

Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee

Date: Thursday, June 26, 2025, 4:00 p.m.

Location: Reception Hall, Office of the President

Chair: Convener Lai Ching-te

Recorder: Ministry of the Interior (MOI)

Attendees: Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao, Deputy Convener Pan Men-an (潘孟安), and Deputy Convener Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), Advisor Huoh Shoou-yeh (霍守業), and Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung (林敏雄).

Committee Members: Wellington L. Koo (顧立雄), Kuo Jyh-huei (郭智輝), Chen Shih-kai (陳世凱), Chen Junne-jih (陳駿季), Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源), Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), Wang Pao-tzong (王寶宗), James Liao (廖英熙), Chen Hsin-liang (陳信良), Enoch Wu (吳怡農) (on leave), Kuo Chia-yo (郭家佑), Tseng Po-yu (曾柏瑜), Liu Yu-hsi (劉玉皙), Tu Wen-ling (杜文苓) (on leave), Hsiao Hsu-chun (蕭旭君), Yen Po-wen (顏博文), Hsiao Ya-wen (蕭雅文), Liu Wen (劉文), Bob Hung (洪偉淦), Tina Lin (林雅芳), Kenny Huang (黃勝雄), Wu Jong-shinn (吳宗信) (on leave), and Dai Chen-yu (戴辰宇).

Non-voting Participants: Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng (季連成), Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳), Deputy Executive Secretary Chang Tun-han (張惇涵), Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧).

I. Chair's Remarks

Since last year when I announced the establishment of three committees at the Presidential Office, today will be the fourth meeting of the Office

of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. I want to thank all the advisors and committee members for their many valuable suggestions during this period.

We also conducted tabletop exercises last December and field exercises this March to review the coordination, integration, and response capabilities between the central and local governments and between the government and civil society organizations, as well as to verify Taiwan's response and mobilization capabilities in addressing natural disasters and various extreme situations. Going forward, we will continue to prepare the resources and strengths of various agencies, reviewing and improving our processes over and over again to promote development of whole-of-society defense resilience that is even more sound and solid.

Recently, the Executive Yuan proposed a special act to enhance national security resilience, allocating a special budget of NT\$410 billion drawn from the annual budget surplus, of which NT\$150 billion will be used to enhance national resilience and strengthen territorial defense capabilities. Examples include: strengthening coastal patrol facilities and equipment, adding unmanned vehicles, enhancing the resilience and equipment performance of military-civilian communications operations, building joint military-civilian image surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and improving important protective facilities.

Regarding field verification, July is almost here, and the annual Han Kuang exercises are about to begin. During this year's 41st Han Kuang exercises, the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises will also be conducted. The Han Kuang exercises emphasize military training exercises, while the Urban Resilience Exercises emphasize the integration of non-military sectors in responding to emergencies. Through military-civilian cooperation, the exercises demonstrate the nation's will to come together in solidarity and enhance Taiwan's whole-of-society defense resilience.

This July is our National Solidarity Month. Through practical exercises, we want to make Taiwan society more aware that preparation enhances security. We also want to demonstrate to the international community that Taiwan's people have a strong will to defend and determination to protect ourselves.

In recent years, founded on realistic combat training and a strategy of resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence, the military has developed asymmetric warfare capabilities, and constructed a multi-domain denial and resilient defense approach to preparedness.

In the 41st Han Kuang exercises that will run this year from July 9 to 18, for 10 days and nine nights, military units will fulfill realistic combat training requirements. Key items for verification include: responding to gray-zone intrusions; rapid response reserve deployment; strategic communication operations mechanisms; mobilization to reconstitute troop combat capabilities; multi-domain, deep defensive deployment; combat effectiveness of new equipment; enhancement of logistics support capabilities; and military-civilian integration and coordination operations.

Beginning on April 10 this year, we held 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises in eight counties and cities: Lienchiang County, Hualien County, Keelung City, Hsinchu City, Taitung County, Penghu County, Kinmen County, and Chiayi City.

From July 15 to 17, further exercises will be held in three cities – Taichung City, Tainan City, and Taipei City, focusing on key infrastructure with distribution, first aid, and relief stations set up in the surrounding administrative areas. At the same time, the nation's 22 counties and cities will also simultaneously conduct air raid shelter and civil defense drills for the first time to verify the coordinated response capabilities of the central and local governments when faced with extreme situations.

We will use advance notifications, systematic drills, and cross-department field exercises to ensure that the public clearly understands how to connect their respective roles and generate maximum strength to collectively respond when crises or challenges arise.

I want to emphasize that defending Taiwan has never been solely the military's responsibility; it is a reflection of the will of our entire population. In addition to a military with strong combat capabilities, we also need police officers to maintain order and firefighters and medical personnel to save lives. We also need government workers, corporate partners, and community volunteers to stick to their posts, along with the united efforts of all citizens.

I want to take this opportunity to thank Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung, who is here today, as PX Mart will also participate in the Urban Resilience Exercises in July. This shows that no matter where we work, every role and every ounce of strength makes an indispensable link in our national security network.

Therefore, by conducting verification in the Han Kuang and Urban Resilience exercises, National Solidarity Month will demonstrate the spirit and resilience of Taiwanese society in maintaining a sense of composure and cooperation during crises.

Many of our fellow citizens have recently been discussing disaster prevention and evacuation go bags and checking supply lists. Many have also registered for courses to learn emergency first aid skills and gain civil defense knowledge. In addition, many people are looking at map apps with their families to locate evacuation sites near their homes and become familiar with evacuation routes.

Prevent problems before they arise; preparation enhances security. These maxims, from mental preparation to concrete planning, are the best ways of preparing to respond to natural disasters or various extreme situations. Only when the entire population feels involved and everyone participates

can whole-of-society defense reach maximum strength, so that amidst various challenges, Taiwan can remain stable and become even more united.

