Minutes of the 7th Meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee

Date: Thursday, March 19, 2026, 16:00

Location: 3rd Floor Reception Hall, the Presidential Office

Chair: Convener Lai Ching-te
Recorder: Ministry of the Interior (MOI)

Deputy Conveners: Bi-khim Hsiao (蕭美琴), Pan Men-an (潘孟安), and Joseph Wu (吳釗燮)

Committee Advisors: Huoh Shoou-yeh (霍守業) and Lin Ming-hsiung (林敏雄) (on leave)

Committee Members: Wellington L. Koo (顧立雄), KUNG Ming-hsin (龔明鑫), Chen Shih-kai (陳世凱), Chen Junne-jih (陳駿季), Shih Chung-liang (石崇良), Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), Wang Pao-tzong (王寶宗) (on leave), James Liao (廖英熙), Chen Hsin-liang (陳信良), Enoch Wu (吳怡農) (on leave), Kuo Chia-yo (郭家佑), Tseng Po-yu (曾柏瑜), Liu Yu-hsi (劉玉皙), TU Wen-ling (杜文苓), Hsiao Hsu-chun (蕭旭君), YEN Po-wen (顏博文), Hsiau Ya-wen (蕭雅文), Liu Wen (劉文), Bob Hung (洪偉淦), Tina Lin (林雅芳), Kenny Huang (黃勝雄), Wu Jong-shinn (吳宗信) (on leave), and Dai Chen-yu (戴辰宇).

Non-voting representatives: Executive Secretary Chang Tun-han (張惇涵), Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng (季連成), Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳), Deputy Executive Secretary Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆), and Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) of the Presidential Office

I. Chair's Remarks

Today, we are convening the seventh meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. This is the first time that the committee is meeting since the 2026 Lunar New Year.

Last year, Taiwan faced earthquakes and typhoons, and was struck by the especially serious Fata'an Creek barrier lake disaster. Besides working together to rebuild our homes and communities, we must also continue enhancing our whole-of-society defense resilience in order to increase Taiwan's disaster preparedness and capacity for providing humanitarian aid.

In addition, Taiwan is a technology powerhouse whose capabilities in drones and other applications can serve as a key bridge for international cooperation.

Taiwan is willing and able to contribute even more to regional peace and prosperity through deepened exchanges and cooperation with other countries.

This month marks the 30th anniversary of the institution of direct presidential elections in Taiwan. This occasion reminds us that Taiwan's democracy is quite young, and also reminds us how Taiwan, amidst the most challenging circumstances, built a democratic system of government that is now acclaimed the world over.

In 1996, as the people of Taiwan were preparing to take that key step in our transition to democracy by casting their votes in a direct presidential election, the CCP threatened us by conducting large-scale military exercises and missile tests. But the people of Taiwan did not back down. On the contrary, the voter turnout rate exceeded 76 percent for an election that marked an important milestone in our transition to democracy.

Over the past 30 years, Taiwan has progressed further and further, and our democracy has grown increasingly resilient. We have become an indispensable partner to the world. But what has not changed is the military ambitions of the CCP toward Taiwan. They have not abandoned their ambitions; on the contrary, those ambitions just keep growing. Taiwan must

maintain peace through strength, and build strength through resilience. This is the way to defend the status quo and prevent disruption of the regional order.

To strengthen our national defense, the government has drawn up a proposal for an eight-year, NT$1.25 trillion special defense budget. This will be used to build the T-Dome, adopt AI as a means of improving our response capabilities, and develop our indigenous defense industries. Such measures will protect our national security, and can spur an upgrading of our industries.

The special defense budget has support from over 60 percent of the public across parties, and has been highly praised in the international community. However, to accomplish this urgent work, a special act must be passed in the Legislative Yuan as soon as possible.

I want to reiterate that we only have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty, and we only have peace insofar as we have strength. We cannot achieve these tasks unless the ruling and opposition parties work together. Political parties can compete, but with regard to matters of national defense – which have a bearing on national security, sovereignty, and our very survival – we need to maintain solidarity and show the world we stand together.

I hope that the ruling and opposition parties can set aside their prejudices and work together. That is the only way to achieve maximum well-being for our society and our people, and the only way to move further ahead with national development.

