reliance on military support, and will have a design that takes the latest international experiences into account. These resilience exercises will be distinct from the Han Kuang military exercises, and yet complementary at the same time. In other words, whole-of-society defense resilience must particularly strengthen the defensive mechanisms of the non-military sector, and must verify the ability of civil defense and disaster preparedness systems to protect our nation's people.

I want to emphasize once again that the more resilient we make Taiwan, like-minded nations around the world will be more willing to coordinate with us in responding to various challenges together.

I realize that to defend democracy, we must gather together every bit of strength we have. The task of promoting whole-of-society defense resilience is a massive undertaking. The public sector must adopt a more open-minded attitude and be willing to tap into private-sector human resources, because combining government and private-sector forces is the only way to jointly respond to challenges arising under extreme conditions, and is the only way to strengthen Taiwan's overall defense capabilities, jointly consolidate global democratic resilience, and maintain regional peace and stability.

In just a few moments, Minister Liu will deliver a report on the progress of certain items listed in the first committee meeting, and Deputy Secretary-General Lin will deliver a report on the outcomes of the tabletop exercises held this morning.

Next, let us engage in open discussions and examine and verify each component of the tabletop exercises, so that together we can improve whole-of-society defense resilience, make Taiwan more secure, and make the region more stable. Thank you.

II. Confirmation of the Meeting Agenda

Decision: Meeting agenda confirmed.

III. Confirmation of the Minutes of the First Committee Meeting

Decision: Minutes of the first committee meeting confirmed.

IV. Report Items

1. Status report on items listed in the first committee meeting (omitted)

(Presented by Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang)

2. Report on outcome of tabletop exercises (omitted)

(Presented by Deputy NSC Secretary-General Lin Fei-fan)

V. Discussion Items (In Speaking Order)

1. Committee Member Remarks

(1) Committee Member, Yen Po-wen

1. During the tabletop exercises conducted this morning, it was impressive to see all participants fully demonstrate their professionalism and dedication. As an observer, I learned a lot. The exercises revealed that in a disaster scenario, local governments may request support from neighboring counties or cities, or from the central government. However, in a real-world situation, each locality may be overwhelmed by its own challenges, and the central government may be limited in its resources or coordination capacities. Therefore, enhancing private sector engagement and strengthening connections between the private sector and the central government are matters that the government at all levels must continue to address moving forward.
2. During a major disaster, resilience in communications is extremely important. Communication efficiency and the prevention of uneven resource allocation need to be tested through exercises. For example, during the 921 Earthquake, many engineers prepared to resume work at 2 or 3 a.m., yet on their way to Hsinchu Science Park, they encountered bumper-to-bumper traffic, and telephone communications were nearly unusable. It is suggested that strategies to maintain efficiency and avoid resource unavailability be incorporated as considerations in designing future exercise scenarios.
3. In addition, in the design of future exercises, it may be necessary for participants to address complex scenarios requiring engagement over an extended period. Rather than focusing on a single issue or a single local government, a

complex scenario such as a compound disaster could involve multiple issues across several regions, even including infrastructure damage, chemical spills, or toxic gas leaks. These situations require the government to consider appropriate response measures.

(2) Committee Member, Chen Hsin-liang

1. Regarding this morning's tabletop exercise procedures and the level of cooperation among participating departments, I personally found the thoroughness to be commendable. Nevertheless, these exercises were only discussion-based; in an actual disaster, the situation is constantly evolving, necessitating comprehensive, experience-based thinking and sharing. It is suggested that, in addition to government officials' involvement in the exercises, future exercises should also involve non-governmental participation, which is also very important. Exercises involving non-governmental participation could be designed to be simple, easy to remember, and straightforward to implement.
2. In terms of government departments promoting their policies, one of the most effective channels is through campuses. By integrating experiences into everyday life, verifying them through experience, and incorporating them into relevant scenarios, it would better equip people to adapt to potential changes in their environment.
3. Future expanded exercises could also incorporate international collaborative assistance. For instance, Taiwan and Japan have always maintained very good relations. In the event of a disaster, both countries can offer support through government agencies, civil society organizations, or even individual donations.

4. It is also suggested to enhance all-out national defense education. Schools at all levels are encouraged to include students' relevant training and performance records in learning passports. Additionally, enterprises, agencies, and schools can be encouraged to hold more competitions and apply various incentive mechanisms, such as promoting a culture of shooting sports.

(3) Committee Member, James Liao

1. Regarding civil defense training, it is suggested that the government expand training venues to conduct first aid education, survival skills, and self-defense training. The government can also provide training participants with relevant necessities (such as dry food or water) and improve the rate of preparedness in terms of survival supplies in each household.
2. It is suggested that each county and city set up a Resilient Taiwan pavilion. It is also suggested to convert all-out national defense training profiles from paper-based passports to a digital app. This will allow the central government to track the progress and locations of each county's and city's reliable civilian force training through the cloud, and have a good grasp of training progress and quality. This plan would also allow for the collection of big data from the cloud, enabling the rapid organization of different teams in response to different tasks to achieve optimal coordination.
3. It is also suggested that decommissioned vehicles and equipment from military, medical, and firefighting units be kept in the private sector as reserve capacity for emergency situations.