To help everyone better understand the essence of National Solidarity Month, today's agenda will include five reports. In addition to the progress of items listed in the third committee meeting, the MOI, Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the Executive Yuan will, respectively, deliver reports regarding the execution and goal achievement of the five key areas of whole-of-society defense resilience; planning for the 41st Han Kuang exercises; the preparations and promotional status of the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises; and observations regarding the 2025 resilience exercises. On the table in front of all advisors and committee members is a "Han Kuang 41" arm patch specially prepared for everyone by the Presidential Office.

Once again, thank you to all the advisors and committee members for your participation. I look forward to your providing professional opinions from various perspectives, engaging in wide-ranging discussions, and working together to enhance Taiwan's whole-of-society defense resilience. Thank you.

II. Confirmation of the Meeting Agenda

Decision: Meeting agenda confirmed.

III. Confirmation of the Minutes of the Third Committee Meeting

Decision: Minutes of the third committee meeting confirmed.

IV. Report Items

1. Status report on items listed in the third committee meeting

(omitted)

(Presented by Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang)

- 2. Report on the execution and goal achievement of the five key areas of whole-of-society defense resilience** (omitted)
(Presented by Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang)
- 3. Report on National Solidarity Month – planning for the 41st Han Kuang exercises** (omitted)
(Presented by Minister of National Defense Wellington L. Koo)
- 4. Report on National Solidarity Month – preparations and promotional status of the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises** (omitted)
(Presented by Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang)
- 5. Report on National Solidarity Month – observations on the 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises** (omitted)
(Presented by Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng)

V. Discussion Items (In Speaking Order)

Report Items 2 through 5 are presented for discussion; written opinions will be included in the meeting minutes. (Appendix not included in the English meeting minutes.)

1. Committee Member Remarks (Non-government)

(1) Committee Member, Tseng Po-yu

1. Regarding items listed in the third committee meeting, the policy report on countering the hazard caused by disinformation contained response measures that were researched and formulated early on. At this time, there must be more new preventive approaches and methods, and it is suggested to offer additional explanations. To address the hazard resulting from various forms of cognitive warfare, it is hoped that instead of passively supplying clarifications, the government could take the initiative, respond more proactively, and implement better communication within

society. It is suggested that the various ministries and agencies establish communications, make advance preparations to counter cognitive warfare, help the public understand what response measures the government is taking, and provide better explanations regarding new responses and breakthroughs to boost public confidence.

2. The inclusion of strategic communication mechanisms as an exercise item was a major highlight. Compared to the physical actions visible during land, sea, and air exercises, the specific steps and scripts used to counter cognitive warfare are not very clear. It is suggested that the government disclose narratives such as the gray-zone warfare script in advance to build up a certain level of psychological resilience among the public.
3. The “three together” appeal in the closing statement of the MOI’s briefing on the Urban Resilience Exercises was fantastic. I invite the committee members and civil society groups present to participate in this initiative. During National Solidarity Month in July, let us download the Readiness TW e-APP, prepare go bags, and comply with the air defense evacuation guidelines, making this appeal the highlight of the exercises.

(2) Committee Member, Hsiao Ya-wen

1. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) has already proposed flowcharts as well as personnel training and reference guidelines for each care node to establish a feasible and comprehensive care system that includes trauma-based, pre-hospital emergency medical services for communities. After being implemented for one year, it is suggested that a more comprehensive implementation blueprint be proposed to help participating units within the care system understand their roles, the tasks they perform, and the preparatory training they receive, thereby linking the nodes more closely.

2. Over the past few years, many individuals and civil society groups have received basic first aid training. However, inconvenience in obtaining tourniquets is still an issue, which makes training promotion less effective. It is suggested to evaluate the possibility of making trauma first aid kits widely available in public places, which would be particularly helpful in mass casualty situations.
3. The government has set up first aid stations all over Taiwan, converting health centers into first aid stations, so that people can receive care in the community. It is suggested that the relevant information and systems be integrated, and promotional efforts be intensified to facilitate public inquiries regarding the locations of first aid stations. In addition, all 500 first aid stations throughout Taiwan were commissioned to be set up and transformed by health centers, utilizing primary medical personnel. However, pharmacies and pharmacists were not very willing to participate in the exercises. It is suggested that a plan be implemented regarding the relevant personnel to increase their willingness to participate and integrate them into the medical rescue system.
4. Medical rescue systems have set up forward surgical teams and backup teams. It is suggested that subsequent to emergency medical services, there should be a plan for evacuation mechanisms and other related support, such as dispatching private ambulances and surgeons to the dispatch location. In addition, the MOHW is also requested to clarify the purpose of expanding emergency medical facilities. Are those locations intended to serve as alternative locations when hospitals cannot operate effectively, or as enhanced first aid stations? Different purposes will have different deployment requirements.
5. Hospitals are required to prepare response measures for situations such as load shedding, resets, and evacuations, yet at the same time,

they could be subject to attack. Since hospitals have neither relevant experience nor clear command systems, they would not be able to figure out what to do. The government is earnestly requested to provide a care system blueprint so that all participating personnel can discuss it together and verify the design through various scenarios.

6. Finally, I would like to convey the perspective of United States military trauma surgeons: Medical treatment is only one component of whole-of-society defense. But if we fail to establish a sound trauma care system within the framework of resilience preparedness, what we will lose is not only human resources, but also the people's trust in the nation.