I also want to emphasize that the CCP's military preparations are for the purpose of fulfilling its goals for authoritarian expansion. Our preparations, in contrast, are for the purpose of defending the peaceful status quo and ensuring our continued survival.

In vigorously pursuing the goal of whole-of-society defense resilience, our government seeks to gather together the power of the people and enable Taiwan to adopt peace as a core value, adopt democracy as a shared conviction, embrace freedom as a way of life, and demonstrate an unyielding determination to accelerate preparatory efforts in every part of society.

In today's meeting, the Ministry of the Interior will brief the public on our plans to build regional disaster relief corridors through international collaboration, and the Executive Yuan will report on plans to enhance the readiness of our Central Joint Emergency Operation Center (CJEOC) to respond to extreme geopolitical risks. The National Security Council (NSC) will then report on the 2026 Urban Resilience Exercises scheduled to begin in April across 11 counties and cities. With this, we aim to impress upon our citizens that "the more prepared we are, the safer we will be," which is the government's core objective in pursuing whole-of-society defense resilience.

Finally, I want to again thank all the advisors and committee members, as well as our nation's citizens, for all they have done to build a safer and more resilient Taiwan. We are able to progress with this work and implement one goal after another precisely because all of you are working hard together. We have laid a more solid foundation for a safer and more stable Taiwan.

II. Confirmation of the Meeting Agenda

Decision: Meeting agenda confirmed.

III. Confirmation of the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee

Decision: Meeting minutes confirmed.

IV. Report Items

1. **Progress on items listed in the sixth WOSDR Committee meeting** (omitted)

   (Presented by Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang)

2. **Overview of current preparations and promotion of the 2026 Urban Resilience Exercises** (omitted)

   (Presented by Lin Fei-fan, Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Council (NSC))

3. **Overview of the drills planned for the 2026 Urban Resilience Exercises by the Central Joint Emergency Operation Center (CJEOC)** (omitted)

   (Presented by Chi Lien-cheng, Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan)

4. **International cooperation in whole-of-society defense resilience: Constructing regional disaster relief corridors** (omitted)

   (Presented by Liu Shyh-fang, Minister of the Interior (MOI))

V. Discussion Items (In Speaking Order)

The aforementioned Report Items 2 to 4 were presented for discussion, with written comments included in the meeting minutes (see Appendix I).

1. **Committee Member Remarks** (Non-government)

(1) Committee Member Bob Hung

1. To respond to changes in the international situation, the information architecture of the CJEOC and the Local Joint Emergency Operation Center should be highly resilient so that the centers can withstand large-scale cyberattacks or attempts by hostile forces to paralyze their systems. Because these systems integrate information from multiple connected information

systems and endpoints, cybersecurity protections should be strengthened across all connected systems and endpoints.

2. To ensure uninterrupted operation of the emergency operation centers and command hubs during emergencies, the following suggestions are made:

(1) Plans should be made for a rapid switch to backup systems in the event of damage to the main system or a communications blackout, and this should be incorporated into annual drills to test system stability and verify the appropriateness of the process planning. Both cloud-based and local backup systems should be built.

(2) In the event of an emergency, personnel may be delayed in taking up their positions at emergency operation centers due to traffic or other conditions, so the government should improve online conferencing and virtual command systems to ensure smooth remote decision-making.

(2) Committee Member Kenny Huang

It is suggested that information and communications technologies be used to diversify risks and enhance the resilience of the command system.

(3) Committee Member Liu Wen

1. Given the recent escalation of geopolitical risks, along with lessons drawn from the experiences of Ukraine and Israel in using mobile apps to send real-time air raid warnings during conflicts, it is suggested that the government integrate existing digital resources (such as the Readiness TW e-APP and the Police Service App) and

upgrade their warning functions to include real-time air raid alerts in addition to push notifications of natural disaster information.

2. In Taiwan's national public safety guide *In Case of Crisis*, the guidance on air raid sheltering focuses heavily on urban environments (such as basement sheltering), making it less applicable to rural areas. It is suggested that relevant ministries and councils assess the need for a guide for rural areas that would provide concrete and feasible sheltering recommendations for areas lacking underground sheltering facilities.

