

Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee

Date: Tuesday, December 23, 2025, 4:00 p.m.

Location: Reception Hall, Office of the President

Chair: Convener Lai Ching-te

Recorder: Ministry of the Interior (MOI)

Attendees: Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao, Deputy Convener Pan Men-an (潘孟安), Deputy Convener Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), Advisor Huoh Shoou-yeh (霍守業), and Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung (林敏雄).

Committee Members: Wellington L. Koo (顧立雄), Kung Ming-hsin (龔明鑫), Chen Shih-kai (陳世凱), Chen Junne-jih (陳駿季), Shih Chung-liang (石崇良), Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), Wang Pao-tzong (王寶宗), James Liao (廖英熙), Chen Hsin-liang (陳信良), Enoch Wu (吳怡農), Kuo Chia-yo (郭家佑), Tseng Po-yu (曾柏瑜), Liu Yu-hsi (劉玉皙), Tu Wen-ling (杜文苓), Hsiao Hsu-chun (蕭旭君) (on leave), Yen Po-wen (顏博文), Hsiao Ya-wen (蕭雅文), Liu Wen (劉文), Bob Hung (洪偉淦), Tina Lin (林雅芳), Kenny Huang (黃勝雄), Wu Jong-shinn (吳宗信), and Dai Chen-yu (戴辰宇).

Non-voting Participants: Executive Secretary Chang Tun-han (張惇涵), Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng (季連成), Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳), Deputy Executive Secretary Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆), Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧), and Minister of Digital Affairs Lin Yi-jing (林宜敬).

I. Chair's Remarks

Today, we are convening the sixth meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. We have used a number of different formats to conduct these meetings since the committee was established.

These activities included tabletop exercises for central and local governments at the Office of the President, field exercises in Tainan City, and an international forum. This afternoon we carried out a resilience consensus building workshop.

I want to thank our three deputy conveners and all the advisors and committee members for their hard work. Moving forward, we will continue our efforts.

As I emphasized at the first committee meeting, the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee is an action committee that should not be confined to fixed formats. We want to gather together our forces – both central and local, public and private – and bring them to bear at the grassroots level, laying down roots in neighborhoods. We need to enable people with all different kinds of expertise to engage with one another, so as to build up societal resilience more broadly and comprehensively.

We have therefore taken many steps to integrate systems, policies, and resources. Our intention is to ensure that the government and all sectors of society can work in close coordination. At the same time, we actively engage with our friends and allies to ensure that Taiwan can play an indispensable role in the global democratic defense network.

At today's meeting our MOI, Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), and Ministry of Digital Affairs will report on the results of work done in the five key areas, including “civilian

force training and utilization.” We have also invited Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng to speak on practical experience and improvement measures related to disaster relief work in Hualien.

In addition, at today’s resilience consensus building workshop, I invited our advisors and committee members to provide recommendations for improvements regarding the five key areas. I look forward to more thorough discussions as this meeting proceeds. But before we begin, I want to share four points with the people of Taiwan.

First, Taiwan has met with several major natural disasters this year that have resulted in many casualties and damage to infrastructure. However, as we have all witnessed, our people have withstood the disasters with unwavering perseverance.

Rescue workers and troops showed up immediately. The central government responded without delay. Construction crews worked day and night to complete urgently needed repairs. Civil society groups raced to provide support. Many individuals – superheroes of disaster relief – came from around the country and from all walks of life to help. Such acts highlighted the spirit of unity and mutual help that is so characteristic of Taiwan, and truly demonstrated the power of whole-of-society defense resilience. What I want to say is that the spirit of Taiwan is a spirit of unity.

Second, last Friday’s indiscriminate attack in Taipei shocked Taiwanese society and resulted in severe injuries and deaths. The central and local governments as well as medical institutions all responded promptly to the incident.

I want to emphasize once more that protecting the people’s safety is the government’s fundamental responsibility. I hope that, with this incident in mind, the central and local governments can

demonstrate Taiwan's spirit of unity by jointly conducting a review, taking corrective actions, establishing systems, and continuing to improve incident response capabilities, so that we can quickly deal with crises and together protect the safety of our citizens.

Third, China continues to ratchet up its threats against Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region in an attempt to change democratic Taiwan into "Taiwan, China." This is a serious threat to our national sovereignty and national security. And beyond that, it is a blatant provocation directed at the community of free and democratic nations around the globe.

Last month I held a press conference right here, where I announced two national security action plans to safeguard democratic Taiwan and proposed an eight-year, NT\$1.25 trillion special defense budget. Today, speaking via live broadcast, I want to assure my fellow citizens once again of the following: Taiwan intends to vigorously develop its defense industry and comprehensively strengthen its national defense capabilities in order to demonstrate to the world that it is determined to defend itself and maintain the status quo.

Fourth, we know that achieving defense resilience involves more than just being militarily prepared, strengthening social systems, and improving infrastructure; more importantly, awareness must be raised throughout society.

The more prepared we are, the safer we will be. That is why our government this year published "Taiwan's National Public Safety Guide" and distributed it throughout the nation. We wanted citizens to have a booklet in hand that would provide guidelines on how to respond to all kinds of challenges, and would remind people what they need to do in advance to improve their

emergency response preparedness. The guide also encourages readers to take an active part in civil defense work and help to strengthen Taiwan's ability to respond with resilience to challenges.