(3) Committee Member, Kenny Huang

1. During the recent war between Israel and Iran, the first phenomenon observed was the frequent and voluntary implementation of internet restriction and shutdown measures to prevent cyberattacks. The second phenomenon was massive amounts of AI-generated images widely proliferating on social media platforms. The exercise verification items in today's report covered cognitive warfare issues, and in the future, the relevant exercise and verification items for emerging scenarios can be strengthened.
2. It was also suggested to evaluate including a large scale of AI-generated images in rapid information clarification systems, technological countermeasures, and international joint defense mechanisms. In terms of large-scale internet restriction and shutdown measures, it is necessary to consider whether a voluntary internet shutdown would paralyze the command control system or communications systems, and whether an internet shutdown would cause communication links among critical facilities to fail. It is suggested that future exercises test this new type of vulnerability.

3. Critical facility cybersecurity is extremely important, but the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure around the world is relatively fragile, and often subject to cyberattacks. This explains why internet access was restricted or shut down during the Israel-Iran war to protect against cyberattacks. If critical infrastructure fails due to cyberattacks, valves and rotating equipment need to be able to support manual operation. All critical infrastructure should support black-starting to the greatest extent possible to maintain the function and resilience of facilities when external power fails.
4. To maintain personnel safety, especially for the special corps and joint response command centers, basic protective equipment should be inventoried and replenished regularly with bulletproof vests and helmets to provide basic protection for those who need it. Personnel in the special corps protecting critical facilities and in joint response command centers may apply to the Armed Forces Reserve Command to defer military service in accordance with MND regulations to maintain personnel capacities at critical facilities and joint response command centers.
5. After the armed forces and joint response command centers establish lines of communication, they can transmit encrypted intelligence so that the special corps and joint response command centers can understand the scope of relatively safe zones, and establish expanded medical areas in those zones to conduct large-scale evacuations of the sick and wounded.

(4) Committee Member, Liu Wen

1. After every speech, the public's greatest concern is: What has the government actually done? After an explanation, everyone is surprised that the government has already made the relevant preparations. It is suggested that quarterly information regarding food and energy reserves that is not classified be provided to

committee members in a comprehensive and consistent manner to facilitate communication between committee members and the public.

2. The Tri-Service Blood Program organized by the MND's Medical Affairs Bureau is designed to maintain the resilience of the armed forces' blood supply during wartime; this is also a matter of concern for our allies' representatives. In addition, to ensure that the domestic blood bag supply is stable, it is suggested that the government evaluate developing the domestic blood bag industry.
3. It is suggested that the national air defense plan reference the Finnish model, where each household has access to an underground shelter, so that the public pays greater attention to the use of their basements. It is also suggested that building regulations require new buildings to be equipped with lighting and lavatory facilities to enhance the overall resilience of Taiwan's air defense shelters.

(5) Committee Member, Kuo Chia-yo

1. To share another country's approach, evacuation measures in Japan are divided into initial, emergency, and safe periods, as responses are different after three-day and seven-day periods, as well as after situations stabilize. They therefore make different plans, and even establish measures lasting two weeks or more for long wars of resistance, so it is suggested that the government reference Japan's approach.
2. The current quality of disaster prevention and evacuation map information, as well as shelter data, varies across counties and cities, and the air defense shelter app does not allow the public to clearly identify the usage status of shelters. It is therefore suggested that local governments take inventory of the status of all shelters again, and indicate the status clearly. In addition, a "status" filter should be added to the air defense shelter app to allow the public to prioritize the selection of usable shelters.

3. It is recommended that the MOI or local governments write a shelter management manual and manage the status of shelters so that both public and private shelters have reference guides. For example, the US, New Zealand, and Japan have established management platforms to inventory the list of shelter managers, the current status of shelters, and the list of management personnel. It is suggested that the government digitize shelter materials, management personnel information, and the status of each space in the future to provide up-to-date information regarding the usage status of each shelter.
4. It is suggested that the interior space of shelters be constructed with diversity and friendliness in mind. For example, can the designs for the mentally and physically challenged, nursing areas, and women's restrooms ensure privacy? After the war began, Ukraine opened underground subway stations and underground public facilities to be used as shelters. Should we consider opening underground MRT stations as air defense shelters?
5. Regarding disaster prevention volunteer recruitment, local governments in New Zealand and Japan form committees that incorporate participation from local governments, NGOs, and enterprises. New Zealand has an online volunteer system, and if people are willing to help, they can take the initiative to register online. Finally, New Zealand has established 16 civil defense centers across the country to conduct local disaster prevention volunteer training. Taiwan has many civil society groups, but no government-led civil defense systems. It is recommended that Taiwan reference New Zealand's approach.
6. Boosting confidence and enhancing communication and publicity are also important factors in strengthening national defense, and the enemy will deliberately foment defeatism. The MND briefings

have many scenario frameworks, but they are hard for the general public to understand. It is suggested that short videos about one minute long be produced to show the nation's response in all kinds of situations, such as the Ocean Affairs Council (OAC)'s exercises. The Taipei tabletop exercises have been widely discussed online, but are still too difficult for the public. The scenario videos will help communication with the public.

(6) Committee Member, Bob Hung

1. The sources of information needed for emergency response should be verified in advance, before an emergency strikes. The information exchange nodes of various units, such as academic units, that are not defined as critical infrastructure can easily become vulnerable points subject to attack, as they do not necessarily have adequate protection capabilities. It is suggested that the government assess the vulnerable points in the information flow required for emergency response.
2. Although there are backup mechanisms for critical infrastructure, the issue with backup drills is that critical infrastructure plays an extremely important role, and facility providers often worry that after switching to the backup system, they will not be able to smoothly switch back to the original system, impacting normal operations. It is suggested to consider ways to carry out effective drills and avoid situations where backup mechanisms are available but cannot actually be implemented.

(7) Committee Member, Tina Lin

1. The MOI mentioned that Google Maps has established location markers for the newest disaster prevention locations, but those location markers require a single central counterpart to provide the correct information flow, rather than allowing each local government to connect with Google Taiwan separately.

