

## **Meeting Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee**

**Date:** Thursday, September 26, 2024, 4:00 p.m.

**Location:** Reception Hall, Office of the President

**Chair:** Convener Lai Ching-te

**Recorder:** Tsai Hsin-ya, Ministry of the Interior

**Attendees:** Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao, Deputy Convener Pan Men-an (潘孟安), and Deputy Convener Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), Advisor Robert Tsao (曹興誠) (on leave), Advisor Master Jing Yao (淨耀法師), Advisor Huoh Shoou-yeh (霍守業), and Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung (林敏雄).

**Committee Members:** Wellington L. Koo (顧立雄), Kuo Jyh-huei (郭智輝) (on leave), Chen Shih-kai (陳世凱), Chen Junne-jih (陳駿季), Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源), Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), Wang Pao-tzong (王寶宗), James Liao (廖英熙), Chen Hsin-liang (陳信良), Enoch Wu (吳怡農), Kuo Chia-yo (郭家佑) (on leave), Tseng Po-yu (曾柏瑜), Liu Yu-hsi (劉玉皙) (on leave), Tu Wen-ling (杜文苓), Hsiao Hsu-chun (蕭旭君), Yen Po-wen (顏博文), Hsiau Ya-wen (蕭雅文), Liu Wen (劉文), Bob Hung (洪偉淦), Tina Lin (林雅芳) (on leave), Kenny Huang (黃勝雄), Wu Jong-shinn (吳宗信), and Dai Chen-yu (戴辰宇).

**Non-voting Participants:** Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng (季連成), Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳), Deputy Executive Secretary Chang Tun-han (張惇涵), Deputy National Security Council Secretary-General Hsu Szu-chien (徐斯儉), Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧).

## **I. Chair's Remarks**

Our three deputy conveners Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, Secretary-General to the President Pan Men-an, and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Joseph Wu; all of our advisors and committee members, our dear friends watching live online: Good afternoon.

In order to consolidate forces from various sectors to strategize on national development, at the end of my first month in office, I announced that the Presidential Office will establish three committees in response to three major global issues: climate change, health promotion, and social resilience. Last month we convened the first meetings for two of those committees – the National Climate Change Committee and the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee.

Today, we are convening the first meeting for the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee. I want to thank our three deputy conveners and all advisors and committee members for their joint commitment. I also want to thank our fellow citizens and friends for following the committee's proceedings online.

Climate change, large-scale natural disasters, and the threat to democracy posed by expanding authoritarianism are all challenges not just for Taiwan, but for the entire world. The operations and goals of these three committees are interrelated, and they are closely connected by the issue of national resilience. We intend to build up a more resilient Taiwan, proactively deal with challenges, and bring Taiwan into deeper cooperation with the international community.

When former President Tsai Ing-wen was in office, the government took stock of resources in the public and private sectors in order to lay a solid foundation on which to build up our social resilience. Now, we will continue forward, from stocktaking to validation. This will entail three principles for whole-of-society defense resilience.

The first principle is “preparedness through vigilance.” We will actively engage in comprehensive preparation to make our nation stronger and our people more confident. That way, in a disaster or emergency, the government and the public can quickly leverage their respective strengths and maintain the normal operation of society.

The second principle is “enhanced response, fearlessness in action.” We will expand the training and utilization of civilian forces, enhance our strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution, and reinforce the operations and maintenance of energy and critical infrastructure. We will also improve the readiness of our social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facilities, and ensure the protection of information, transportation, and financial networks. All of this will enhance Taiwan’s response capabilities.

The third principle is “orderly execution, methodical action.” At all levels of government, from central to local, we will conduct extensive validation and drilling, and we will expand connections with civil society groups and societal forces so that we can all work together, in a systematic and professional manner, to identify problems, propose solutions, and follow through with implementation. This is how we will resolve problems.

The work involved in whole-of-society defense resilience is diverse and complex. Accordingly, this committee needs members from the public and private sectors who can work together in coordination. The members must be guided by practical experience, have interdisciplinary expertise, span different generations, and constitute a balance between the genders. These were the factors we took into consideration when we invited representatives from industry, government agencies, academia, and research institutions to serve as the four advisors and 23 members who make up this committee. Of the total committee membership, 67.7 percent are not government officials, and 32.3 percent are women.