Finally, I again want to thank you all for generously contributing your expertise and enthusiasm, as well as your time and effort, to this undertaking. In the effort to build up whole-of-society defense resilience, we have pooled our collective wisdom, built consensus, and promoted more concrete and more practical action plans.

Our achievements belong not just to the committee, but to all our nation's citizens. Let us continue to work hard together and further enhance our whole-of-society defense resilience.

II. Confirmation of the Meeting Agenda

Decision: Meeting agenda confirmed.

III. Report Items

1. Report on 2025 results in five key areas

(1) Key Area 1: Civilian force training and utilization

(omitted)

(Presented by Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang)

(2) Key Area 2: Strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution (omitted)

(Presented by Minister of Agriculture Chen Junne-jih and Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin)

(3) Key Area 3: Energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance (omitted)

(Presented by Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin)

(4) Key Area 4: Social welfare, medical care, and evacuation

facility readiness (omitted)

(Presented by Minister of Health and Welfare Shih Chung-liang)

(5) Key Area 5: Information, transportation, and financial network protection (omitted)

(Presented by Minister of Digital Affairs Lin Yi-jing)

2. Relief efforts for the Fata'an Creek barrier lake disaster and pathways to improving resilience measures (omitted)

(Presented by Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng)

IV. Discussion Items (In Speaking Order)

Proposal to discuss group outcomes of resilience consensus building workshop.

1. Group Representative Remarks

(1) Key Area 1: Civilian force training and utilization
(Committee Member Liu Wen, group representative)

1. When a major disaster occurs, large numbers of civilians may rush to the area to assist with relief efforts, but information asymmetry may make it difficult to dispatch these volunteers. It is suggested to develop an integrated platform incorporating functions such as volunteer registration, task matching, and a QR code to scan for insurance purposes to coordinate and manage civilian volunteer capabilities more effectively.
2. To fully leverage community strength, it is suggested to expand the scope of certification for T-CERTs (Taiwan Community Emergency Response Teams) and optimize T-CERTs' organizational and operational mechanisms.

3. Based on observations from the Fata'an Creek incident, low efficiency in the initial post-disaster response was mainly due to information asymmetry and decision-making gaps between grassroots and senior officials.
 - (1) To resolve this structural problem, it is suggested that the Executive Yuan establish a standard operating procedure for decision-making and communication in the initial post-disaster period (6 to 8 hours), and clarify the authority and responsibilities of the central and local governments, thereby reducing the costs of organizational coordination and friction, and improving response efficiency.
 - (2) The organizational resilience of coordination centers for disaster prevention at the township, town, city, and district levels should be strengthened, using practical drills and evaluations to ensure that grassroots staff possess standardized emergency response awareness and operational capabilities.
4. To address complex natural disasters and deliberate attacks, the government should establish a multi-level platform for unified disaster reports. That platform could quickly identify sensitive incidents such as a security threat on the Taipei MRT as a public security incident or a terror attack. That would eliminate information gaps, ensure the clarity and consistency of information flows, and prevent manipulation through disinformation and cognitive warfare that leverages uncertainty, thereby quelling social panic and achieving the goal of reassuring the public.
5. Although the widely distributed "Taiwan's National Public Safety Guide" has already established a basic understanding and response framework among the public regarding whole-

of-society defense resilience, physical preparedness should advance in tandem. It is suggested that the government allocate a special budget to assist grassroots service points at the village and neighborhood levels in acquiring sufficient emergency medical equipment, prioritizing tourniquets and automated external defibrillators (AEDs). This would aid the promotion of practical first aid education at the local level while also making life-saving efforts more effective during the critical initial stages of an emergency or crisis.

(2) Key Area 2: Strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution (Committee Member Tu Wen-ling, group representative)

1. To enhance food resilience, Taiwan should actively build a flexible food supply system.
 - (1) The market share of domestically produced grains and other agricultural products should be expanded through food and agricultural education and procurement incentives, gradually reducing reliance on external sources. We should continue to promote the diversification of imported food sources to mitigate geopolitical risks, and also conduct regular, dynamic inventories of strategic staples that are highly dependent on imports, such as soybeans, wheat (flour), and edible oils.
 - (2) In the event of a state of emergency, the government should possess the legal basis and capacity to intervene in distribution using public authority, and rapidly release strategic reserves to certified critical food processing plants to ensure precise resource allocation and reassure the public.
2. In an emergency, the potential disruption of household energy supplies may make cooking impossible. It is therefore suggested that local governments plan institutional catering

or communal meal services, and encourage the public to prepare go bags and household food reserves, including ready-to-eat rations, canned goods, and drinking water, as well as portable gas stoves as backup heat sources. Such measures would alleviate the pressure on government resource allocation in the initial post-disaster period.

3. Currently, legally designated daily necessities are limited to rice, cooking oil, salt, and liquefied petroleum gas. However, when a disaster occurs, public demand often shifts toward immediate-consumption items such as instant noodles, vegetables, and fruits. It is suggested that the government reevaluate the scope of the official emergency supply list. In an emergency, rather than relying solely on existing public rationing stations, it is suggested to incorporate private retail channels such as convenience stores, supermarkets (e.g., PX Mart), and hypermarkets to build a diversified logistics and distribution network.