2. Regarding the Han Kuang exercises in July, from a business management perspective, the first thing to do is ensure effective private sector participation in the Urban Resilience Exercises. In the past, people usually cooperated with the exercises by stopping their cars at the side of the road, but did little else in terms of substantive participation. It is suggested publicity be strengthened regarding how enterprises and employees work together to participate in the exercises.
3. Regarding ways for civilian forces to assist the public in preparing go bags, it is suggested that companies utilize existing mechanisms, such as having employee benefit committees provide go bags as an annual benefit for employees to reduce the additional burden of preparing their own go bags.
4. Finally, regarding public communication, Taiwan has a large number of new immigrants and foreign employees. Please consider ways to communicate with those who reside in Taiwan but are not proficient in Chinese, and help the international community understand the situation in Taiwan. For example, when an earthquake occurred last year, Google had to prepare relevant English materials to explain the situation to its foreign employees and headquarters.

(8) Committee Member, Liu Yu-hsi

1. Regarding adjustments to infrastructure and legal regulations that support people's livelihoods, most buildings are currently equipped with emergency diesel generators, but according to current regulations, they can only be activated in the event of a fire. However, if special circumstances such as gray-zone attacks occur, power outages will cause water tower pump motors to become inoperable, leading to water outages, which will have a major impact on people's livelihoods. Therefore, it is suggested that the

relevant regulations be relaxed so that diesel generators can be activated in a wider range of emergency situations. In addition, the public is already well aware of the risk of war disasters, and encouraging building management committees or communities to purchase diesel generators on their own can be considered to improve the overall resilience and stability of society.

2. The Youth Daily News and Military News Agency can play a greater role in combating cognitive warfare with the use of AI technology. The AI virtual anchor at Youth Daily News is a good example – its performance is quite natural, and many viewers find it hard to tell that it is a virtual entity, which shows its technical potential. Disinformation is sometimes a quantitative problem, and if we can use AI to expand our capacity to produce information, that will help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of overall operations in the face of cognitive warfare. On the other hand, it is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that the style of AI virtual anchors is easily plagiarized or duplicated, making it hard to tell friend from foe.
3. Regarding the integration and certification of local civilian force resources, the information groups in various locations are now primarily composed of enthusiasts who have diverse skills such as wireless communication, drone operation, and first aid. It is suggested that civilian forces be included in the official “talent pool” system and meet basic certification requirements. That way, in the event of an emergency, civilian forces can be quickly dispatched and integrated, strengthening response capabilities through government-civil society cooperation.

(9) Committee Member, Hsiao Hsu-chun

1. To avoid the problem of unstable network connections in emergency situations, the public should be encouraged to

download the Readiness TW e-App in advance or set up a default download location to take advantage of its offline map function, especially for areas near their homes. In addition, as the app has too much information and too many levels of navigation, it is suggested to set up shortcut keys for commonly used functions to make it more convenient for the public.

2. If a network protocol design lacks an authentication mechanism, it may lead to incorrect addresses or routes being fraudulently used, such as Russia's claim to own Ukrainian network addresses during the Russia-Ukraine war. In addition, the fact that Google's browser does not trust the updated Chunghwa Telecom certificate is a key trust architecture problem in online information transmission. It is suggested that the government further consider ways to transmit correct and trustworthy information in a timely manner, ensure the adoption of correct authentication mechanisms and configurations, and prevent information from being blocked or tampered with during transmission.

(10) Committee Member, Yen Po-wen

1. Much misinformation and disinformation can now be clarified by a fact-checking center, which helps the public understand what constitutes correct information. To make queries convenient, it is suggested that functions be designed to trace back the relevant false information and compile databases of clarified information.
2. Last year, CNN reported that JPMorgan Chase & Co. was attacked by hackers 45 billion times per day and spent huge sums of money each year to defend itself. It is suggested that the government consult JPMorgan on data maintenance matters.

(11) Committee Member, James Liao

1. It is suggested to evaluate conducting military training earlier, during the student stage, so that military training instructors can

return to senior high schools and vocational schools and lead students in gunnery training, and increase student participation and commitment through performance records, official certifications, academic credit mechanisms, and bonus incentives.

2. After three years of solid training, students will be able to master basic gunnery skills and related knowledge, which is in keeping with the principle of mastering the basics before joining the military, and will reduce armed forces training time and improve overall efficiency.

(12) Committee Member, Dai Chen-yu

1. Whole-of-society resilience is meant to maintain people's livelihoods, command and control systems, disinformation clarification, and information flow operations. People from all walks of life have information applications, and there is much coordination among systems. Key livelihood and medical systems – every system – could possibly be attacked. Regarding Taiwan's possible isolation from the international community due to an undersea cable break, from Ukraine's example, one can see that domestic networks actually can operate independently.
2. It is suggested to award digital resilience labels to encourage all units to achieve three major goals: continuous operation of critical systems, system restoration from backup drills, and cybersecurity red and blue team drills, gradually expanding from government website systems to private sector systems. The Ministry of Digital Affairs already has a digital resilience cruise program, but due to limited funding, it is currently limited to a small number of central government websites. It is hoped that the program can be extended to private sector systems in the future to achieve digital resilience.
3. Most of the government's command and control systems are built by private software and hardware suppliers, and it is suggested that the relevant suppliers be invited to obtain digital authentication. In

addition, most of the instant messaging software that the government relies on for communication with the public comes from foreign firms. Those firms, however, believe that Taiwan's peer-to-peer bandwidth is expensive, so their servers are not located in Taiwan, and once the external network is disconnected, it is difficult to restore. It is suggested that the government actively seek to solve this problem.