(4) Committee Member Tu Wen-ling (see Appendix I for written comments)

1. In the face of energy security challenges arising from geopolitics, it is suggested that the government study the establishment of a real-time maritime threat monitoring center to systematically monitor maritime route risks and stay up to date on insurance market changes, thereby ensuring national energy stability.

2. It has been observed that the public generally lacks a sense of urgency about the energy crisis triggered by the US–Iran War, mainly because of the relative stability of domestic energy prices due to policy regulation. This has made it difficult for the public to perceive the substantive impact of the international conflict on people's livelihoods. It is suggested that the government take this opportunity to launch public communication efforts and turn geopolitical risk into educational material to strengthen citizens' awareness and psychological preparedness for coping with such situations.

3. It is suggested that the government re-examine resource allocation for industries that consume high amounts of energy and water,

assess the use of pricing mechanisms to reflect actual energy costs and guide industries toward reducing energy consumption, and increase reserves of strategic materials such as natural gas.

(5) Committee Member Tina Lin

1. It is suggested that the government use the impact of the US–Israel–Iran conflict on global energy and transportation security as an opportunity to promote rational communication within society, convey defense concepts to the public, and strengthen the public's psychological resilience and ability to respond during crises.
2. Disasters and emergencies can happen anywhere, not just in the home environment, so defense preparedness in the workplace is also crucial. It is suggested that the government guide private enterprises in implementing workplace response plans and encourage them to participate in the joint Han Kuang and Urban Resilience exercises in August. It is hoped that through simulations and practical drills within enterprises, the task of building whole-of-society defense resilience can be extended from communities to the industrial sector.
3. Disaster Relief Volunteer (DRV) courses have done much to teach members of the public how to help themselves and others in times of emergency. It is suggested that the government also offer advanced DRV courses.

(6) Committee Member Kuo Chia-yo

1. It is suggested that the government include wireless communications equipment in village and neighborhood procurement lists for disaster preparedness and emergency response, and adopt low-cost, high-resilience, low-power, long-

range (LoRa) network technology, using relays to pass transmissions among neighborhoods and thus ensure information and intelligence reporting capabilities.

2. Given that the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) has strong R&D capabilities related to the types of technologies mentioned above, it is suggested that the government consider centralized procurement of related products in order to lower costs and ensure cybersecurity quality. The private sector is currently supporting the Tainan City Government's promotion of wireless networks; if successful, the approach could gradually be extended to other counties and cities.

3. Drawing on the collaborative project between Taiwan's Yilan Senior High School and Norway's Vardø Upper Secondary School, it is suggested that communication resilience education be introduced into schools and grassroots communities, along with hands-on practice to stimulate learners' interest and improve the public's proficiency in operating emergency communications equipment.

(7) Committee Member Tseng Po-yu

The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has required TWSE/TPEx listed companies to submit environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reports starting in 2025. TSMC and the European Union (EU) have respectively included geopolitical risks and energy security in their risk assessments. It is suggested that the government consider incorporating corporate defense resilience into the scope of ESG assessments and use workshops or task forces to focus discussions on relevant indicators and disclosure items, prompting

industries to incorporate national security risks into their core business decisions. It is also suggested that the government provide tax breaks or rewards and incentives to encourage enterprises' proactive involvement.

(8) Committee Member Dai Chen-yu

1. Recent international military conflicts have shown that wartime command and control systems are vulnerable to enemy intrusion, and that IoT devices and surveillance cameras may themselves become tools for the enemy's real-time intelligence gathering. It is suggested that the government take a comprehensive inventory of networking equipment associated with critical infrastructure (CI) and enhance its level of protection to prevent enemy infiltration.
2. It is suggested that the extreme scenario of system paralysis due to a large-scale cyberattack be included in the scenario scripts for the Urban Resilience Exercises, and that cross-ministry response procedures be drawn up to ensure the operational resilience of critical life support systems. It is also suggested that the government study how to effectively counter the spread of disinformation during a network outage and ensure the accurate delivery of government information to villages and neighborhoods.
3. In addition, Taiwan's domestic Internet must maintain normal operations even when all of our international undersea cables have been cut. For example, government websites need to continue issuing information normally, and information systems need to continue handling administrative matters as always. It is suggested that a nationwide loss of international connectivity be included in future resilience exercise scenarios.