(3) Key Area 3: Energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance (Committee Member Tu Wen-ling, group representative)

1. To strengthen the protective resilience of critical infrastructure, personnel risk literacy and response capabilities should be enhanced. These capacities should be strengthened through practical drills to verify notifications, personnel deployment, and operational continuity plans. In peacetime, stress tests and scenario simulations should be conducted to improve threat awareness and decision-making abilities under extreme pressure.
2. Diversified energy storage deployment and energy dispatch infrastructure

- (1) In addition to strengthening the power grid, it is suggested to increase deployment of energy storage equipment such as microgrids, mobile power sources with water storage capabilities, and hydrogen fuel cells, and promote energy self-generation for self-consumption to diversify management risks and expand energy resilience.
- (2) Clearly define the order of priority and mechanisms for energy supply-and-demand adjustments to ensure uninterrupted water and electricity supply to critical facilities, such as medical facilities, during emergencies.
3. Due to Taiwan's limited land area, if all critical energy facilities are concentrated domestically, they will inevitably become priority targets for enemy attacks. To ensure energy resilience, it is suggested to leverage the power of international alliances to establish cooperative mechanisms for energy storage and transportation to diversify risks.
- (4) Key Area 4: Social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facility readiness (Committee Member Hsiao Ya-wen, group representative)**
 1. Further improvement of the medical preparedness plan
 - (1) Due to a lack of buy-in for the overall plan among frontline healthcare personnel, willingness to participate in drills is low, which impacts the effectiveness of resilience building. It is suggested that the government reassess the medical preparedness plan, and clearly define the tasks, communication channels, and information flows at each level to ensure that all response personnel can grasp the overall tactical picture, and thus know what to do, and when and where to do it, thereby improving their willingness to participate and their response efficiency.

- (2) In the past, vertical and horizontal communication across units within the healthcare system (MOHW, local health bureaus, and health centers) often faced information bottlenecks or disruptions. It is suggested that the revised medical preparedness plan clearly define the communication channels and information flows at each level, and that such communication mechanisms be included as core verification objectives in future exercises. The seamless operation of the command system must be ensured through live exercises, iterative testing, and the elimination of obstacles.
2. Establish a platform for collaboration and volunteer management across government agencies
 - (1) Currently, most disaster shelters and relief stations are set up in schools, yet the Ministry of Education (MOE) has not been deeply involved, making it difficult to integrate school facilities and personnel. In addition, there is a lack of a centralized coordination mechanism for community clinics, pharmacies, and professional volunteers. It is suggested that a cross-agency collaboration platform be established, and that the MOE be required to participate in medical preparedness initiatives at school sites.
 - (2) The Taiwan Medical Association should coordinate the incorporation of grassroots clinics and community pharmacies into formal organizational units. A platform for professional mobile volunteer management should also be established to turn voluntary private sector professional personnel into a deployable and effective operational force.
3. In the current response framework, urgent care centers are not clearly positioned, and there is a lack of operation guidelines for transitioning from normal status to disaster

status, or peacetime to wartime. It is suggested that urgent care centers be incorporated into the resilience framework as soon as possible, the division of labor among urgent care centers, health centers, and hospitals responsible for emergency care be clearly defined, and standard operating procedures be established to clarify the activation timing and cooperation models under different emergency situations, serving as a flexible medical response solution.

4. Transportation networks may be disrupted during wartime or disasters. The government should pre-plan alternative transportation and supply routes for instances when major delivery routes are compromised to ensure that critical medical supplies can still reach the frontlines, even in extreme circumstances.

(5) Key Area 5: Information, transportation, and financial network protection (Committee Member Kenny Huang, group representative)

1. Undersea cables are a critical vulnerability within Taiwan's physical and digital infrastructure, as they are highly susceptible to being severed by the enemy during wartime, leading to external connection and signal interruptions that could isolate the island. It is therefore suggested that the government integrate land, sea, air, and satellite resources and establish a backup mechanism with diversified transmission pathways. Maximum transmission capacity could be maintained during peacetime, and alternative solutions, such as satellite or microwave transmissions, should be in place to ensure baseline network connectivity if undersea cables are compromised during wartime.

2. Considering that wartime cyberattacks may cause widespread paralysis through lateral movement and vertical privilege escalation, resulting in significant damage, it is suggested to make a comprehensive inventory of core functions and critical infrastructure, prioritize operations and maintenance based on the extent of social impact due to facility failure, and actively promote the localization of operations for data centers and critical systems to ensure normal operations for domestic facilities and systems even in the event of an international internet outage.
3. Cybersecurity attacks often exploit the “weakest link” theory, breaching poorly defended points to attack more secure facilities. Currently, defensive capabilities vary across sectors, making uneven protection a major vulnerability in the overall line of defense. It is suggested that the government formulate common cybersecurity standards and sector-specific protection guidelines to raise the overall security threshold while operationalizing a joint cybersecurity defense mechanism.
4. It is suggested to establish a cybersecurity personnel database categorized by suitability, competencies, and capacity, and plan an emergency personnel deployment mechanism to mitigate potential staffing shortages in emergency situations.

2. Supplementary Committee Member Remarks (Non-government)

Committee Member Kuo Chia-yo made the following suggestions regarding the Urban Resilience Exercises and the recent security incident on the Taipei MRT:

- (1) Although the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) is designated as critical infrastructure, its involvement in the

2025 Urban Resilience Exercises was limited in scope to the “physical security level,” consisting primarily of Ministry of National Defense briefings or drills tailored solely to security personnel. It is suggested that the scope be expanded in the future to include all core and non-core personnel within the organization. Through full personnel participation, resource deployment and emergency response procedures could be validated to ensure the organization’s overall operational resilience in wartime or disaster situations.