(4) Committee Member, Enoch Wu

Here, I would like to share my findings from visits to various countries, hoping that it will be helpful to the committee in promoting its future work:

1. Establishing good communication between the government and the people is important for maintaining social order; therefore, it is important work to ensure cybersecurity and conduct social communication.
2. In addition to issuing air raid warnings, it is also necessary to inform people of shelters available for use; therefore, it is necessary to review building regulations.
3. It is suggested to invite people from the business community to participate in the exercises, as many core services in Taiwan are provided by businesses.
4. The core services that the government must provide during a crisis include: first, services that affect public health and people's lives; second, services that influence the economy; and third, services that impact national security. When these three core service areas are effectively managed, the public will have greater confidence in the government.
5. With a clear understanding of strategic material stockpiles, the government can assess the accessibility or adequacy of these reserves. Given that the government's whole-of-society defense resilience is closely tied to stress testing, all government departments must understand their maximum stress capacity in order to strengthen their response capabilities.

(5) Committee Member, Kuo Chia-yo

1. I am delighted to participate in these tabletop exercises and

discussions, which bring together central government agencies as well as local governments. I commend the Tainan City government team for its unity and rapid response capabilities. It is hoped that other county and city governments can similarly build up the capability to respond to disasters quickly. In addition, the central government and local governments should continue to strengthen their collaboration and mutual understanding of available resources to ensure more effective allocation and utilization.

2. It is suggested that the central government have an executive department dedicated to civil defense affairs. This department would oversee strategic arrangements and cross-agency coordination to effectively enhance civil defense efforts.
3. To address various hazards, it is suggested that government agencies consider producing hazard maps for each county and city in Taiwan. These maps would not only help increase public awareness of risks, but also facilitate downloading and promotion of disaster prevention manuals.
4. In addressing different approaches to cognitive warfare, discerning disinformation is just one element. More critical is to proactively shape communication by formulating strategies and messages before problems occur, thereby securing an advantage. To achieve this, webpage content and media releases need to be prepared and practiced in advance; waiting to respond until a situation occurs is not an option. This approach also forms an important part of communication between government agencies and the public.
5. In response to cyberattacks, it is advisable to conduct graded exercises based on severity levels, while incorporating defensive measures such as shutting down official websites,

using static webpages, verifying identities via email, and designating managerial personnel in charge of decision-making in advance.

6. Finally, it is suggested that future exercises include real-world cases from abroad, as such situations have actually occurred. It is also suggested that the Presidential Office or central government agencies organize delegations to visit foreign countries, or invite them to visit Taiwan, to promote mutual learning and understanding.

(6) Committee Member, Tseng Po-yu

1. Today's tabletop exercises demonstrated the collaborative efforts between the central government and local governments, for which I would like to express my appreciation. Based on my observations this morning, I would like to offer a few comments. Firstly, there are relatively well-defined mechanisms for addressing tangible physical disasters, but the same cannot be said for the area of cognitive warfare.
2. Communication and clarification are two different capabilities. Currently, the central government and local governments are well-equipped to provide prompt clarifications, but the capacity for effective policy communication still requires further strengthening.
3. It is suggested to set up an intelligence gathering center. Beyond collecting public opinion, this center should also anticipate and inventory disinformation and cognitive warfare tactics, developing communication strategies in response. The central government and local governments should form strategic communication teams and carry out

relevant training. Internationally, many such teams have already gained experience in executing strategic communication in conflict zones, and we should align our efforts with these international practices.

4. Concerning connections with civilian forces, many bureaus and departments emphasized that they have contact lists, but it is hoped that these communication channels can be utilized during normal times so that civilian forces can be mobilized effectively in emergency situations.

(7) Committee Member, Liu Yu-hsi

1. The public's confidence in the financial order is primarily sustained through effective communication of information. Based on my observations from this morning's tabletop exercises, the online clarification approach is passive. It is suggested to utilize a variety of communication approaches.
2. In addition, during extraordinary circumstances, it is impractical to rely solely on the national army for response efforts. Auxiliary police, auxiliary firefighters, and civil defense teams established by local governments have shown enthusiasm for joining collaborative responses. However, plans should be in place for integrating such civilian forces, including an assessment of the need to adopt cooperation agreements.
3. The Armed Forces Reserve Command of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) has set up liaison officers or networks across townships, towns, cities, villages, and neighborhoods. To harness local mobilization capabilities under extraordinary circumstances, it is suggested that they collaborate with the competent authorities in charge of civil

defense units to conduct training tailored to these administrative levels. This would ensure the effective implementation of concepts and response measures at the grassroots level.

(8) Committee Member, Tu Wen-ling

1. I commend the tabletop exercises conducted this morning, as such exercises provide everyone with an opportunity to picture themselves in specific scenarios and foster preparedness across units. This is both positive and helpful for the future of whole-of-society defense. Today's exercises were designed to address an emergency gray-zone situation. Regarding disinformation, who should be responsible for its identification? How should it be countered? Addressing these issues requires more nuanced approaches, which will necessitate a good grasp of cognitive warfare.
2. Given the close proximity between counties and cities in Taiwan, the need for cross-county and cross-city collaboration is highly probable. Therefore, it is hoped that future exercises will involve horizontal coordination between localities incorporating a broader range of scenarios.
3. It is suggested that future tabletop exercises focus on energy issues, inviting participation from the energy industry to facilitate joint preparedness and response efforts.
4. It is also suggested to incorporate international assistance into the exercises, examining how to manage requests for assistance from friends and allies or international organizations, or whether it is possible to import energy through cooperation with various countries in the event of aggression. These scenarios could all serve as focuses for

future tabletop exercises.