(9) Committee Member James Liao

1. Given the recent changes in the international situation and geopolitics, there has been a significant increase in public attention and support for all-out national defense among Taiwanese citizens and overseas Taiwanese businesses. It is suggested that the government seize this opportunity to proactively encourage private enterprises and civil society to take part in defense resilience building.
2. We thank the National Security Council (NSC) for arranging for reserve forces to verify the effectiveness of electronic targets and imitation firearms training. Electronic gun (E-gun) training was shown to be beneficial, so it is suggested that the armed forces further promote such training.
3. Other suggestions include developing an app to scientifically manage the results of citizens' shooting training, studying the possibility of incentive payments to encourage citizens' participation in such training, and conducting media campaigns to create a social atmosphere conducive to all-out defense.

(10) Committee Member Hsiao Hsu-chun

1. Gray-zone aggression can easily generate large numbers of false reports, potentially paralyzing emergency operation centers due to their sheer quantity. It is suggested that the government study the establishment of a standardized intelligence filtering mechanism to guide all frontline units in distinguishing ordinary cybersecurity incidents from hostile wartime attacks, and to implement tiered reporting, thus ensuring that the Central Emergency Operation Center has sufficient processing capacity.

2. It is suggested that intelligence classification and interpretation be incorporated into annual defense drill scenarios to verify the independent operational resilience of units at all levels in the event of information chain disruption or rampant spread of disinformation.

2. Remarks by representatives from the public sector

(1) Wellington L. Koo, Minister of National Defense

1. To deal with the risk of possible network outages during wartime or emergencies, the government should formulate a four-level P.A.C.E. communications redundancy plan consisting of Primary communications, Alternative communications, Contingency communications, and Emergency communications. Using multiple means, the plan would ensure a common operating picture (COP) across the command system and between the military and civilians, maintaining uninterrupted transmission of information and intelligence.

2. For situations involving damage to communications facilities, the key focal points should include “immediate repair” and “backup relay” to strengthen network self-repair and dynamic adjustment capabilities, thus ensuring the maintenance of basic information and communication functions in extreme situations. The feasibility of relevant mechanisms should be verified through annual drills, and the practicality of relevant technologies should be improved through continuous testing.

3. We should promote horizontal communication links to ensure uninterrupted collaboration and reporting through standardized

radio relay mechanisms despite communications disruptions, thus strengthening whole-of-society joint information and communications defense.

(2) Chen Shih-kai, Minister of Transportation and Communications

1. Transportation is central to maintaining normal societal operations. Whether it's for delivering supplies for civilian or military use, a stable transportation system is crucial. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) has established routine planning for the mobilization of transportation vehicles and precautionary evacuation preparations for various tasks of the Central Emergency Operation Center. A key feature of the training and drills over the past two years has been a focus on transforming static planning into practical exercises. The aim is to familiarize all units with extreme scenarios so that in an emergency, all transportation systems can be rapidly activated and response operations carried out.

2. Given that rural areas, outlying islands, and areas with damaged transportation infrastructure often face road closures and difficulties in vehicle dispatching, the MOTC is studying collaboration with Chunghwa Telecom and the Institute of Transportation to deliver emergency medicines and basic supplies by drone, aiming to enhance emergency supply resilience in extreme situations. A field drone drill is planned for this year's (2026) Urban Resilience Exercises.

(3) Kung Ming-hsin, Minister of Economic Affairs

1. The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) has proactively promoted the diversification of energy types and supply regions. To reduce the risk of overconcentration of natural gas sources, imports from safe regions such as Australia will be increased to balance geopolitical risks and ensure transportation security.

2. Given the impact of the international situation, and Taiwan's current high import rate of natural gas for power generation, the MOEA has activated emergency response dispatch measures, prioritizing sufficient supply and stable prices, while maintaining secure reserves in the supply chain, to ensure that electricity supply, downstream industries, and people's basic needs are not affected by international fluctuations.

(4) Chen Junne-jih, Minister of Agriculture

1. To ensure food security resilience, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) has adopted a source diversification strategy for agricultural production inputs such as fertilizers. Stable stocks and imports of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potash fertilizers can be maintained for more than half a year.