- (2)** Review and suggestions regarding the recent Taipei MRT security incident
 1. At the time of the incident, the public and passengers at nearby stations (such as Zhongshan Station) did not receive any warnings, indicating a serious information gap in the current public early warning mechanism.
 2. It is suggested to refer to the tiered notification system established after the 2017 London Bridge terror attack, where real-time warnings would be issued via MRT station screens, scrolling displays, and SMS messages when an incident occurs.
 3. Drawing on the experiences of Ukraine and Israel, a government emergency response chatbot should be developed. This would allow the public to not only passively receive information, but also actively inquire about guidelines for taking shelter in the moment, thus resolving the problem of information chaos at the scene.
- (3)** It is suggested that the government act as a bridge for technological exchanges between Taiwanese private military and drone companies and the United States, accelerating cooperation in areas such as AI and drone technology.

3. Government Representative Remarks

(1) Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang

1. To resolve the issue of inconsistent decision-making and response capabilities within the disaster relief command system, amendments to the Disaster Prevention and Response Act will be discussed to establish the position of a disaster prevention chief at the township, town, city, and district office levels. In principle, the position would be held by a civil servant (such as the chief secretary of the respective office) to ensure professional continuity and administrative consistency in the command and dispatch functions, increasing the resilience of the grassroots command system.
2. For compound disasters, the traditional top-down command model may be too slow to meet urgent needs. Therefore, next year, the National Fire Agency (NFA) will expand the participation of civil disaster relief resources to assist disaster prevention coordination centers in integrating civilian resources, including disaster relief volunteers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), nonprofit organizations, and the nation's armed forces. It will also promote a bottom-up resource-sharing mechanism to ensure that every village and neighborhood is equipped with decentralized, independent operational and handling capabilities across each stage, from prevention and preparedness to response and reconstruction.
3. To improve the quality of grassroots disaster prevention and relief personnel, the MOI will continue to enhance the professional training of disaster relief volunteers and alternative military service personnel, and through regular drills, improve their skills to assist in the execution of duties,

strengthen the team cohesion of alternative service personnel, and deeply cultivate grassroots civilian defense capabilities.

(2) Minister of Agriculture Chen Junne-jih

1. Compared to the traditional food self-sufficiency rate index, whole-of-society defense resilience focuses more on food security reserves, namely ensuring an uninterrupted supply of essential commodities at critical times. The MOA has continued to inventory various strategic materials to ensure sufficient stockpiles and capacity, prioritizing emergency survival needs.
2. Regarding the distribution of supplies, a three-tiered system of “grain storage facilities → supply stations → rationing stations” has been established. Supplies are moved from grain storage facilities to supply stations, which then extend to private retail channels (e.g., PX Mart and convenience stores) for rationed distribution.
3. In times of war or disaster, water and power outages may prevent people from cooking. The government has already requested manufacturers to develop ready-to-eat products and promoted the inclusion of such foods in personal go bags. In addition, disaster preparedness reserves will be incorporated into corporate ESG indicators to encourage companies to establish independent food reserves.
4. When the country faces an emergency, disasters will be classified as “regional” or “national” based on the scenario and scale. If it is regional, a cross-county/city dispatch response will be adopted. For example, Pingtung County assisted with relief during the recent barrier lake disaster in Hualien. If it is a national disaster of extended duration where

market mechanisms risk failure, the government will invoke its public authority to intervene and carry out a unified rationing system for centralized distribution.

5. For areas prone to disasters or transportation disruptions, cooperative efforts have already been made with local government heads to set up storage facilities and pre-position stockpiles locally. This ensures that when transportation is cut off and pockets of isolation are formed, there will still be adequate supplies to sustain those areas' populations without the need to wait for external aid.

(3) Minister of Economic Affairs Kung Ming-hsin

1. To verify the operational capacities of private distribution channels in emergency situations, the government has gradually been conducting data linkage tests with private operators. Next year, plans prioritize conducting live-field exercises regarding supply distribution and rationing in cooperation with PX Mart. Based on the results of the exercises, this model will be extended to other chain convenience stores and supermarkets to build a dense, digitally resilient, and diversified supply distribution network.
2. To cope with emergencies involving electricity or gas outages, the government will advise the public to prepare their own portable gas stoves to buy time for power restoration. If the restoration time is prolonged, the government will consider implementing mass catering or communal kitchens to resolve the public's dining needs.
3. Regarding the national energy security strategy, the government has routinely implemented plans to diversify energy import sources and decentralize energy storage. In the

future, it will consider how to cooperate with friendly neighboring countries to establish joint energy dispatch and emergency mutual assistance mechanisms.

(4) Minister of Health and Welfare Shih Chung-liang

1. To ensure uninterrupted medical capacity during disasters, a resilient medical system has been planned to form a close-knit regional care network.
 - (1) Tier 1, Core Hospitals: Composed of 51 hospitals with heavy emergency care responsibilities whose goal is to maintain operations independently for 72 hours, with 10% to 30% of their capacity reserved for critical care.
 - (2) Tier 2, Community and Regional Hospitals: Composed of approximately 200 community and regional hospitals, responsible for extended care and patient transfers.
 - (3) Tier 3, Emergency Shelter Points: Composed of 372 health centers and primary care clinics, establishing 500 first aid stations and over 4,000 shelters (on a village/neighborhood unit basis), responsible for treating minor injuries.

In addition, the armed forces' forward surgical teams and Backup Operation Room Project promoted by the MOHW will handle frontline emergency response operations, ensuring the seamless integration of the overall mechanism.