(13) Committee Member, Chen Hsin-liang

1. Israel is a country with a small population in the Middle East, and its faith is different from that of its neighbors. It has a sense of crisis on a daily basis, and virtually all citizens perform military service. The government, military, and people are united. From childhood, they receive disaster response and combat education training. In the event of war, they immediately take their assigned positions. It is suggested that Taiwan learn from Israel, reference how they promote overall community-building, and connect the public sector, military, and people with industry, government, and academia to carry out education for all.
2. Churches use their systems to help promote the fight against disinformation and fake news, using information sharing to prevent believers from being deceived.
3. Disaster prevention education in Taiwan should begin in childhood, and be taught in the education system at all levels from kindergarten to university. In addition, in order to meet the needs of people of different ages, it is suggested to provide simple printed materials to popularize disaster prevention education among the public.

2. Responses by Executive Secretary, Report Presenters, and Committee Members (Government Representatives)

(1) Executive Secretary, Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang

1. The policy of including air defense shelter facilities attached to buildings in public safety building inspections and reporting came into effect on July 1 this year. Air defense shelter facilities with a capacity of more than 500 people must be inspected and reported to the local government, including information regarding facilities, equipment, and whether they provide unobstructed access. In theory, when an air defense drill alert is issued, buildings should be opened to the public. Media reports have said that Israel uses train stations for emergency shelters, and Taipei City can also do this. For example, the Ximen MRT station can shelter about 34,000 people.
2. The difference between the Police Service App and the Readiness TW e-App is that the former focuses on real-time evacuation, using Google Maps to display air defense shelters within 100 meters of the user's location, and queries can be expanded to include other regional locations; the latter provides users with the locations of the five closest shelters, and the query cannot be expanded to include other regional locations. Considering that the general public typically go about their everyday lives within relatively fixed geographical areas, people should be familiar with the locations of air defense shelters in their spheres of daily life. In the event of an air defense alert or earthquake, the principle is for people to use the basements of their own homes for shelter. The relevant concepts will be reinforced through social communication in exercises such as the Urban Resilience Exercises.

(2) Minister of National Defense Wellington L. Koo

1. Whether in peacetime or wartime, cognitive warfare countermeasures and strategic communication are aimed at the international community, local citizens, and the nation's armed forces. We see the responses of the US and Japan to PLA gray-zone provocations, including proactive countermeasures against misinformation and disinformation – such responses are cross-ministerial tasks for which the National Security Council (NSC) is also responsible. In emergency situations, the government is obligated to establish authoritative and credible information transmission channels, which is crucial for stabilizing public morale.
2. The formulation of evacuation plans and routes requires the MND's Armed Forces Reserve Command to be responsible for coordination and liaison, communicating with the Central Joint Emergency Operation Center, local emergency response centers, and the public, while considering tactical actions during combat operations, which should be incorporated into future drills.
3. In July during National Solidarity Month, related short videos and promotional content will be released, along with public statements and live broadcasts regarding the Han Kuang and Urban Resilience Exercises.
4. In terms of communications resilience, regarding the problem of fiber optic network interruptions, it is difficult to sever a cable completely, and even a damaged cable can be repaired quickly while mobile relay equipment is used to maintain communications. However, this work still depends on the joint efforts of the armed forces, government, and private sector enterprises.

(3) Executive Secretary, Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng

1. The 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises will be held from July 15 to 17 during the Han Kuang exercises in three participating cities: Taichung, Tainan, and Taipei. The exercises entail tabletop wargaming exercises in the morning, and air defense alerts, evacuations, and integrated field exercises in the afternoon.
2. The mayors of these cities will serve as commanders for the tabletop wargaming exercises in the morning. The main exercise will be activating and operating county and city government response centers, including mechanism operations, air defense evacuation and sheltering, mass evacuation and accommodations, medical treatment for mass casualties, and countermeasures against disinformation.
3. During the air defense drills in the afternoon, the public can use the Police Service App to find and proceed to the nearest air defense shelters. The integrated field exercises will take the form of a small-area simulation drill for a realistic scenario to conduct various operations such as war disaster relief. The exercise contents include the distribution of daily necessities, disaster victim shelter and relief station operations, rescue and relief efforts for mass casualty victims and their evacuation to expanded medical emergency departments for treatment, and anti-cognitive warfare and disinformation operations.
4. The distribution of daily necessities component requires setting up stations in each neighborhood and distributing five daily necessities: rice, cooking oil, salt, milk powder, and liquefied petroleum gas. The main exercise is the operation of these stations and the withdrawal of supplies. In addition, the disaster victim shelter and relief stations can accommodate disaster victims for

long periods because schools have more comprehensive facilities, and about 60% of the nation's relief stations use school facilities.

(4) Committee Member, Kuo Jyh-huei

Emergency daily necessities, such as rice, cooking oil, salt, milk powder, and liquefied petroleum gas, will all be rationed out by the government. The Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) will continue testing material preparedness to ensure sufficient capacity for production of daily necessities in emergency situations through stocktaking rather than stockpiling prior to the occurrence of emergencies. In an emergency, gasoline will be rationed; electricity will be supplied with priority given to public services, people's daily necessities, and essential industries; and water supply will continue as normal as long as electrical and related facilities are not damaged.

(5) Committee Member, Chen Shih-kai

1. The field exercises held at Anping Port in Tainan City on March 27 were taped for review and analysis, and the videos can also be used as reference for other ports.
2. In emergency situations, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) is responsible for traffic mobilization and evacuation. Traffic mobilization involves a wide range of issues and entities, and the Highway Bureau, Taiwan's high-speed railway system, Railway Bureau, Civil Aviation Administration, and Maritime and Port Bureau have taken inventory of related resources.
3. The heavy rainfalls on May 18 and 20 this year cut off roads to Hualien, but traffic was restored within 12 hours. In the interim, the Taiwan Railway Corporation, Ltd. used diesel-electric trains to provide shuttle services to the next station, showing that diesel-electric trains are a very important backup for railway transportation. In addition, as suggested by a committee member

regarding the importance of diesel power generation and diesel reserves in the event of a power outage, the MOTC will conduct a detailed inventory of diesel reserves and, with military needs in mind, retain a portion of the large number of diesel-powered trains and buses decommissioned due to the electrification of public transportation.