2. The MOA has incorporated the concepts of food security resilience and food waste reduction into its food and agriculture education promotion system. Themed seminars and interactive courses are designed for students at every level from elementary school through college and university to strengthen public understanding of agricultural production, healthy diet, and resource scarcity, improve people's ability to reduce consumption and manage

supplies, and build whole-of-society defense resilience from the consumer side.

3. In this year's exercises, the MOA plans to conduct maritime supply transfer and resupply missions to verify the mobility and collaborative effectiveness of logistics transfers in the field.

(5) Shih Chung-liang, Minister of Health and Welfare

1. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) has issued five operational guidelines, including reference guidelines for the setup of first aid stations, and reference guidelines for using underground spaces as alternative medical facilities. A tabletop exercise was conducted on March 11 this year (2026) to verify these guidelines. Observations and expert comments were compiled into revised guidelines to be used as reference for this year's exercises. In addition, field drills will be conducted for the first time on hospital patient load reduction, evacuation preparation, and capacity expansion.

2. The MOHW has proposed a four-year, NT$24 billion national pharmaceutical resilience preparedness program to enhance domestic production capacity and build up safety stocks of key drugs, while continuously monitoring drug supply and planning for drug dispatch, to ensure uninterrupted medical resource supply in emergencies.

3. The MOHW has completed the pilot operation of 13 urgent care centers (UCCs) in the six special municipalities, and verified their substantive medical triage benefits during the Lunar New Year. Subsequently, UCCs may be gradually rolled out in other areas, depending on resource availability, and a unified architecture

template will be developed to integrate information flows on patient numbers and resource dispatch, thus ensuring rapid information sharing among various nodes.

(6) Kuan Bi-ling, Minister of the Ocean Affairs Council

1. The Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) intends to use special budget funds to procure drones and life detectors, which will significantly enhance search and rescue capacities. In addition, the National Academy of Marine Research is planning a Maritime Disaster Relief Volunteer Program, and will establish competency models for marine pollution and chemical disasters and have teams of experts with experience in marine pollution response conduct the training. A total of 41 training sessions have been planned to train over 1,000 professionals in the second half of the year (2026), and an examination system will also be planned. All such efforts aim to facilitate mobilization of civilians in maritime areas.

2. To strengthen international humanitarian assistance capabilities and regional disaster relief corridors, four medical ships from the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) have been equipped for medical treatment in seas with up to a Force 10 storm. In addition to participating in the Han Kuang and Urban Resilience Exercises, the OAC will also test and verify drone applications in real-time disaster relief scenarios and medical evacuation using transport aircraft.

3. The CGA is committed to exposing smuggling and Chinese harassment, as well as enabling its junior officers to communicate more knowledgeably and transparently about

cognitive warfare. By strengthening their public communication abilities, they can more effectively guide public opinion and stabilize public confidence in national defense and maritime law enforcement.

(7) NSC Deputy Secretary-General, Lin Fei-fan

Internet disruption drills, counter-disinformation efforts, and cognitive warfare have been included as important tabletop exercise components for this year. In the future, proactive cross-agency coordination and discussions will be implemented to establish comprehensive response mechanisms.

(8) Minister of the Interior, Liu Shyh-fang

1. Regarding rescue efforts involving international cooperation, Taiwan will share communication methods and information with neighboring countries, leverage vessel support to transport disaster relief personnel, and establish a high-efficiency logistics mechanism, ensuring the rapid delivery of critical resources to Taiwan and thereby enhancing disaster relief efficiency.
2. To promote our national public safety guide, the MOI, along with police and fire departments in various counties and cities, held promotional events in temples. Public enthusiasm for participating in defense issues was successfully increased through varied performances by auxiliary service corps personnel serving as public welfare ambassadors, thereby achieving the goal of having a basic understanding of defense take root at the neighborhood level.

3. DRV training has yielded significant results, with over 114,000 DRVs certified in 2025, and a goal of adding another 100,000 this year, actively integrating the resources of private sector enterprises, religious groups, and non-profit organizations such as the Red Cross. To address external demand for professional skills, conducting advanced DRV training will be explored to enhance the disaster prevention and relief capabilities of all citizens.