(9) Committee Member, Hsiao Hsu-chun

1. I was honored to participate in today's tabletop exercises. From these exercises, I observed that the central government and the Tainan City government have developed relatively good resilience in risk diversification. However, the issue of centralized resource integration was not discussed as thoroughly, which would lead to hindered response speed and even prevent effective action in the face of a cognitive warfare conflict. It is suggested that, when addressing disinformation, a three- or four-level graded response approach akin to that used for cybersecurity incidents could be applied. This approach warrants further discussion.
2. It is suggested that future scenarios involving internet and power outages be added to better reflect real-world conditions during a disaster. Additional similar cases could be collected to help everyone with future exercises.

(10) Committee Member, Hsiau Ya-wen

1. In today's exercises, I saw that central government agencies and the Tainan City government responded quickly and demonstrated strong familiarity with the tasks at hand. However, the interaction between the central government and local governments was less apparent. For example, it was not clearly shown how the central government would address requests from local governments, how central military intelligence could impact local operations, how it is relayed to local governments, and what resources are provided.
2. In addition, coordination and discussion across government agencies were relatively weak. For example, tasks such as

maintaining public stability and security require police assistance. Exercises should incorporate mechanisms for coordinated dispatching, prioritized allocation, and police support.

3. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) categorize common responses to any disaster situation, including areas such as communications, sheltering, medical services, and transportation, etc. It is suggested that the main responsibilities of government agencies be broken up, and that responses be ESF-oriented for a unified effort.
4. Regarding medical service networks and evacuation facilities, accommodating patients with special needs should be considered. It is hoped that more detailed planning and analysis will be available in the future.

(11) Committee Member, Liu Wen

I commend these tabletop exercises, especially their inclusion of cognitive warfare issues. Here, I have three suggestions to offer:

1. Legal sources for administrative authorities to address gray-zone tactics are often lacking. It is hoped to have a more defined command system, with confirmation of one another's indicators, to facilitate overall command.
2. In terms of information warfare, our current focus centers on countering misinformation and disinformation. However, surrender rhetoric may sometimes involve cognitive manipulation or political declarations. Without a unified response from the central government, such tactics could escalate the situation, causing public unrest. It is hoped that future exercises will also incorporate such scenarios, beyond

just technical matters.

3. Finally, local governments tend to rely on the central government for the utilization of human resources, and resources and manpower are highly dependent on the central government. It is hoped that local governments and the central government will consider collaborating with civil society. Without established cooperative channels, there is a risk of resource redundancy among civil society groups during emergencies. For example, most civil society groups and non-governmental organizations are concentrated in northern Taiwan. Without coordination nationwide, responses may be inadequate. It is hoped that three-way communication be established among the central government, local governments, and civil society.

(12) Committee Member, Bob Hung

1. The standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency response in Taiwan are quite thorough, but when complex disasters arise, relying solely on a single government agency for disaster response will result in bottlenecks. For example, protecting critical infrastructure requires not only the special police corps to bolster security, but also maintenance units to leverage their own capabilities in safeguarding facilities, enhancing infrastructure resilience.
2. Today's tabletop exercises addressed the issue of financial order. If hackers breach financial institutions and instantly wipe out the public's accounts, it would be difficult to manage the ensuing public anxiety and prevent a bank run. It is suggested that financial institutions maintain their own backup systems, enabling a swift system transition when a problem is deemed serious. Such systems should be

established as part of enhancing self-protection and response capabilities for critical infrastructure during normal times.

3. Top enterprises in Taiwan usually develop their own ways to respond to situations without reliance on the government, resulting in significant efforts spent on independent security incident response. Government agencies could promote the work of these enterprises, allowing the private sector to generate ideas in terms of how to reduce reliance on the government during extreme situations and adopt the concept of self-protection.

(13) Committee Member, Tina Lin

1. With regard to tasks such as maintaining social stability and information communication and clarification, more specific indicators should be established within the emergency classification system. These should outline which decisions need to be communicated and which information requires a rapid response, preventing operational rigidity.
2. Disaster prevention education and civil defense training are all about building awareness in normal times. Enterprises often conduct regular internal drills to heighten employees' awareness. Employees are required to participate in drills during typhoon season, and notification by messaging is conducted once a year, requiring employees to respond with an update to confirm their safety. The number of employees who reply and the time taken to complete the drill are also recorded. Such drills serve as a test of the resilience of companies' internal systems. By showcasing to civil society how large enterprises cultivate risk awareness, this approach can facilitate further cooperation. I believe that establishing good awareness and risk management in normal times will

lead to more agile and flexible response capabilities during emergencies.

3. Regarding media literacy, besides enhancing everyone's ability to identify disinformation, implementation should be expanded. For example, enterprises could conduct information tests every year to fulfill employee training requirements. Strengthening the ability to identify disinformation through educational mechanisms is particularly important.