4. In 2024, the MOTC conducted 50 exercises and found that some equipment needed to be updated, so new equipment procurements or updates have been ongoing. It is hoped that the MOTC's practice of biennial exercises can be changed to annual exercises. In the transportation system, it is not very difficult to switch among various backup mechanisms, so the MOTC will take this committee member's suggestions as an important reference, and will try to test switchovers among various backup mechanisms during the exercise.

(6) Committee Member, Chen Junne-jih

1. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the MOEA are jointly responsible for the supply of grain and essential daily necessities. Rice is a staple food item, and in terms of the rice reserve and supply chain, to cope with conflict situations, it is necessary to design a supply chain that covers granaries, supply stations, and distribution stations.
2. The government has inventoried and is ensuring reserves of aquaculture and livestock products. As long as Taiwan is not subject to a blockade, Taiwan's deep-sea fishing fleet can continue to replenish reserves. In a total blockade, Taiwan's domestic aquaculture industry could still support internal demand.
3. The MOA has also been actively taking inventory of fast-growing crops, such as sweet potatoes, that might be useful in case of a blockade or war. The MOA is also working to ensure the supply and production of seedlings to meet needs in different scenarios.

4. The MOA is promoting its rural regeneration plan. Disaster resilience and rural regeneration in combination can bolster autonomous response actions in rural areas. It is hoped that the responses in towns and townships can be made more efficient through the implementation of comprehensive community-based responses.

(7) Committee Member, Chiu Tai-yuan

1. Regarding the suggestions from Committee Member Hsiao on preparing trauma first aid kits, informing the public of the locations of first aid stations, and enhancing the willingness of primary medical personnel to participate in the exercises, the MOHW has taken note and will make improvements.
2. Since 2024, the government has implemented a program for resilient national medical preparedness. It is assisting 22 county and city governments with personnel training, promoting all-of-society training, developing teaching materials and guidelines, and studying alternative medical sites. The government has also explained the content of the program to local health units and hospitals so as to improve medical capacity.
3. In communities, local governments should invite medical personnel, retirees, and civil defense medical teams from health clinics to participate in the Urban Resilience Exercises. It is hoped that local governments will strengthen cooperation with medical associations, leveraging the power of private medical care.

(8) Committee Member, Kuan Bi-ling

1. One committee member suggested that the government produce videos for modern public communication. The OAC attaches great importance to this suggestion and will produce short videos from suitable exercises. For example, the Hai An No. 12 Exercise in 2025 was based on the following scenario: Members of an

international terrorist organization fly to Taiwan, posing as tourists. Five terrorists hijack and force a passenger vessel to steer away from the established Taiwan-Penghu route, while accomplice terrorists hijack another speedboat, launching a terrorist attack on the Yongan LNG Terminal. This cross-agency exercise was conducted jointly by the coast guard, navy, air force, and airborne service and was observed by delegations from the US, the Philippines, Japan, and Australia, who gave positive feedback.

2. China's gray-zone aggression often involves cognitive warfare conducted through videos that seek to mislead the international community about the nature of China's law enforcement activities in the Taiwan Strait and the waters near the Dongsha Atoll. The goal of the OAC is to issue messages prior to China's cognitive operations to ensure that the international community knows that China will be monitored and driven away by the Taiwan Coast Guard when it engages in such activities in those maritime areas.
3. As for strengthening international exchanges and bolstering our response to information warfare, the OAC will communicate with relevant countries in line with guidance from the NSC. In July 2025, the Taiwan International Ocean Forum will be held, one important theme of which will be cognitive warfare.
4. In terms of maritime disaster response, 18 regional search and rescue drills focusing on scenarios involving offshore wind farms and large passenger vessels were conducted in 2024. Moreover, in the second half of 2025, an oil pollution training session will be held in the Asia-Pacific region, while eight training sessions for maritime emergency response operators and command personnel will be conducted domestically. On May 13, 2025, the OAC's Ocean Conservation Administration established a professional technical team for maritime chemical incidents, a 60-person team

of technical experts, response personnel, and professionals trained overseas.

5. Social resilience has been mainly developed from a land-based perspective; however, new efforts will be made to respond to disasters from both aspects – land and sea. As for coastal shelters, in addition to primary evacuation routes, secondary routes will also be added to ensure passage of at least small passenger cars. The next stage will focus on shore-sea connections, which will be included in the whole-of-society resilience exercises under the guidance of Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi and Minister Liu.

3. Remarks by Advisors and Deputy Convenors

(1) Advisor, Lin Ming-hsiung

1. Most high-rise buildings have basements which can be partitioned for use during peacetime, and can serve as air defense shelters in wartime. Such basements are far better than the old cement air defense shelters. Moreover, with a water tank placed in the basement, water supply would not be a worry for people taking refuge.
2. All PX Mart outlets are equipped with diesel generators, which will start up automatically in the event of a power outage to ensure the continuous operation of refrigerators, thus preventing goods from spoiling. However, a diesel generator can continue running only as long as diesel fuel remains available from gas stations.

(2) Advisor, Huoh Shou-yeh

1. The point of the National Defense Act is a unified system of military governance and military command, with the civilian government overseeing the military. In peacetime, the chief of the general staff acts as the military chief of staff for the minister of

national defense, and the troops are under the command of the minister of national defense. When conflict occurs, the president assumes executive authority over the minister of national defense, who instructs various commands and their subordinates, while the chief of the general staff takes command to carry out operational missions. The Han Kuang exercises have not included scenarios that involve the above; it is suggested that they be incorporated in upcoming nationwide exercises.