2. A review of the current energy resilience of medical institutions indicates that approximately 65% of hospitals can maintain power for 72 hours; however, most still rely on diesel generation, posing a high risk of fuel supply interruption. To strengthen the stability of life support systems, in 2026 the MOHW, in collaboration with the MOEA, will seek to introduce new, high-efficiency

alternative energy solutions, reducing dependence on fossil fuels and ensuring that medical facilities can continue operating in extreme situations.

3. Drawing on our experience from the Fata'an Creek incident, to protect the rights and interests of volunteers, we will launch an instant QR-code insurance enrollment system wherein the Financial Supervisory Commission will assist volunteers in adding coverage within 24 hours. In 2026, plans will be made to set up a cloud-based medical supply and personnel dispatch system, integrating logistical, medical, and scheduling information to facilitate command and dispatch operations.
4. Referring to the suggestions from committee members, education and training will be dedicated to building a clear operational picture, ensuring that all personnel have a complete understanding before deployment. In terms of basic community resilience, we will plan subsidies to equip 8,000 neighborhoods across Taiwan with basic medical supplies such as AEDs, and comprehensively promote CPR and AED training to realize bottom-up self-help and mutual aid capabilities.

(5) Minister of Digital Affairs Lin Yi-jing

1. To guard against the risk of foreign hostile forces implanting Trojan horses or backdoors through system back ends during peacetime and fully activating them during wartime, continuous scanning and testing of critical systems should be conducted in peacetime to remove latent malware. In emergency situations where comprehensive prevention is impossible, physical network isolation should be adopted as

a response to directly sever external connections, ensuring that core data is neither leaked nor compromised.

2. If a foreign force launches a full-scale cyberattack, bandwidth and response personnel will be limited, making it difficult to provide a comprehensive response at the first moment. Therefore, wartime processing priority for each system should be determined first, and then assistance from national security units should be requested to help set clear wartime cybersecurity scenarios. By making dynamic adjustments based on demand, personnel and resources can be allocated appropriately to ensure the operation of core command and life support systems.
3. Considering the shortage of high-level cybersecurity personnel within the government, while Taiwan's private software and cybersecurity industries have strong technical capabilities, the government should proactively identify private-sector cybersecurity experts. This will ensure that during emergencies, top private-sector cybersecurity teams can be quickly and legally mobilized and integrated into the armed forces' defense system.

(6) Minister of National Defense Wellington L. Koo

1. Currently, the list of legally designated daily necessities is limited to rice and cooking oil, which would likely be insufficient to meet diverse wartime needs. It is suggested that we sign open contracts with private retailers and convenience stores to expand the scope of daily necessities to include other essential food items and supplies. In wartime, public authorities could intervene and utilize private logistics channels to distribute rations. Furthermore, to avoid insufficient staffing in the distribution process, a

plan should be drawn up to integrate logistics channel staff into the operational system to ensure a smooth rationing mechanism.

2. Shelters and disaster relief stations are mostly set up in schools; however, schools often lack independent energy and water supplies, and thus face the same predicaments as medical institutions. It is suggested that the MOEA assist schools in enhancing their energy storage, power generation, and water storage capacities to ensure that disaster relief stations can maintain a certain level of self-sufficiency over a certain period, even when external supplies are cut off.
3. Regarding reserve mobilization, although a national defense mobilization information integration system has already been established, the accuracy of the data still requires improvement. Relevant units will be tasked with identifying improvements to ensure the system's capability for accurate mobilization of human and material resources. Only then will we be able to make use of the system in times of emergency.

(7) Chen Shih-kai, Minister of Transportation and Communications (MOTC)

1. The MOTC has formulated resilience plans for maintaining land, sea, and air transport operations during critical times, and has now entered the quantitative inventory-taking stage. Such plans and actions seek to accurately grasp the surplus capacity and flexibility of particular transport systems in order to ensure that in emergencies, transport systems can provide cross-system support to maintain the operation of the nation's basic transportation backbone.
2. Modern rail transport is highly dependent on electricity, so a power grid failure can lead to system shutdown. The Taiwan Railways Corporation has completed a stocktaking of diesel locomotives and

has prepared sufficient diesel fuel for operation. For example, in 2025 when the Hualien power grid was damaged in a typhoon, power restoration should have taken one to two days. But with diesel locomotives running station-to-station connections, it only took two hours to restore the system's operations. This demonstrates that retaining non-electric means of transport and conducting drills is one solution to enhance overall transportation resilience in emergencies.

3. To prevent the failure of the public transport command system due to communications disruptions, we have completed the stocktaking and deployment of backup communications systems. Taking the Freeway Bureau as an example, since building its own fiber optic transmission network, the normal operation of the traffic control center can be maintained through a redundant communications system, even without satellite phones.

(8) Kuan Bi-ling, Minister of Ocean Affairs Council (OAC)

1. Integrating the Coast Guard into the land-based disaster prevention and relief system
 - (1) In the past, the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) was limited to maritime search and rescue, and did not undertake land-based disaster relief tasks. However, the CGA did take part in relief work after the Fata'an Creek barrier lake disaster. On that occasion, the CGA successfully conducted coastal search and rescue and provided support in disaster-stricken areas for the first time without affecting its statutorily mandated operations.
 - (2) With its numerous inspection offices throughout Taiwan, the Coast Guard is frequently in position to provide support from near the scene of a disaster. In the future, following the model of fire agencies, the Coast Guard could be integrated into the land-based disaster prevention and relief system, providing professional assistance while at the same time ensuring that such participation does not detract from its preparedness to perform the duties assigned to it by law.