First, I want to thank the committee advisors who have taken on that important responsibility. With us today we have Master Jing Yao of the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China; Huoh Shoou-yeh, chairman of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research; and Lin Ming-hsiung, chairman of Chuan Lian Enterprise Co. I thank each of you for your participation, and look forward to seeing you provide the committee with broadly considered, professional views on such matters as civilian force preparedness, strategic frameworks, and supply distribution.

I also want to introduce committee members who are here today. We have with us Wang Pao-tzong, chairman of the Holy Glory Temple; Chen Hsin-liang, general secretary of the General Assembly Executive Committee of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan; and Yen Po-wen, CEO of the Tzu Chi Charity Foundation. I thank you all for your commitment and for giving us all the opportunity to learn how religious groups engage in disaster preparedness and relief efforts.

Let me also thank James Liao, president of the National Defense Education Association; Enoch Wu, founder of the Forward Alliance; Hsiao Ya-wen, honorary chairperson of the Taiwan Development Association for Disaster Medical Team; Liu Wen, chairperson of the Kuma Civil Defense Education Association; and Tseng Po-yu, consultant at Doublethink Lab. You have all been long involved in civil defense education, emergency medicine, and other fields, so I am quite confident that you will help the committee to better understand civilian force training and utilization.

Let me also introduce Tu Wen-ling, distinguished professor in the Department of Public Administration at National Chengchi University, and Hsiao Hsu-chun, associate professor of Computer Science and Information Engineering at National Taiwan University. I thank both of you for generously contributing your expertise to

make Taiwan's energy and critical infrastructure operations more robust.

Also, I want to thank Wu Jong-shinn, director general of the Taiwan Space Agency; Kenny Huang, chairman of the Taiwan Network Information Center; and Dai Chen-yu, board member of the Association of Hackers in Taiwan. Your involvement will contribute immensely to the protection of information, transportation, and financial networks in Taiwan.

Among our committee members we have the following six government representatives: Minister of National Defense Wellington L. Koo; Minister of Economic Affairs Kuo Jyh-huei, who could not attend today's meeting; Minister of Transportation and Communications Chen Shih-kai; Minister of Agriculture Chen Junne-jih; Minister of Health and Welfare Chiu Tai-yuan; and Minister of Ocean Affairs Council Kuan Bi-ling. The committee has two executive secretaries, namely Chi Lien-cheng, minister without portfolio of the Executive Yuan, and Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang.

In addition, one member who will be joining us shortly is Bob Hung, general manager of Trend Micro Taiwan. I also want to introduce one advisor and three committee members who could not attend today. They are, respectively, Robert Tsao, founder of United Microelectronics Corporation; Kuo Chia-yo, president of the Taiwan Digital Diplomacy Association; Liu Yu-hsi, associate professor in the Department of Communications Management at Shih-Hsin University; and Tina Lin, managing director of sales and operations at Google Taiwan. I also thank them for participating in this committee's operations and for contributing their valuable advice at today's proceedings in written form.

Last Saturday marked the 25th anniversary of the major earthquake that struck Taiwan on September 21, 1999. For the past 25 years, we

have worked continuously to improve Taiwan's disaster preparedness and relief capabilities. Today, our purpose in building up whole-of-society defense resilience is to enable each and every individual to realize, when an emergency arises, where to best make a contribution and how to protect themselves, contribute to society, or deter an approaching enemy. We want to enable all our citizens to feel utterly confident in the continuity and future of Taiwan's society. Today, in this first meeting of the committee, the NSC will brief us on the topic of "Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience: Planning and Challenges." The NSC will familiarize all of us here, as well as our citizens and friends watching online, with the concepts and operations involved in whole-of-society defense resilience, the associated challenges and goals, and the progress we have made toward achieving our tasks.

I have said before that a sudden natural disaster is like an acute cold, while climate change is more like a chronic disease. What whole-of-society defense resilience addresses is both the chronic and the acute. In addition to national disasters and emergencies, Taiwan has also been dealing for a long time with the challenges of gray-zone aggression and cognitive warfare.

Located in the first island chain, Taiwan stands on the frontline of the democratic world. As such, we have always endeavored to safeguard regional peace and stability. I firmly believe that a more resilient Taiwan will contribute more to global democracy, peace, and prosperity.

I also believe that when Taiwan is properly prepared and shows determination, our like-minded partners from around the world will be more willing to help Taiwan, jointly respond to all kinds of challenges, and work in concert to mitigate risks.