2. In light of the current gray-zone aggression from across the Taiwan Strait, it is suggested that the MND add one scenario during the exercises, i.e., upon the sign of a full-scale invasion by the PLA, the president will convene an emergency NSC meeting, with the issuance of one emergency order for the entire country to enter a state of war, or emergency orders will be issued in phases. For example, in the event of a local or naval/air conflict, the first order could be issued for the chief of the general staff to take over the command of emergency operations, and subsequently, the mobilization order could be issued if the enemy shows signs of a full-scale invasion.

(3) Deputy Convener, Joseph Wu

1. Over the past year, the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee has moved forward step by step toward the objectives set out at its inception. Based on the five key areas defined in the beginning, we conducted tabletop exercises in December last year, and on-site drills in March this year, and for National Solidarity Month in July, we held the Han Kuang exercises and Urban Resilience Exercises, expanding the committee's efforts from the whole of government to the whole of society. This time, urban resilience was promoted through diverse publicity to help people understand how to begin with efforts in their daily lives. For

example, people were encouraged to download apps and prepare go bags, with the hope of making preparedness a national movement, fostering a sense of “the more prepared we are, the safer we’ll be.”

2. Regarding the work done during this past year, we have shared observations and directions for future improvement, which could also be taken as self-imposed expectations for the NSC. First, strengthening all-out defense education has been improved during the past year. The public can now look at it rationally. They do not panic, but rather adopt a matter-of-fact attitude about something needing active preparation. Therefore, future Urban Resilience Exercises will include specific practices from people’s daily lives and get more entities to participate in the exercises and education. In addition, strategic communication channels have been established with various central government agencies, with results gradually emerging. All future progress will be reported to committee members and advisors, and feedback will be accepted as reference.
3. Second is deepening civil society partnerships. The MOI, in cooperation with PX Mart, has conducted air defense sheltering exercises in northern, central, and southern Taiwan, which would not have been possible without the participation of private enterprises. In the future, it is hoped that similar cooperation can be expanded to more enterprises, organizations, and all walks of life.
4. Lastly, resilience and preparedness must also be innovative. It is hard for the public to imagine a time without the cellular broadcast system and without early warning text messages. In terms of disaster preparedness innovation, Taiwan has achieved remarkable results, yet we should not be complacent. Rather, we must continue

to strengthen our disaster preparedness efforts to respond to compound disasters such as war by improving functionality of apps and introducing new technologies. Those that can be introduced into disaster preparedness must continue to be strengthened. As technologies and industries evolve, we are presented with opportunities to reorganize resources. We thank committee members for providing suggestions. All of your suggestions will be brought in for discussion and provided as important reference for future improvements, allowing for preparedness to be more comprehensive.

(4) Deputy Convener, Pan Men-an

1. Over the past year, the three committees launched by the president have achieved significant results. Thanks to the participation and suggestions of the committee members and advisors, closer vertical integration of administrative units has been achieved. Through tabletop exercises and on-site drills, whole-of-society defense resilience awareness has spread throughout society, as seen from spirited discussions of go bags online recently. Information related to whole-of-society defense has taken root in people's minds, and is no longer seen as the sole responsibility of the government or charitable organizations, but rather as each person's responsibility.
2. Various religious groups can provide their valuable experience in disaster preparedness collaboration to government agencies, helping disaster preparedness systems operate more smoothly. The government will also continue strengthening education and social communication through cooperation with NGOs. In the future, we must bolster defense resilience education for people of all ages and initiate open discussions, avoiding misunderstandings among the public and enabling them to calmly face emergencies caused by natural and man-made disasters. We believe that through joint

integration from the central to local levels, we can effectively enhance our nation's resilience in dealing with various risks.

(5) Deputy Convener, Bi-khim Hsiao

1. Over the past year, I have met with numerous guests from all over the world. What most of them were concerned with, aside from the Taiwanese people's determination for self-defense and the chip issue, was Taiwan's resilience and preparedness, i.e., how Taiwan is prepared to respond to various challenges. Seeing the great importance of Taiwan to the world, the world has also been concerned with how Taiwan is prepared to respond to various emergencies. I therefore give my thanks to all committee members and advisors for not only participating in quarterly committee meetings, but also for regularly giving feedback to staff; they have even acted as bridges of communication between the committee and society. Now the committee is becoming increasingly focused in its operations.
2. Thanks also to local governments for their help with preparations and exercises for urban resilience, as well as to central government agencies and the NSC for the efforts to enhance whole-of-society defense resilience, which have involved a wide scope of tasks, ranging from the five key areas to many interconnected details, all requiring the full involvement of the whole of society. In July, National Solidarity Month, the Han Kuang and Urban Resilience Exercises will be an important opportunity for educating society. It is hoped that more people can seriously participate and better understand response measures.
3. I request that the committee members continue serving as bridges to communicate with society. And I suggest that staff take publicly released but scattered information (e.g., news, media, online content) and provide it to the non-governmental committee

members, so that they can better utilize such information when communicating with society. I thank all committee members for making use of their diverse professional backgrounds and for their contributions, and I hope for even greater participation by society.

4. The international landscape is changing rapidly. Examples include the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Iran conflict, and even the India-Pakistan conflict. These events constantly remind us that Taiwan still has shortcomings in its response capabilities. AI-generated images, cognitive warfare, disinformation, false information, and long-term attacks by a “fifth column” should all be handled with caution. Everyone’s participation over the past year is appreciated, and with more work ahead, I ask everyone to keep working together. Most importantly, upholding the core spirit of civilian-military and society-wide unity, we move toward our goal of making a more resilient Taiwan that can better face challenges by working across levels of government, across central government agencies, and with participation by all of society.