- (3) In addition to continuing the Coast Guard's involvement in shore-based disaster relief and material transportation, its assets such as drones, life detectors, and mobile rescue vehicles could be incorporated into the national disaster relief resource database to enhance overall defense resilience.
2. Actively studying international practices, the CGA plans to establish a standardized "maritime mobilization mechanism" to expand the scope of mobilization to include the fisheries, marine engineering, and shipping industries. In the event of a large-scale maritime disaster or war, would quickly mobilize civilian maritime transportation and engineering capacities to carry out public-private collaboration in disaster preparedness and response.

(9) Chi Lien-cheng, Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan

1. Regarding the incident of violence in the Taipei Metro system, a review meeting was convened as instructed by the premier, resulting in the following findings:
 - (1) The Taipei Main Station, Taipei Metro, and the National Police Agency had all deployed comprehensive surveillance systems (namely closed-circuit television, CCTV). However, the lack of a single unit integrating intelligence had led to fragmented information, hindering command and decision-making. Future efforts will focus on building a cross-unit information integration mechanism.
 - (2) The primary objectives in dealing with violent incidents are to strengthen monitoring at the scene and provide real-time alarm mechanisms, improve the timeliness of intelligence integration, strengthen public security through rapid response, joint defense, and investigation mechanisms, and strengthen social resilience and establish institutionalized crisis response procedures. The nature of an incident must be quickly determined as either a routine public security incident or a terrorist attack, and on that basis it must be decided which

command level to activate and what actions to take. This approach will ensure that correct decisions are made.

2. In 2026, Urban Resilience Exercises will focus on work in the five key areas and on integrating military and civilian efforts. The exercises will abandon scripted performances in favor of realistic capability validation. The coming Urban Resilience Exercises will emphasize verification of, under extreme scenarios, the feasibility of counties and cities providing each other with coordination and material support; and the efficiency achieved by integrating command mechanisms. The Urban Resilience Exercises will allow for the stocktaking and strengthening of real-world defense resilience between county and city governments.
3. In response to non-conventional security threats such as drones, the government has launched a critical infrastructure protection plan covering key facilities in sectors such as energy, finance, and communications.

4. Advisors' Remarks

(1) Advisor Huoh Shoou-yeh

1. Risks in critical sectors such as people's daily necessities, energy, and healthcare should not be treated uniformly. It is suggested that we clearly distinguish between three scenarios, namely "sudden emergencies," "local short-term disasters" (such as typhoons, train derailments, and 3- to 7-day power outages), and "long-term, comprehensive war conditions." Different response strategies should be developed for each scenario to ensure the feasibility of the plan and enhance the practicality of defense resilience.
2. The MOHW required large and medium-sized hospitals in various regions to establish dedicated on-duty teams and prepare medical equipment for chemical, biological, and general disasters involving mass casualties, and to establish a "year-round, always-on-call"

combat readiness mechanism, ensuring that medical teams can immediately deploy to the front lines for disaster relief upon the occurrence of a disaster.

3. The next stage of enhancing social defense resilience hinges on local implementation.

(1) To date, central ministries' top-level planning under the Committee has been quite thorough. The key to the next stage lies in local implementation. To avoid a situation in which local governments are overly reliant on the central government in times of crisis, it is suggested that we refer to the experience of the 19th Han Kuang Exercise of 2003 in promoting live exercises by local governments.

(2) We should focus on training local governments to exercise inventory and command over the police, fire, and medical facilities (including clinics) within their jurisdictions, and to establish detailed resource lists and standard operating procedures. This would enable grassroots entities to independently solve problems and maintain operations using local resources, even when communications are disrupted or central government support is unavailable.

(2) Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung

Whenever needed by the nation, PX Mart and its outlets and logistics system across Taiwan will cooperate fully with government operations and resource allocation.

5. Deputy Conveners' Remarks

(1) Deputy Convener Joseph Wu

1. Having been established for over a year, the Committee has successfully advanced resilience preparedness from verbal discussions to action and implementation through diverse methods, such as field exercises, international forums, and workshops. Through hands-on

operations, it has pragmatically identified shortcomings and blind spots, making operations more focused and effective.

2. The Committee has gradually expanded from its initial “whole-of-government” phase to a true “whole-of-society” approach. In the face of natural disasters, war, or other events, only when every citizen understands “what to do and when” can a force capable of stabilizing society emerge during crises. The government has shown its commitment to developing the public’s ability to collectively build a social safety net by disseminating the all-out defense manual entitled “In Case of Crisis: Taiwan’s National Public Safety Guide,” encouraging people to prepare go bags for use in disaster prevention and evacuation, and making improvements in the five key areas, which include energy and healthcare.
3. The Committee will gradually review high-complexity scenarios and test them through drills to find solutions. The 2026 Han Kuang Exercises will be combined with the Urban Resilience Exercises, with emphasis on verifying the adequacy of joint central-local response mechanisms for civilian evacuation, medical care, transportation, and other areas.
4. In addition, future disaster relief operations and tabletop exercise outcomes should be systematically compiled and disseminated to all society. Given that Taiwan’s exercise experience is forward-looking and of interest to many countries, we will continue to invite international experts for exchanges and experience sharing in order to build closer international defense partnerships.