As the people of Taiwan become more united, our nation grows more stable. As our society becomes better prepared, our nation

grows more secure. And as Taiwan shows more determination to defend itself, the international community will feel more at ease.

And so, I want to thank all of you once again for taking on the major task of enhancing our whole-of-society defense resilience. I look forward to working together with everyone, as we continue to observe global conditions, to establish a platform through which we can communicate and coordinate on our national resilience strategy, thereby fostering a nationwide consensus and strengthening resilience throughout Taiwan in national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy.

Moving forward, let us engage in wide-ranging discussions, build a fortress of unity, and further empower our whole-of-society defense resilience, making Taiwan a cornerstone for ensuring regional stability and democratic sustainability. Thank you.

## **II. Issuance of Appointment Letters and Group Photo (Omitted)**

## **III. Confirmation of the Meeting Agenda**

**Decision: To confirm the agenda of this meeting.**

## **IV. Report Item (Omitted)**

Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience: Planning and Challenges

(Presented by Deputy NSC Secretary-General Hsu Szu-chien)

## **V. Discussion Items (In Speaking Order)**

### **1. Committee members are invited to comment on Report Item**

#### **(1) Committee Member Remarks (Non-government)**

##### **1. Committee Member, Wang Pao-tzong**

Whether it was the 921 Earthquake or Typhoon Morakot, the I-Kuan Tao organization has always actively participated in various disaster relief efforts, including stationing personnel at temporary first aid stations and supplying disaster victims and

working staff with vegetarian meals cooked by a rotating staff from various branches across Taiwan at fixed meal stations, assisting to the extent of its ability with logistics work involving disaster victims and disaster relief.

## **2. Committee Member, James Liao**

- (1) Due to the importance of all-out national defense, it is suggested to encourage incorporating shooting sports into all-out national defense. Highly safe electronic targets can be used in static, dynamic, or alternating static-dynamic training to cultivate muscle memory in a fun and educational way, helping strengthen response capabilities through sports.
- (2) It is suggested, to strengthen all-out national defense education, that relevant education and training records such as training history, levels, and performance can also be used to produce learning passports. Enterprises, agencies, and schools can be encouraged to promote the culture of shooting sports by holding more competitions or by applying various incentive mechanisms.

## **3. Committee Member, Chen Hsin-liang**

- (1) The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan built Mackay Memorial Hospital, Changhua Christian Hospital, and Tainan Sin-Lau Hospital to provide medical services to northern, central, and southern Taiwan, respectively. Of which, Mackay Memorial Hospital has assigned professionally trained medical personnel to assist with humanitarian aid in Ukraine, and such work has won the trust of Ukrainians. In addition, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has also donated more than 100 ambulances through its cooperation with Taiwanese enterprises to assist with rescue care on the frontline.



- (2) In a good cooperative relationship with the local governments, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan can assist with the evacuation of many injured and sick patients through the hospital system whenever a large-scale disaster occurs. Various disaster relief drills are regularly conducted by the hospital system during peacetime. In addition to enhancing the capabilities of medical personnel and strengthening them both physically and mentally in preparation for facing extreme wartime situations, these drills also allow non-medical staff to participate to help bolster Taiwan's capacity for self-preservation.
- (3) There are 1,300 branches of the Presbyterian Church located throughout Taiwan, each of which is equipped with its own kitchen and able to provide many forms of assistance, including spiritual comfort and logistical work such as evacuation and sheltering for the populace.

#### **4. Committee Member, Enoch Wu**

- (1) I express my affirmation for the Presidential Office's effort in establishing the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, which aims to shape a resilient Taiwan through integration and collaboration among various ministries and agencies of the central government. Resilience has several aspects: Resilience in emergency response constitutes a security issue; resilience of critical infrastructure affects economic development; and resilience in democracy makes it possible to unite society. Thus far, Forward Alliance has trained about 10,000 citizens across the country to strengthen their basic disaster response ability. More importantly, it has established close interaction with grassroots organizations in the community to share correct knowledge and skills with the community by way of

“empowerment,” so as to enhance the resilience of civil society.

(2) Based on Forward Alliance’s experience in international cooperation and exchange, it could be reasonably concluded that risk management effort requires knowledge of the scenario. Once the scenario is known, the tasks can then be determined; and once the tasks are determined, the required capabilities can be identified; and from there, core efforts can be confirmed. By clarifying scenarios and tasks, resource allocation and priority setting can be properly addressed and we can then propose corresponding policies, measures, and plans, while evaluating their results and effectiveness.