4. Convener’s Directives

Thank you to all committee members, deputy conveners, and advisors for your valuable comments. Also, I want to thank Minister Liu Shyh-fang, Minister Wellington L. Koo, and Minister without Portfolio Chi Lien-cheng for their thorough reports, as well as the heads of various central government agencies for their detailed responses.

For this meeting, I will issue several directives:

First, the government must be a pioneer, guiding civil society to participate more comprehensively in whole-of-society defense resilience efforts, so that it takes root more deeply at the grassroots level. Over the past year, the government has completed inventories in the areas of personnel training, material preparedness, and

strengthening of critical infrastructure, while promoting policies to implement the various objectives of the five key areas of whole-of-society defense resilience. In the future, there will certainly be more work requiring expanded promotion or further improvements.

The importance of enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience has gradually been accepted by government at all levels and by our citizens. Next, we must ensure that all central government agencies understand their responsibilities, and at the same time, we must construct a framework with adequate flexibility that can cultivate civil society's response capabilities while allowing it to collaborate with the government.

Our work must be rooted in neighborhoods and villages and implemented at the grassroots level. The more grassroots the level and the smaller the administrative unit, the more capable it is. This is the most critical indicator for evaluating the effectiveness of whole-of-society defense resilience.

Second, government at all levels must popularize knowledge on whole-of-society defense resilience and deepen awareness that "the more prepared we are, the safer we'll be." I request that the Executive Yuan strengthen synergy among the various central government agencies and ask all committee members to work with experts and scholars from civil society groups in formulating teaching materials and training content aimed at different generations to popularize knowledge and capabilities related to whole-of-society defense resilience. I want to underline that the work of whole-of-society defense resilience can by no means be accomplished overnight. It requires cross-generational efforts to enhance the overall security of the country. Youth are the future of the country, so the government must ensure that they understand, participate, and identify with the work of whole-of-society defense resilience. On this front, the government still has a lot of room for improvement.

Third, we must keep strengthening the capacity of civilian-military cooperation and gradually expand the exercise contents for verification. In July this year, during the Han Kuang exercises, the Urban Resilience Exercises will be simultaneously conducted in Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan, involving civilian-military cooperation and public-private collaboration. I request that the central government agencies carefully supervise the exercises and ensure their implementation. One of the key points of the 41st Han Kuang exercises will be to strengthen integration and coordination of civilian-military efforts. Preparations and exercises for whole-of-society defense resilience mainly aim to establish the self-help and mutual assistance abilities of non-defense sectors in times of disaster, with the goal of maintaining government operations and the continued operation of core functions pertinent to society and people's livelihoods.

In addition, supporting military activity as necessary is another objective of whole-of-society defense resilience. As this July is National Solidarity Month, we must quicken the pace with integration of civilian-military efforts and public-private cooperation and actively verify our capabilities through the exercises so that we can unite the people and protect the country. I request that the MND make good use of every exercise opportunity to let society fully understand Taiwan's defense capabilities and bolster the people's confidence. I also ask the MND and other central government agencies to think about how to incorporate whole-of-society defense resilience tasks into future Han Kuang and Urban Resilience Exercises. Regarding the items listed in the third Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee meeting, I give my thanks to the Executive Yuan for coordinating and bringing together relevant central government agencies to actively plan and promote those efforts. Work on whole-of-society defense resilience is steadily yielding results.

I know that committee members held numerous group discussion sessions prior to today's meeting. I hope that these small group discussions can also be held prior to future committee meetings. The expertise and wisdom of committee members can be brought together to focus on and refine issues and render more substantive suggestions. This will improve our preparations for whole-of-society defense resilience, so that the effort is carried out not only by the whole of government, but also by the whole of society and, further, with full societal participation.

I request that the administrative team incorporate the comments from today's meeting into policy considerations and continue to gather suggestions from the public so that together we can shape a more resilient Taiwan.

VI. Extempore Motions

Motion: A suggestion to adjust the manner of the committee's operations (Proposed by Committee Member Tseng Po-yu and co-signed by Committee Member Liu Yu-hsi and five other members)

- 1. Description of Committee Member Tseng's motion** (Not included in English meeting minutes)
- 2. Resolution:** This proposal is significant to the effort to expand social participation. Breaking into small groups to discuss issues on the agenda prior to the next quarter's meeting is conducive to building social consensus and understanding public feedback. Secretarial staff are requested to study the operating manner for the committee.

VII. Chair's Closing Statement

Taiwan's efforts to build whole-of-society defense resilience in response to threats from foreign hostile forces has been affirmed by many international allies.

In the future, as the work of whole-of-society defense resilience continues to advance, there will only be more challenges ahead. I want to emphasize that regardless of any changes in the international landscape, we will always maintain our staunch determination to safeguard our country, and we will take steady steps toward enhancing Taiwan's resilience in response to various challenges.

The government must take a positive attitude, pragmatic actions, and engage in intensive advocacy to help the people understand that we can make good preparations by working together.

Before concluding this meeting, I want to once again extend my appreciation to all the committee advisors and members for their contributions. Over the past year, your diverse and open discussions have been very constructive in terms of direction and results.

Next, through the Han Kuang and Urban Resilience Exercises, we will expand the range of items to be verified. We also plan to share with the international community Taiwan's achievements and experience this year in implementing whole-of-society defense resilience in the next committee meeting.

The challenges facing Taiwan must be addressed by uniting people from all walks of life, inside and outside Taiwan, who support the values of freedom and democracy. Therefore, we must be extremely cautious in implementing our policies.

Through our actions, we will prove that, even faced with tremendous threats, Taiwan will continue to stand tall on the international stage. Let us keep working together to show the world what a "resilient Taiwan" looks like. Thank you.

VIII.Meeting End Time: 7:45 p.m.