(14) Committee Member, Kenny Huang

1. The tabletop exercises this morning were quite a success, especially the unscripted exercise involving 29 central government agencies and 16 bureaus and departments, in which smooth interaction among these participants was demonstrated.
2. The tabletop exercise process was relatively passive, lacking the advantage of forestalling the enemy. Without understanding timing, situations will unfold in a point-by-point manner, and resources will be improperly prepared and thoroughly lacking. It is worth considering the use of digital tools or other models to enhance timing. By displaying situations in a timeline and presenting their chronological context, response units can manage resources more effectively and prepare for possible developments.
3. Combat relies on command, and command relies on communications. In an emergency, communication resources may be relatively scarce, so a compound communication network is necessary.
4. In emergencies, external resources including the armed

forces, special police corps, and coast guard may not be available to provide support. Therefore, administrative agencies must consider how to enhance their independent defense capabilities. In situations with an absence of external support and where external water, oil, and electricity supplies fail, critical facilities must be equipped with the capacity for sustained independent operations and support blackout resilience. This includes ensuring that emergency medical services, such as basic trauma life support, are available through training. It is also necessary to assess the accessibility of external support within a three-level protection framework for critical facilities, while considering other possible protection structures.

5. In terms of whether the existing SOPs of the protection plan are adequate to handle emergencies, and whether a separate emergency response mechanism should be developed, it is suggested that government departments evaluate these matters in the future.
6. It is suggested that local governments enhance personnel evacuation drills.

(15) Committee Member, Wu Jong-shinn

1. As for the response to situations involving the Chinese Communist Party shifting from a military exercise to combat, access to intelligence is extremely important. We should continue to refine our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities by utilizing space technologies and fostering international and business cooperation.
2. To ensure resilient communications, maintaining satellites at multiple orbits with different applications tailored to specific

purposes is essential. It is suggested to advance our self-developed communications technology as soon as possible to integrate into the global space industry chain.

(16) Committee Member, Dai Chen-yu

1. It is suggested that the government encourage the preparation of supplies for disaster prevention and evacuation. Drawing from the examples of the US and Japan, every floor in American companies is equipped with an emergency kit containing common medications, fire safety gear, and gas protection equipment, while every office seat in Japanese companies is equipped with an earthquake helmet and a go bag, and office buildings feature a disaster prevention storehouse containing three days' worth of drinking water and food, ensuring that trapped employees can sustain basic living needs.
2. Cybersecurity also entails responses to communication disruptions. Future discussions should explore methods for maintaining backup communications during power outages and base station disruptions.
3. Russia and Estonia have designated a nationwide network outage day, during which domestic internet is shut down and the operations of social systems are tested under such conditions. In addition, the Ukrainian Ministry of Digital Transformation has set up a reporting hotline which allows the public to report various situations through backup communication channels. The relevant departments then relay this information to non-profit groups for assistance with analysis, after which the analysis is forwarded to the Ministry of National Defense (MND). This exemplifies effective government-civilian cooperation. Moreover, Ukraine has

civilian volunteer teams engaged in repairing mobile base stations and networks, helping restore basic communications across communities.

4. Given the frequency of cyberattacks targeting IoT devices such as electronic billboards and wireless base stations, the central government should provide detection programs or methods to bolster detection capabilities. It should also explore options for conducting IoT device inspections at the local government level, or even consider investing in IoT inspection laboratories and certification systems, drawing on practices from the US and Japan, to strengthen protection capacity.

2. Responses by Executive Secretaries, Report Presenter, and Committee Members (Government Representatives)

(1) Minister of the Interior and Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang

1. One committee member inquired about the competent authority responsible for civil defense; the answer is that the MOI is the competent authority according to the Civil Defense Act. Currently, training for civilian defense and auxiliary police and firefighters is conducted by local police and firefighting personnel. Training includes cognitive warfare, drone training, enhanced Disaster Relief Volunteer (DRV) training, etc., which aim to enhance resilience in utilizing civilian forces.
2. Currently, the MOI is promoting the establishment of coordination centers for disaster prevention in townships and cities. In the future, civil society organizations will be included in the coordination centers to conduct various disaster relief and training activities. This will ensure that

vertical command systems and horizontal communications systems can be effectively connected and integrated during disasters. The suggestions made by the committee members today have all been incorporated into the tasks under the five key areas of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee for deliberation. However, some issues cannot be resolved immediately and will require continued deliberation for short-, medium-, and long-term solutions.