4. Considering the potential threat of drones to national security, counter-drone training courses will be evaluated for critical infrastructure operations and maintenance personnel, as well as the Second Special Police Corps.

(9) Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan, Chi Lien-cheng

1. The plan for this year's six-day, three-phase exercises includes carrying out command post relocation operations as well as testing the reliability of hybrid backup mechanisms and the resilience of communication operations in non-standard facility environments. After the command and dispatch system matures, the developmental goal will be to gradually move toward system virtualization and decentralization.

2. The upcoming exercises will simulate a loss of electric power and communications due to an attack on our energy nodes by hostile forces. All county and city governments will be required to participate in security maintenance drills prioritizing first-level critical infrastructure such as medical, energy, and transportation facilities, and including at least one-fourth of such infrastructure, to test and verify local government defense resilience.

3. A project team including academic, industrial, and government institutions has been formed to detect and review critical infrastructure cybersecurity vulnerabilities, actively prevent potential cyber and electronics attacks, introduce counter-drone technology, and build regional joint defense networks. The Executive Yuan will oversee progress in achieving the goal of integrating military and civilian defense capacities.

3. Remarks by Advisor Huoh Shoou-yeh

The focus of local government drills is on training response capabilities and applying for needed resources from the units above them, as well as developing command and dispatch capabilities. Only by thoroughly mastering basic response procedures can they adapt to unscripted situations.

4. Remarks by Deputy Conveners

(1) Deputy Convener, Joseph Wu

1. Exercises have already shifted from pre-set scripts to realistic simulations wherein the tested units, after receiving information, “create something out of nothing” by initiating response procedures; this serves to verify their actual response capabilities. In addition, to strengthen regional coordination mechanisms, this year we will promote a cross-county/city support system incorporating two demonstration areas: Kaohsiung and Pingtung, and New Taipei and Yilan. The plan is to have neighboring counties/cities provide immediate support when a certain county/city is incapacitated by a major disaster, successfully implementing joint regional defense.

2. This year's Urban Resilience Exercises will comprehensively test and verify the status of actual military-civilian integration operations in various domains such as transportation, medical care, evacuation, and strategic communication. The exercises will extract key parameter and scenario information regarding military-civilian integration, and incorporate that information into the Central Joint Emergency Operation Center exercises held in April. Various government agencies, as well as the NSC, will participate in the exercises to ensure that government institutions maintain command resilience during military conflicts or major disasters.

3. Taiwan's experience in building whole-of-society defense resilience has become a focus of international attention. We will continue to strengthen substantive exchanges with neighboring countries and promote Taiwan's practical achievements abroad, establishing a mutual assistance network with the international community.

(2) Deputy Convener, Pan Men-an

1. The Urban Resilience Exercises from April to August this year will break with past models, adopting an unscripted, scientific, "start-from-scratch" approach that reflects realistic scenarios, linking synchronized exercises conducted by the central government, local governments, and the military. When local disaster prevention and relief capacities are insufficient, central government assistance, regional joint defense, and integrated military-civilian response will come into play, thereby achieving this committee's focal points of over a year.

2. Since the 921 Earthquake, Taiwan has received substantial international assistance, boosting our own disaster relief capacities effectively. It is suggested that exit-entry administration and inspection of goods at our airports and seaports be included in the exercises to enhance our ability to receive international aid supplies and personnel.

3. The MOI is to be commended for allocating a budget to assist grassroots communities in setting up information networks, as well as electric power and emergency life support facilities, so that our security net is not limited to the central or local governments and can truly reach the grassroots level.

4. Taking the Fata'an Creek barrier lake incident in Hualien as an example, numerous members of the Auxiliary Service Corps and reservists participated in post-disaster recovery, demonstrating the tremendous resilience of the Taiwanese people. Looking to the future, we expect an even more appropriate allocation and utilization of civilian resources; this is also a core objective behind the founding of this committee.

(3) Deputy Convener, Bi-khim Hsiao

1. Thirty years ago in spring, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election. Looking back, we have collectively experienced major earthquakes such as the 921 Earthquake, the February 2016 earthquake in Tainan, and the April 2024 earthquake in Hualien, as well as challenges stemming from various natural disasters, with Taiwanese society demonstrating a resilient spirit of solidarity and mutual assistance.