(二) 潘副召集人孟安

(2) Deputy Convener Pan Men-an

1. In building whole-of-society defense resilience, cybersecurity and communications are of paramount importance. If cybersecurity is breached or communications are disrupted, accurate information will

be not be able to be disseminated, and foreign forces, in cooperation with domestic collaborators, could wage cyberattacks and cognitive warfare to confuse the public. If communications networks get cut or information is manipulated, leading to a financial system collapse, it would cause public instability and social unrest, which could pose an even greater threat than the physical destruction of war itself.

2. When planning distribution stations, the “one village/neighborhood, one station” approach should not be rigidly adhered to. Rather, distribution station locations should be planned rationally and appropriately adjusted to local conditions, based on differences in population density and geographic coverage, ensuring that people can access essential resources within a reasonable distance and timeframe, thus strengthening the social and psychological defense line from the ground up.
3. It is suggested that we incorporate the education system into the operation framework of the whole-of-society defense resilience.
 - (1) Schools, located in townships across Taiwan and adjacent to communities, serve as key nodes for building a social safety net. In recent years, the government has actively implemented seismic reinforcement of school buildings and constructed independent photovoltaic microgrid systems in conjunction with green energy policies, enabling schools to serve as resilient disaster preparedness hubs.
 - (2) The education system possesses high-quality organizational and mobilization capabilities, and has educational personnel readily available as well as high-quality civilian defense human resources. Therefore, it was suggested that the education system be formally incorporated into the whole-of-society defense resilience operation framework so that schools can quickly convert into energy self-sufficient shelters and relief centers during emergencies.

4. Although the Taipei MRT security incident was a single public safety case, it serves as an important alert about the need for the protection of critical infrastructure.
 - (1) The Taipei Metro is not a military facility, but it is situated in a densely populated area. If a future incident, instead of being a “lone-actor attack,” were to involve “organized, cross-regional coordinated actions,” it would trigger significant social panic.
 - (2) Considering the fact that a non-conventional yet critical location like the Taipei Metro does face the possibility of such escalated risks, in addition to strengthening on-site response, it is necessary to re-examine the metro system’s information backbone and cybersecurity mechanisms to ensure that command and communications remain resilient in crises and are not paralyzed by a single point of failure.
- (3) Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao**
 1. Due to its geographically isolated location, aging population, and unique local governance environment, Hualien County has faced highly complex challenges in disaster relief. Special thanks to Minister without Portfolio Chi for his crucial role in comprehensively planning and directing operations during the Fata’an Creek disaster. He served as a key coordinator, enabling smooth communication and coordination between military-civilian, cross-agency, and multi-level parties.
 2. Today, several Committee Members suggested better utilization of civilian forces. Future efforts to enhance whole-of-society defense resilience should leverage emerging technologies. For example, integrating technologies and experience from private enterprises (e.g., the logistics sector) into a whole-of-society information platform to build a system integrating supplies, missions, expertise, and real-time field information. This would enable contributing members to

understand their roles and allow the government to make appropriate deployments and arrangements based on the actual situation.

3. The high demand for Disaster Relief Volunteer (DRV) training courses demonstrated strong public support for whole-of-society defense. It is suggested that DRV training courses be further expanded. In addition, the efforts of Deputy Secretary General Lin of the National Security Council in disseminating the booklet entitled “In Case of Crisis – Taiwan’s National Public Safety Guide,” and the strategy of Minister of the Interior Liu of conducting outreach efforts at major temples and shrines around Taiwan have both won support for the idea that “Only by preparing for war can we avoid it.” However, some people still misunderstand or misinterpret civil defense work. Committee members are requested to help strengthen public communication, conveying correct defense concepts to the public, correcting biased narratives, and preventing erroneous perceptions from undermining public confidence.
4. The Fata’an Creek disaster and Taipei Metro incident demonstrate that the existing social defense system is under pressure from compound risks. To strengthen societal resilience, not only should there be rolling reviews of the defense network’s vulnerabilities, but also the competent authorities in charge of critical infrastructure should establish a high-frequency, small-scale field exercise mechanism. By simulating real-world scenarios to identify blind spots, response standards can be revised to ensure the effective operation of the defense system.
5. There have been recent incidents abroad involving aviation cyberattacks, navigation signal jamming, gray-zone interference, etc. Taiwan faces similar potential risks. We should continue monitoring these international cases and update our response procedures accordingly. Furthermore, whole-of-society defense resilience is an international concern, and many countries are willing to help Taiwan.

In the future, we should consider how to align international expert insights and resources with Taiwan's actual needs and thereby spur broader participation from society.

6. Convener Lai Ching-te

(1) Responses to Committee Members' and Advisors' Comments

1. All ministries and councils are requested to evaluate the suggestions from the workshop and incorporate them into planning for subsequent exercises.
2. Relevant units are requested to incorporate the suggestions made by Committee Member Kuo regarding "company-wide drills (including non-security personnel)" and "technology connections" into subsequent planning.

(2) Comprehensive Directives

I want to thank all the Deputy Conveners, Advisors, and Committee Members for their valuable feedback today. Thanks also to the heads of relevant central government agencies, as well as Minister without Portfolio Chi, for their reports.

After more than one year, our efforts in whole-of-society defense resilience have strengthened connections between the central government and local entities, deepened the diversity of dialogues between Taiwan and the international community, and raised public awareness and readiness for disaster prevention and various emergencies.