(2) Report Presenter: Deputy NSC Secretary-General Lin Fei-fan

1. Whole-of-society resilience forms the foundation for enhancing the government's defense capacity. My observations of today's tabletop exercises are as follows: First, this morning's exercises showed that the main communication mechanism between the central and local governments relied on telephone calls. When the scenario was presented, the central government rarely sought input from local governments or shared information with them. Likewise, local governments did not promptly verify information with the central government. This indicated that our government departments have tended in the past to respond to situations often from a business perspective, easily lacking horizontal and vertical communications.
2. It was observed that although various central government agencies had need for information provided by the MND, they did not actively request it. For example, in today's exercises, information and communication gaps appeared in the decision-making process as the situation escalated from the gray-zone stage to a level 1 alert stage. The same observation applied at the local level. However, today's

exercises were the first tabletop exercises involving both the central and local governments and with the deputy heads of the 19 central agencies playing leading roles, which was commendable. Everyone's full participation, along with your many insightful observations and suggestions, was greatly appreciated. As some committee members mentioned during today's exercises, it is necessary for each central government agency and local unit to conduct further exercises in greater detail based on their respective areas of responsibility. This includes the Financial Supervisory Commission's exercises on financial resilience and maintaining order, as well as preparation, which should all be rehearsed in normal times. It also includes exercises conducted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare and Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), as well as energy infrastructure maintenance, which require moving from paper-based SOPs to real-world verification; this also needs rehearsal. Today's tabletop exercises are a good start.

3. Regarding references to international experience, the NSC and the ADMA have tremendous experience in exchanges and cooperation with the international community, including the Nordic and Israeli models shared by Committee Member Enoch Wu, which offer many valuable lessons. International think tanks are expected to visit Taiwan in February and March of next year, when they will participate in, among other events, the Global Cooperation and Training Framework Workshop on Whole-of-Society Resilience Building, Preparation, and Response jointly hosted by Taiwan and the US. It is hoped that through these opportunities, the business community can be encouraged to learn from

international experience. Invitations will also be extended to all committee members to take part in the events.

(3) Committee Member, Wellington L. Koo

1. In an emergency, vertical or horizontal connections can be disrupted. It is crucial to establish multiple connections and support integration. The MND will assist central government agencies and local governments in conducting verifications to strengthen whole-of-society defense resilience.
2. There is indeed room for improvement in promoting go bags and the All-out Defense Contingency Handbook. Going forward, we will deliberate with the Executive Yuan's Directorate-General of Personnel Administration on conducting relevant promotional education and training to civil servants at all levels. We will also consider promoting such education and training at schools and in villages and neighborhoods so as to implement it at the grassroots level of society.

(4) Committee Member, Kuo Jyh-huei

1. The MOEA will continue to bolster energy resilience and ensure stable supplies of petroleum and electricity.
2. Regarding disaster relief, our government departments' operations are currently quite mature. However, there is still room for improvement in areas such as information dissemination and security, which advisors and committee members are concerned about. The MOEA will remain attentive to these matters. For the identification of disinformation and the dissemination of public information, there must be an operational mechanism. Civil defense groups established by the MOI can respond to the above-

mentioned issues through measures such as reassuring the public and promoting government policies.

(5) Committee Member, Chen Shih-kai

1. In emergencies or unique disasters, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) is responsible for maintaining the operations and services of the land, sea, and air transportation infrastructure. Currently, plans have been proposed to ensure continued operational resilience and address resource needs in land, sea, and air transportation. In today's exercise scenarios we have also spotted areas needing improvement. The MOTC will conduct more thorough reviews and advance strategies on certain issues.
2. In response to gray-zone scenarios covered in today's exercises, we have established special corps to safeguard critical infrastructure. However, there is still room for improvement, particularly in terms of real responses to actual gray-zone incidents, and we are prepared to continue advancing strategies. This includes addressing issues such as self-defense of critical infrastructure, assignment of self-rescue tasks, inventory-taking of items used in protective operations, etc. Specifically, facility maintenance supervisors must thoroughly understand the incident situations and operational status of tasks.
3. Next, regarding the issue of communications – an issue of great importance for our committee members, the MOTC is currently implementing the Fiber Optic Channel Project, in which it is actively laying fiber-optic cables along railways and highways.

(6) Committee Member, Chen Junne-jih

1. Regarding livelihood necessities, such as rice, fishery, livestock, and agricultural product assets, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has been conducting regular inventories to ensure domestic food security. In case rationing is necessary due to an emergency, the MOA will establish rationing stations in coordination with the MOEA to jointly ensure that supplies continue to meet basic public needs.
2. From our experience in responding to the four natural disasters that occurred this year, it was found that rolling inventory warehouses were a good method of dispatchment. Currently, such warehouses have been set up throughout Taiwan, and inventory can be released from storage whenever agricultural products cannot be shipped in time.

(7) Committee Member, Chiu Tai-yuan

1. As the country strengthens its whole-of-society defense resilience, we are focusing on the preparedness of social welfare and medical care. We are promoting a three-year program for resilient national medical preparedness, which includes organizing training and maintenance to ensure the resilience of equipment at hospitals responsible for emergency care. So far, we have enhanced the resilience of 52 hospitals with heavy emergency care responsibilities, improved the management of 205 hospitals responsible for emergency care, conducted trauma care training for medical teams, expanded medical rescue capabilities, and enhanced response mechanisms and handling efficiency during disasters.
2. In terms of national resilience, we have overseen 22 counties and cities in conducting emergency services personnel training and equipment preparedness, set up first aid stations

with medical capabilities, conducted recruitment training, and organized trauma management courses to enhance community medical resilience during disasters.