- Key area 1 “civilian force training and utilization”: Suggestions include starting with determination of scenarios after which tasks can be determined, followed by the identification of the capabilities required for the tasks, as well as the work items and scope associated with those tasks. Next, we can plan training standards and set priorities for resource allocation. Only after all of that do we have a basis for reviewing the effectiveness of implementing action plans. Note that in key area 1 “civilian force training and utilization,” the content of the objectives “enhancing the capacity of civilian forces in performing duties” and “civilian forces possessing moderate capacity in performing duties” are still vague. It is suggested to return to the principles of risk management to clearly define the content of the work.
- Key area 3 “energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance”: The power-related risks are not only about the operability of critical infrastructure, but also

about the assumptions about power demand, which needs attention. According to research by Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. on AI application trends and AI data (information) centers, it can be inferred that the development of AI may overturn previous models and assumptions on power demand. For example, ChatGPT search consumes 10 times the power of Google search. Therefore, it is suggested that discussion not be limited to power dispatch or power outage prevention, but rather on reviewing and evaluating the overall energy and power structure.

- International experience shows that the biggest weaknesses in critical infrastructure include system (network) security and aerial attacks. However, the current plan focuses on security and physical protection without fully addressing core risk categories. It is suggested that we establish a public-private collaboration mechanism with reference to examples in advanced democratic countries and prepare ourselves from the position of all-hazard risk management, so as to ensure the effective use of limited resources.
- The civil defense system should be streamlined in accordance with the concept of the whole-of-society defense resilience. The Civil Defense Act is a remnant from the authoritarian era. From its legislation to its implementation, the act was based on a broad positioning with vague tasks, while supporting military duties and often referring to political sensitive issues. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions proposes 15 tasks for three types of civil defense, namely protecting the civilian population, assisting the civilian population,

providing the conditions necessary for its survival. It is suggested that a definition of civil defense with humanitarian assistance as the core be adopted to achieve the goals of clarifying civil defense tasks, fostering social consensus, and aligning with international standards, so that we can expand cooperation with international allies. (Supplemental information: Most scenarios and scenario-based tasks span the various key areas of this committee. In order to implement the vision of whole-of-society defense resilience or all-hazard risk management, it is suggested to evaluate and refine the current approach to division of labor.)

## **5. Committee Member, Tseng Po-yu**

- (1) Ukraine's experience shows us that before whole-of-society defense resilience is promoted, whole-of-government must first be promoted. This is mainly because in extreme situations, the threats posed span many ministries and agencies, and thus cross-ministry and cross-agency response is required. Only with whole-of-society integration can we properly respond with an appropriate approach.
- (2) Regarding cognitive warfare, it is suggested to establish an early warning system while strengthening cooperation with democratic countries around the world. It is important to rapidly introduce monitoring and early warning systems for Foreign Information Manipulation Interference (FIMI) to monitor and warn of such interference, so as to avoid the expansion of crises.
- (3) In the face of cognitive warfare, actions to clarify and verify the situation alone may not be sufficient. It is suggested to proactively conduct strategic communication

and to convey Taiwan's positive image and the importance of Taiwan to the Indo-Pacific region through multi-lateral platform cooperation. Internally, it is suggested to make tiered responses to avoid information confusion. One example is introducing cross-ministry, cross-agency, and cross-domain drills on cognitive warfare in the Han Kuang military exercises to build up people's guard, thus enhancing their confidence in the country.

## **6. Committee Member, Tu Wen-ling**

- (1) In Taiwan's promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience, the focus should lie not only in local efforts, but also in international cooperation and joint defense. In recent US reports on security challenges, Taiwan's defense cases have been mentioned, including how to engage in joint defense of Taiwan in extreme climate. The Presidential Office has established three committees to deal with integrated issues. Whether focusing on the impact of climate change or disease prevention and health issues, the committees are closely linked to whole-of-society security. Infrastructure is an integral part of national security. Therefore, the infrastructure resilience of the society must be considered in an integrated manner. For example, by cooperating with various think tanks to increase the proportion of renewable energy, people could build things like rooftop photovoltaic facilities or community microgrids, which not only provide the people with income but also strengthen the society's energy resilience.
- (2) It is suggested to promote "climate security wargaming" where various simulated scenarios are developed to see how to facilitate the general public's access to society's security system to make contributions to the building of

resilience in climate security, just like during the pandemic, when everyone was able to make a contribution to the pandemic response.