Faced with current challenges such as CCP threats and Middle East geopolitics, this committee is proactively preparing to address new types of threats such as internet disruptions, power outages, drone attacks, and cognitive warfare, which could have wide-ranging impacts on people's livelihoods.

2. To ensure smooth communications during emergencies, the government is actively establishing diverse backup routes, and to address the practical application of communication bandwidth, the priority usage order for key areas such as military, medical, financial, and other essential facilities has been prescribed in advance, thereby ensuring the uninterrupted flow of critical information. I also want to thank the private sector for actively initiating drills for communications resilience using wireless and mesh networks, enhancing the development of Taiwan's communications resilience.

3. Regarding the protection of critical infrastructure, the drone application and defense efforts launched this year are just the beginning. Taiwan has a vast array of critical infrastructure that is also highly complex, so in the future, we should continuously revise our defense models on a rolling basis in line with international technological trends. We should also continue leveraging this committee's expertise and international connections to strengthen our defense mechanisms.

4. At this year's Smart City Summit & Expo, experts from industry and academia presented many new ideas on digital and urban resilience, incorporating new technologies into protective actions. Defense resilience is a whole-of-society undertaking, and in

addition to basic preparations by the government, the private sector must also join in and participate. Distributing Taiwan's national public safety guide and promoting DRV training are concrete developments in social participation. The next phase of this work is to take these individual preparations and expand them into communities and enterprises.

5. Defense programs and equipment required for national defense both require financial support. I request that all committee members use their voices to facilitate communication among various sectors and consolidate public support for national defense-related budget and special acts, thereby jointly safeguarding national security.

5. Convener, Lai Ching-te

(1) Responses to Committee Members' and Advisor's Comments

1. The government will study and discuss assisting security personnel with receiving DRV training, which should, in addition to first aid and disaster relief skills, also incorporate functional training in emerging technological applications, with a particular focus on drone operations and counter-drone training. The security industry should collaborate with community management committees to jointly draft dedicated disaster prevention and relief plans, implementing whole-of-society defense resilience at the grassroots level in individual communities and buildings, and achieving the goal of having resilience become deeply rooted in neighborhoods.

2. The NSC will plan a Presidential Cup survival game competition for military reservists. Through regular, non-live-fire contests, the competitors will maintain physical preparedness and military skills.

The NSC will coordinate with local governments to provide venues, encourage reservists from various counties and cities to form teams and participate, integrate military training into daily activities, and through an approach that combines education and entertainment, ensure a rapid transition to combat readiness during emergency mobilization.

(2) Comprehensive Directives

First, I want to thank everyone for their reports, as well as the heads of various ministries and agencies for their responses. I also want to thank our deputy conveners, advisors, and committee members for providing valuable suggestions.

Regarding the promotion of this year's whole-of-society defense resilience efforts, I have three directives:

First, strengthen all exercises to ensure that capacities are well-implemented, precise, and effective

Exercises should closely resemble real-life situations, and not be superficial. As they are carried out, they should have clear divisions of labor and protocol. Their results must have the capacity to be effectively institutionalized, allowing each department to follow standard operating procedures and respond and act quickly in a crisis.

I request that the Executive Yuan urge government units at all levels to hold their exercises in conjunction with exercises conducted by the armed forces to effectively carry out the task of military-civilian integration, because drills should not be a one-time event, but should be institutionalized and normalized.

Through education and training, we must ensure all kinds of departments are capable of enhancing their horizontal and vertical communication capacities so that they can respond quickly in any extreme scenario.

Second, enhance the capacity of the central and local governments to collaborate on defense resilience

To address the tense international situation and the multiple challenges of natural disasters, Taiwan must not only continue to enhance its national defense capabilities, but should also demonstrate whole-of-society defense resilience.

The Executive Yuan and other government agencies are requested to continue playing a role in policy formulation and resource integration, and work with local governments to jointly execute whole-of-society defense resilience tasks.