(8) Committee Member, Kuan Bi-ling

1. When it comes to compound disasters, Taiwan's disaster prevention mechanisms are relatively mature and efficient. Therefore, today's exercises focused on gray-zone aggression and near-conflict situations. The Ocean Affairs Council and the Coast Guard Administration will continue to enhance their capabilities in responding to cognitive warfare and conducting strategic communications.
2. Today's exercises required government agencies to test their capabilities in response, coordination, and making requests during an emergency, especially in connection with other agencies and even international support. Additionally, the exercises attempted to cultivate their capability for quick recovery. All of these will continue to be implemented in the future.

(9) Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan and Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng

1. The purpose of the tabletop exercises is to verify the operations of government mechanisms. Each single exercise is to examine whether the operating measures taken follow the SOPs. Without following the SOPs, measures taken will result in confusion. Each central response mechanism must have its action guidelines, while each participant must record their response actions in individual logs and try to identify and address gaps between actions and the SOPs through regular exercises.

2. Any tabletop exercise provides an opportunity to practice resource allocation strategies. While working on the reasonable distribution of integrated resources, we should actively seek to identify any deficiencies. Whether it is local governments requesting resources from the central government, or the central government distributing resources to local governments, both sides should review potential issues through after action review to develop more reasonable action plans.
3. Nationwide critical infrastructure for petroleum, water, electricity, finance, medical care, transportation, and information and communications systems have already been inventoried to review their protection programs and enhance protective actions. Regarding strengthening cybersecurity, in 2025 offensive and defensive exercises will be conducted targeting critical infrastructure and policy-making organizations. For both categories, the relevant preparedness tasks have already been carried out.

3. Remarks by Advisor and Deputy Convenors

(1) Advisor, Huoh Shouu-ye

1. Resilience is the ability to cope with extraordinary situations and times, and it is a demonstration of persistence and endurance. Whole-of-society resilience must be applied to every part of the country, and addressing issues in adverse situations requires both endurance and ability.
2. For the national military, tabletop exercises are done to prepare for field exercises, which in turn are done to prepare for direct combat. In March next year, we plan to conduct a small-scale field exercise. It is hoped that counties and cities across the country will have the opportunity to participate and

observe one another. Both observers and participants in the exercise can enhance their awareness of whole-of-society defense, which is also a form of training.

(2) Deputy Convener, Joseph Wu

1. Through the immersive exercises this morning, all the participating agencies could engage more. It is suggested that all agencies evaluate conducting periodic exercises on their own to assess their respective disaster response capabilities. Additionally, they should broadly consider areas that require cross-ministerial assistance. This approach will allow all agencies to rapidly get up to speed and improve overall response capabilities.
2. To thoroughly verify resilience preparedness in all aspects, today's tabletop exercises included the two scenarios of "high-intensity gray-zone operations" and "near-conflict situations." Each event introduced was also closely linked to the five key areas of our whole-of-society defense resilience. This enabled all units to examine whether we are adequately prepared for resilience in civilian forces, materials, critical infrastructure, social welfare and medical care, and digitalization. Currently, the challenges we face are certainly compound disasters, and all units must adopt a whole-of-society and whole-of-government perspective to thoroughly review situations and effectively identify problems.
3. The information aspect during a disaster, including countering misinformation and disinformation and managing strategic communications both domestically and internationally, is vital at all stages. However, this work cannot rely on one single agency. The responsible unit must fully understand all aspects of the facts and share this

information with other units; only then can we root out misinformation and disinformation, make accurate assessments, and seek international assistance. Some friends and allies regularly engage with us in strategic communications. Going forward, we need to continue working on cross-ministerial strategic communications.

(3) Deputy Convener, Pan Men-an

1. In the Local Government Act, the organizational structures of the various counties and cities differ. For high-intensity gray-zone operations and near-conflict situations, the dissemination of news is very important. I suggest taking stock of the news release mechanisms in the 22 counties and cities.
2. During the 921 Earthquake, Puli lost its lighting and communications systems. It was the vehicles dispatched locally that helped stabilize the entire township. Therefore, according to the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act, each county, city, and township office can prepare or install loudspeaker systems in accordance with its own authority.
3. In addition, to address the issue of consistency when dealing with and responding to disinformation, it is suggested that the central government follow the method used during the COVID-19 pandemic, where it releases accurate information for everyone to follow in emergencies.
4. As for financial institutions, in response to a possible bank run in the future, a financial system should be deployed ahead of time that possesses response capabilities. The resilience of the power grid was also mentioned in the last meeting with regard to avoiding the islanding effect.

5. It is suggested that, in addition to enhancing training for DRVs and establishing coordination centers for disaster prevention as promoted by the MOI, disaster prevention training should be rooted more deeply in communities. Under the president's outline, many community care stations have been set up where volunteers, village and neighborhood chiefs, patrol teams, temples, and churches serve as vital sources of manpower for maintaining community order. By incorporating this manpower into disaster prevention training in more detail, efforts can connect more closely with the community. Drawing from the disaster relief experience of the 921 Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot, we have become more aware of the damage caused by disasters and the sorrow of the lives lost, while also observing the resilience of local and central disaster relief systems and the heartfelt support provided by religious groups and non-profit organizations. Through enduring earthquakes, typhoons, and floods, Taiwan has built its current resilience and capacity.