## **7. Committee Member, Hsiao Hsu-chun**

- (1) Critical infrastructure in Taiwan can be categorized into eight major areas based on functional attributes. The current approach leans more toward a single agency taking inventory of each area. However, the interdependencies among the areas are also of significance. For example: a disruption in the internet may affect other facilities. Therefore, the top priority now is to eliminate these interdependencies that affect one another. It is suggested to take inventory of the interdependencies among critical infrastructures to reduce dependence on certain external units, thus strengthening resilience of critical infrastructure.
- (2) Regarding key area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection,” government websites are an important channel for information transmission and are characterized by centralization and trustworthiness. It is suggested to consider incorporating cooperative partners for message immediacy and decentralization to expand capacity in dissemination of information; still, attention should be paid to the sources of information and to enhancing the public’s ability to discern information.

## **8. Committee Member, Yen Po-wen**

- (1) In Tzu Chi Charity Foundation’s experience in disaster relief, the situations we face are getting increasingly complex. In our early days, we mainly offered support after natural disasters caused by climate change. Recently, we have provided support for anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, anti-terrorism financing, anti-weapons-

proliferation financing, and among in other various conflicts. In 2023, the global death toll due to conflicts was double that of natural disasters. Resilience strengthening has become a global trend.

- (2) Tzu Chi is committed to promoting resilience strengthening work, including Disaster Relief Volunteer (DRV) training. Currently, more than 6,000 Tzu Chi volunteers have taken the DRV training. Moreover, Tzu Chi has spontaneously handled the training of Compassionate Care Volunteers. During the Russia-Ukraine war, Tzu Chi has worked closely with international non-profit organizations in numerous supply distribution operations in Poland and Ukraine, estimated to have provided more than 2 million disaster victims with relief supplies. Tzu Chi has also cooperated with friends and allies to provide Ukraine with supply, medical, and educational support, and the promotion of such work is still ongoing.
- (3) In addition, Tzu Chi was greatly inspired by the disaster relief experience in Japan's Noto Peninsula. When the disaster occurred there, traffic was interrupted, resulting in inaccessibility to resources. Demonstrating its resilience in regular disaster relief work, Tzu Chi immediately provided hot meals at the first opportunity and carried out multiple releases of solatium. However, due to traffic difficulties and other problems, there were always obstacles to reconstruction in the disaster area. At the Building Resilience Together: Lessons Learned from the 2024 Japan-Taiwan Earthquakes seminar held by Tzu Chi at Academia Sinica in August this year, one Japanese scholar pointed out that about 230 casualties directly resulted from the Noto Peninsula earthquake, with the number gradually

climbing to 260, which included indirect disaster-related deaths of elderly people due to disruptions in nutrition or medical treatment. This reflects that disaster-related casualties could have been minimized if local governments had properly integrated resources in disaster preparedness.

## **9. Committee Member, Hsiao Ya-wen**

- (1) When a large-scale disaster occurs, the public sector alone may not be able to fully respond; hence, the need for reinforcement and assistance from the private sector constitutes a very important part of whole-of-society defense resilience. It is suggested to incorporate force from the private sector into the public sector's response mechanism, establish a comprehensive public-private cooperation model, and clearly define the role and function of a reliable civil force, so as to give full play to the effectiveness of the civilian force's involvement in response.
- (2) The government has proposed many response measures for medical and social welfare, but has ignored the fact of medical worker shortages. Therefore, filling the gap through the civilian force remains an important issue. For example, in the government's plan for widely establishing emergency rescue care stations, from where will the medical workers be sourced? Would the demand for such workers affect the existing labor supplies at long-term care institutions? Further ongoing discussions are suggested to facilitate the detailed implementation of policies.

## **10. Committee Member, Liu Wen**

- (1) I commend the government's efforts in promoting the concept of whole-of-society defense resilience. In Ukraine's experience, the first wave of attacks targeted the



critical infrastructures, and the second wave of attacks targeted rescue personnel in disaster areas. Therefore, disaster relief groups should continue to strengthen their war disaster awareness, engaging those of the general public who are willing to be involved in unscripted drills for wartime disaster preparedness and assisting the government in promoting relevant drills in the future.