Taiwan's security is the government's responsibility, as well as a shared mission for all citizens. When the entire nation stands united, with close cooperation between the central and local governments as well as between the government and civil society, and with the participation of all citizens, we can protect our homes and daily lives so that democracy and freedom can continue to develop, and Taiwan can prosper and thrive.

Third, construct regional disaster relief corridors, and strengthen international cooperation and whole-of-society defense networks

Faced with climate change and changes in the regional security landscape, all countries place great emphasis on disaster prevention and relief, as well as humanitarian aid cooperation. Therefore,

constructing regional disaster relief corridors can enhance immediate response and strengthen cross-border support for major disasters. At the same time, building such corridors is a crucial factor in deepening cooperation with Indo-Pacific friends and allies and boosting democratic resilience.

The relevant ministries and agencies are requested to actively strengthen coordination and cooperation with like-minded countries and international partners in accordance with whole-of-society defense resilience policy direction, including discussing the establishment of operational mechanisms for regional disaster relief corridors, and integrating key capacities such as transportation, medical care, supplies, and communications to jointly enhance regional disaster response and security resilience.

The government's goals in implementing whole-of-society defense resilience are clear: ensure that exercises are implemented effectively, that responses are precise, and that the entire population participates. This is the only way that Taiwan can show resilience in the face of adversity and overcome difficulties when challenges arise.

In closing, the administrative team is requested to incorporate all suggestions from today's meeting into subsequent policy considerations, and use an even more active and open attitude in incorporating a broad range of private-sector capacities, so that we can work in solidarity, hand in hand, to safeguard Taiwan's security. Thank you.

VI. Extempore Motions

Proposal I: It is suggested that relevant government agencies collaborate to develop a framework for incorporating whole-of-society defense resilience indicators into the sustainability reports of publicly listed and OTC companies, thereby strengthening the nation's overall operational resilience through public-private cooperation. (Proposed by three committee members including Tseng Po-yu. Appendix not included in the English meeting minutes.)

Proposal II: It is suggested to explore establishing whole-of-society defense resilience coordination guidelines. (Proposed by three committee members including Tseng Po-yu. Appendix not included in the English meeting minutes.)

Proposal III: It is suggested that the relevant ministries and agencies be tasked with conducting logistic and resupply exercises or tabletop exercises for strategic materials (energy). (Proposed by three committee members including Liu Yu-hsi. Appendix not included in the English meeting minutes.)

Resolutions: The Executive Yuan and NSC are requested to take the objectives of the committee members' proposals into consideration and study, discuss, and plan relevant measures for refinement.

VII. Chair's Closing Statement

Deputy conveners, advisors, and committee members: Over the past month, we have seen significant changes in the geopolitical landscape. Authoritarian forces have suffered setbacks, but conflicts have therefore

spread to neighboring countries, impacting energy supplies and economies worldwide. This shows how crises often occur unexpectedly, and the complexity of international politics also proves the importance of whole-of-society defense resilience.

For this year's Urban Resilience Exercises, we have continued to increase the proportion of various conflict scenarios, with the goal of having more citizens understand the work of military-civilian integration. When a threat occurs, military affairs and civilian affairs are inseparable, and all citizens have a role to play in providing assistance and support.

Preparedness in whole-of-society defense resilience is also critical for when we face natural disasters.

Last year, we launched the first-ever service recall for reservists from the Auxiliary Service Corps to support recovery in the Fata'an Creek barrier lake disaster area. We also distributed a new version of the national safety guide to every household so that all of our fellow countrymen understand how to help themselves and others.

I want to thank the various civil society groups who have assisted the government in gradually instilling the concept of resilience, from awareness to action, at the grassroots and neighborhood levels. The government has also gained experience from each disaster and crisis that occurs, revising policies and laws accordingly.

In the future, whole-of-society defense resilience efforts must continue to be institutionalized, establishing shared standards for both the government and private sector to enable close mutual cooperation. Therefore, all ministries and agencies need to consider the roles of various industries during disasters, and promote corresponding training and drills.

In the year ahead, we must continue to translate our current achievements in preparedness into concrete capabilities in response so that every exercise can play a decisive role in critical moments. Let’s move forward hand in hand, and work together. Thank you.

VIII. Meeting End Time: 6:55 p.m.