(4) Deputy Convener, Bi-khim Hsiao

1. When visiting Taiwan, many like-minded countries and NGOs focus on how we promote whole-of-society defense resilience and lead the country toward building a more resilient defense force. They also inquire about ways they can provide any assistance in this regard. Each country has its own strengths, and we can benefit from their different experiences.
2. The tabletop exercises this morning only involved participants from the government and have not yet been extended to the whole of society. However, some agencies that previously did not participate in national security

discussions have begun to have different perspectives. Many compound gray-zone incidents that were once unimaginable could occur in the future. Therefore, each agency must conduct its own exercises to assess its capabilities.

3. Previously, we began promoting defense resilience with the national security system, but two or three years ago, we began to discuss gradually expanding defense resilience to the whole of government, and now the president is implementing defense resilience with a whole-of-society approach. For the tabletop exercises this morning, the scope was expanded from the national security system to the whole of government, and now non-government committee members are also invited to participate in the exercises. It is hoped that in the next stage, the exercises can be implemented throughout the whole of society.
4. In the next stage, some practical examples should be developed. Similarly, private enterprises need to establish indicators to verify whether defense resilience has been achieved. For example, this could include the level of preparedness of disaster shelters, the role of neighborhood volunteers, even the number of DRVs there are in the neighborhood, and the availability of DRV training in the community. On a broader scale, cognitive training can also serve as a key indicator of the defense resilience level of neighborhoods or communities.
5. It is hoped that through these exercises and discussions, we can think about how to integrate existing resources and incorporate them into our policies. We remain open to suggestions and comments regarding any deficiencies. It is also hoped that all of you can make a case for this issue in

various fields. For instance, although today's tabletop exercises involved personnel at ranks no higher than deputy minister, you are encouraged to implement similar exercises at the grassroots level.

4. Convener's Directives

I would like to thank our advisors, committee members, and colleagues from central government agencies and the Tainan City government for their full cooperation in conducting today's historic tabletop exercises to jointly assess the government's preparedness in terms of whole-of-society defense resilience. It was a busy day, and I really appreciate your hard work. Regarding today's tabletop exercises, many advisors and government heads have offered their comments as reference for the small-scale exercises to be held next year.

I have several points I would like to raise with respect to today's exercises:

First, we need to have SOPs, but we cannot rely solely on SOPs.

Currently, central government agencies or local bureaus and departments have their respective SOPs for certain situations.

However, we must not overlook that our resources are interdependent and that real-world situations may be interconnected. Therefore, while SOPs provide a basis for managing situations, we can also enhance alternative response measures beyond SOPs. We should prepare in advance, ensure adequate preparedness, and maintain flexibility to respond properly.

Second, we must be more proactive when communicating on combating information and cognitive warfare.

At present, we have established a response mechanism to address information and cognitive warfare launched by foreign forces. I would like to acknowledge the response of central and local units, but in addition to passive response, we can also be more proactive.

In the future, we will establish more diverse channels to communicate with the general public. From the heads of various government agencies to neighborhood chiefs at the grassroots level and even opinion leaders from all walks of life in the local area – all should become important communication channels. In normal times, they can communicate and convey information; in emergencies, they can help clarify disinformation and even explain accurate information. Only in this way can we effectively respond to the challenges of various misinformation and disinformation.

Third, we must first build whole-of-government defense resilience before we can strengthen whole-of-society defense resilience.

From today's tabletop exercises, it became clear that in dealing with disasters or emergencies, we have in the past been too reliant on military and police personnel. Whole-of-society defense resilience should first aim at self-help and mutual assistance, and then extend support to the entire society.

We need to consider that the military and police also have their own responsibilities in various emergency situations. Whether it involves the inventory-taking and deployment of civilian forces or the allocation of livelihood necessities, we must identify more possible blind spots from these exercises. We should also think about integrating the abundant civilian forces from various responsible units into the disaster prevention and relief system to continuously improve related actions.

Fourth, today was the first time large-scale tabletop exercises on whole-of-society defense resilience involving central and local units as well as civilian observers have been conducted at the Presidential Office. I would like to commend the central and local governments for their thorough preparations.

From these exercises, it is more apparent that central and local government agencies must break out of departmental biases and think about how to respond to emergencies from a cross-departmental, or even whole-of-government, perspective.

Meanwhile, in the future, vertical and horizontal coordination and information exchange between central agencies, as well as between central and local governments, can be further strengthened to allow each unit to stay updated on each other's tasks and progress in real time, incorporating the spirit of teamwork.

Fifth, these exercises verified the importance of backup systems.

Central and local agencies should consider how to respond to a large-scale disaster if existing mechanisms fail, how to quickly adopt a “plan B,” and how to restore operations as quickly as possible. I would like to reiterate that so long as our government and the whole of society are prepared, we can respond to disasters; so long as we are determined, we can carry on without worry; and so long as we are confident, the people can live with peace of mind.

Sixth, central and local government agencies must conduct internal exercises within their own units during normal times.

Through the exercises, we not only verify the emergency plans of the central and local governments, but also discover many areas for improvement, which proves the importance of tabletop exercises.

With the plans we make and the unscripted exercises we conduct in normal times, we have directions for the future, so that when

large-scale, compound disasters occur, we can respond with due haste.

I want to emphasize that building whole-of-society defense resilience requires the participation of every county, city, township, town, village, and neighborhood, from the central to local governments, so as to gather every bit of strength together to enhance overall national resilience.