Nevertheless, I must remind everyone that threats from hostile external forces against Taiwan continue to intensify. We must more actively expand whole-of-society participation. I hereby issue the following three directives:

First, the whole-of-society defense resilience undertaking must be legally codified by establishing cross-ministerial and civil-society collaboration mechanisms.

“The more prepared we are, the safer we’ll be.” What truly protects Taiwan is not just the strength of the armed forces, but the resilience of society. We must institutionalize and codify civil preparedness efforts and encourage every citizen to participate.

I request that the Executive Yuan follow the principle of “central coordination, local implementation, and civil society collaboration,” and initiate institutionalized efforts regarding the division of responsibilities among central government agencies, the role of local governments, and authorization for civil society participation. It is essential to ensure that all central government agencies understand their responsibilities, and that NGOs, residential communities, and families know what actions to take in a crisis.

We have observed that many proactive individuals in civil society, civil defense organizations, and NGOs are willing to engage in public discussions about how to respond to various emergencies. The government must adopt an open attitude and develop a clear mechanism for empowering participation. This is the only way to gather more strength and enhance whole-of-society resilience.

Second, we must start with school education to establish and promote intergenerational resilience education.

To address challenges such as natural disasters and foreign threats, all sectors of society and all generations must develop risk awareness and response capabilities.

I request that the Executive Yuan compile statistics on relevant educational resources; strengthen cooperation with diverse civic groups; incorporate the needs of different generations and ethnic groups; and develop intergenerational teaching materials, thus

enabling citizens to possess deeper information literacy and disaster preparedness capabilities.

Truth dispels lies, and knowledge brings power. Through resilience education, people must be made to understand that despite the severe threats, Taiwanese society can have the ability to overcome crises.

Current threats do not necessarily involve gunfire; modern crises often begin with chaos. We must expand our action plan, continuously invest resources, and ensure that various drills and exercises incorporate relevant educational content to promote full public participation.

Third, we must promote civilian-military integration through training and exercises. Our defense capabilities must be grounded in society.

This year's Urban Resilience Exercises (UREs), held in 11 counties and cities, only began to address civilian-military cooperation. Next year's UREs must build upon this foundation to refine related training on civilian-military integration.

I request that the Executive Yuan supervise all central government agencies in conducting drills involving their respective responsibilities in areas such as energy, transportation, communications, healthcare, daily necessities, and financial resilience. These drills must be systematic, scientific, and unscripted. The results of the drills should be analyzed systematically to track preparedness progress and ensure that the inter-ministerial actions taken are sufficient to address potential risks.

Meanwhile, I request that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) study people's everyday needs in various emergency situations, develop mechanisms for cooperation between civilian entities and the armed forces, and incorporate the aforementioned considerations and studies into the design of exercises.

Drills must be extended to the local level because, regardless of the region, age, community, or school campus involved, the participants are citizens we cherish and who need protection. Therefore, all civilian capabilities must be fully integrated.

Ladies and gentlemen, the situation is changing rapidly, both globally and regionally. Taiwan faces increasing gray-zone operations, ubiquitous information warfare, and weaponized supply chains. Meanwhile, because democratic societies are open and inclusive, we are constantly being tested, worn down, infiltrated, and divided. Now is the time to step up our actions.

In conclusion, I ask my administrative team to keep the comments from today's meeting in mind when making future policy decisions, and to adopt more proactive and open attitudes regarding the possibility of tapping into civilian capacities in order to enhance Taiwan's resilience and safeguard the lives and property of all citizens. Thank you.

V. Extempore Motions: None

VI. Chair's Closing Statement

I thank our distinguished Deputy Conveners, Advisors, and Committee Members for your efforts and dedication over the past year. Your work to promote whole-of-society defense resilience has brought about tangible changes in society. As we near the end of 2025, I extend my gratitude and respect to all.

The goal of whole-of-society defense resilience is to shape communities that remain calm during power outages, neighborhoods in which residents can help each other during disasters, citizens who can discern the truth amidst disinformation, and industries that can continue functioning even under disruption to critical supplies.

For a long time, people have shied away from defense-related issues. Yet, to protect all of our fellow citizens, we have decided to take proactive measures.

I thank all participants for your efforts. Many people who support the government's efforts to promote defense and enhance societal resilience have come forward, one after another, to express their affirmation. The more openly defense issues are discussed, the stronger the momentum we build for deeper preparedness.

I have also seen many people spontaneously organizing community disaster prevention seminars, capacity-building activities, and civilian tabletop exercises, truly embedding societal resilience at the grassroots and neighborhood levels.

I want to emphasize that true resilience is not about pushing people to their limits, but about giving society the ability to bounce back. Just like the bamboo commonly found in rural Taiwan, it bends in strong winds but doesn't break, and it can stand tall and straight again after a storm.

The more resilient Taiwanese society becomes, the harder it is for external threats to find opportunities to exploit. The calmer and more prepared our people are, the less fertile ground there is for bad actors to infiltrate, intimidate, and divide us.

Peace is priceless, and war has no winners. Building whole-of-society defense resilience is never about fighting, but to make the enemy think twice before launching a war.

My vision is the same as yours: A prepared society is the safest society; and a resilient Taiwan is the hardest to defeat.

With the new year just around the corner, we will continue to confront challenges with prudence and steadfastly advance a "Resilient Taiwan." I wish everyone a Happy New Year, good health, and all the best. Thank you.

VII. Meeting End Time: 7:30 p.m.