This comprehensive cross-sector, cross-party, and cross-generational task requires cooperation between the central and local governments and between the government and various sectors of civil society so that our strength can be exerted to the fullest.

The government will improve upon its policy planning with reference to the results of these exercises as well as feedback from the frontline.

Only by preventing disasters before they occur can we overcome various difficulties. Moving forward, with our continued efforts, we will implement the spirit of whole-of-society defense resilience throughout the country. We hope that all our fellow compatriots can understand, identify with, and participate in this effort to make Taiwan a more resilient country that is better able to withstand natural disasters and mitigate various risks. Thank you.

VI. Extempore Motions

1. Committee Member, James Liao

I suggest that a resilient Taiwan national pavilion be set up at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition in September next year, which would include a hands-on shooting experience, medical rescue instruction, military supplies, various survival tools, sales of a variety of dry goods, and displays of emergency items to be used by individuals, families, groups, and other units,

so that the public can clearly and actively understand the purpose of whole-of-society defense resilience. Moreover, after the exhibition, the pavilion can be replicated locally in various counties and cities to provide many types of functional training and to allow for easy, one-stop purchasing of equipment, because the more prepared we are, the more resilient we are.

2. Committee Member, Enoch Wu

Emergency response may demand far greater capacity than what is assumed in normal times. I agree that our resilience plan for normal times only needs to address basic capacity, but for emergencies, greater capacity is required.

VII. Chair's Closing Statement

First, as countries around the world are enhancing their social resilience, Taiwan must take action all the more.

In face of risks posed by geopolitics and expanding authoritarianism, countries around the world are taking action in response, including the European Union, where member states are encouraged to strengthen domestic resilience, and NATO, which is also deepening cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners to build collective resilience.

As an important member of the free world and the Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has the responsibility and the determination to unite forces from all sectors, enhance whole-of-society defense resilience, safeguard regional peace and stability, and face challenges together with the international community.

Second, the point of enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience is to unite our people so that they can respond to various challenges together.

Protecting the sustainable development of a free and democratic system is our common goal, not for personal gain or political party competition. The promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience should be done through unity and cooperation across political parties, sectors, and generations.

Whether it is enhancing civil defense and disaster prevention preparedness, or actively responding to foreign threats, it is all done to maintain the security, stability, prosperity, and development of our society, and keep our free and democratic way of life intact. Today's tabletop exercises are concrete actions that demonstrate our bravery and pragmatism in facing challenges.

Third, we must continue with intensive discussions and validation to build stronger resolve and confidence and thus more effectively enhance whole-of-society defense resilience.

Prior to today's second committee meeting, group discussions chaired by Vice President Hsiao and Secretary-General Pan have allowed our advisors and committee members to gain a deeper understanding of the specific plans and countermeasures of the executive branch.

Through group meetings, we can prioritize and focus on core issues, allowing our advisors and committee members to provide valuable professional input during the planning stage of building resilience, and allowing the government to review policy directions in a timely manner.

I would also like to request that all government agencies be sure to focus on the policy implementation situation on the frontline to allow for more effective promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience.

Fourth, through the committee's thorough discussions today, cooperation between the government and civil society will be implemented further.

For example, refining and expanding civilian training can make disaster prevention training an activity that reaches all people. Enhancing material preparation and supply distribution for times of disaster can ensure people have uninterrupted access to daily necessities, even under extreme threats.

In addition, developing decentralized energy microgrids, integrating the operations of medical, civil affairs, and social welfare systems, and bolstering the resilience of front-line services in the financial system, can provide robust operational capabilities to sustain social functions amid challenges, from regional disasters to large-scale threats.

In the future, the central government will work with local governments to promote the establishment of coordination centers for disaster prevention in the 368 township, town, city, and district offices nationwide. In normal times, those inactivated Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) can be used as venues, utilizing both government and civilian resources, for promoting education, training, and exercises.

In times of disaster, those EOCs can play a role in mobilizing the civilian force and sharing the workload of the limited front-line staff of the township, town, city, and district offices.

It cannot be overstated that Taiwan's efforts to enhance whole-of-society defense resilience aim to strengthen the country's ability to respond to disasters or emergencies, while achieving the three overarching goals of maintaining government operations, maintaining continued operation of core functions pertinent to

society and people's livelihoods, and supporting military activity as necessary.

As I mentioned at the first committee meeting, the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee is an action committee which must work at the grassroots level, laying down roots in neighborhoods. We must stand unafraid in the face of troubles, setbacks, or criticisms.

I would like to report to you all that at the third committee meeting in March next year, we will conduct small-scale field exercises to allow advisors and committee members to participate in person for verification and to provide various suggestions for improvement. And at the fourth committee meeting in June next year, there will be a preliminary drill linked with Han Kuang exercises. We will continue to mobilize all our strength to enhance Taiwan's whole-of-society defense resilience.

In the recent past, many of our friends, allies, and like-minded countries have recognized Taiwan's democratic achievements and its determination to pursue freedom and diversity.

I believe that as long as Taiwan stands united, we can join with our democratic partners to respond to various challenges and promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. Let's continue to work hard and strive for success. Thank you.