- (2) Kuma Academy, for example, has trained more than 40,000 people for basic war disaster awareness and defense skills since 2022. The Kuma Civil Defense Education Association is committed to equipping an increasing number of citizens with the knowledge of, and skills for, whole-of-society defense resilience, in hopes of establishing a connection platform with the government to help train more people to become DRVs, or establishing a new whole-of-society defense certification mechanism, so as to expand the capacity of civilian force training.
- (3) Currently, Taiwan's disaster victim shelters and relief stations are mostly based in junior high schools and primary schools, which requires the assistance of school principals and teachers. In Ukraine's experience, custodians and keys to access disaster victim shelters and relief stations often could not be found. Therefore, it is suggested that the Ministry of Education (MOE), as the competent authority in education, assist schools at all levels in improving the management of shelters and relief stations based in school campuses.
- (4) In the government's promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience, in addition to the preparedness of physical facilities, it is suggested to also strengthen planning for cognitive warfare.

## **11. Committee Member, Bob Hung**

- (1) Interdependencies exists between key area 3 “energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance” and key area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection.” In Ukraine’s experience, key infrastructure such as telecommunications, petroleum, water, and electricity were the targets in the first wave of the enemy’s attack. Therefore, ensuring the resilience of those networks and systems is a vital issue.
- (2) Key area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection” focuses on network protection. However, in terms of ensuring network resilience, it is suggested that the government start with risk assessment and multi-level protection, while strengthening the planning of backup mechanisms, so as to enhance resilience.
- (3) Current planning overemphasizes the availability of communications infrastructure. In Ukraine’s experience, even with backup measures of satellite and telecommunications companies in response to attacks, there was still the possibility of operations being interrupted due to cyberattacks. It is suggested not to assume that the systems for such infrastructure as petroleum, water, and electricity are completely isolated but rather to properly pay attention to the balance between availability and security.

## **12. Committee Member, Kenny Huang**

- (1) Regarding key area 2 “strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution,” it is necessary to expand the decentralized structure for strategic materials to ensure the resilience of the distribution stations in villages and

neighborhoods, empowering each person with the capacity for self-sufficiency.

- (2) Regarding key area 3 “energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance,” in addition to security assurance plans for seaports, airports, energy and information and communications facilities, it is also necessary to formulate enemy deterrence plans to prevent such facilities from being used by the enemy.
- (3) Regarding key area 4 “social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facility readiness,” at present, search and rescue or medical rescue systems have been established, which, however, are scattered across various units. It is suggested that such systems be integrated to enhance the efficiency of resource utilization.
- (4) Regarding key area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection,” hybrid communications drills should be conducted to enhance the police and civil society’s understanding of the command chain. And consideration should be given to the problem of whether outsourced contractors can continue to provide their services.

### **13. Committee Member, Wu Jong-shinn**

As 4G, 5G, or submarine communications cables may be impacted by natural disasters or extreme situations, in order to maintain uninterrupted government communications 24 hours a day, establishing 3D communications is very important. In particular, establishing satellites will become important critical infrastructure, which must be maintained for the long term. The goal is to establish Taiwan’s capacity for satellite communications systems; the strategy for which is described as follows:

- (1) Improve Taiwan's satellite communications system, targeting multiple satellite & ground communications networks such as geostationary satellites, low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellites, medium-earth-orbit (MEO) satellites.
- (2) Take inventory of the communications capacity required to maintain normal operations of the national defense, medical care, government, and financial systems during emergencies to facilitate the deployment of satellite systems.
- (3) Actively engage in international cooperation. Taiwan possesses robust industrial production capabilities, and international cooperation can drive Taiwan's industrial development, achieving long-term self-sufficiency in production and enhanced resilience.

#### **14. Committee Member, Dai Chen-yu**

- (1) Types of cybersecurity attacks generally include: computer-based crimes, such as fraud and extortion; information warfare, such as public opinion manipulation; critical infrastructure attacks, such as cutting off petroleum, water, or electricity supply; Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks, such as espionage-related data theft; supply chain attacks, such as setup of backdoors in network communications equipment, etc. It is suggested that the government study threat models and establish corresponding regulations accordingly. The current Cyber Security Management Act lacks binding force on private units and local governments, and it also lacks cross-ministerial resources. Therefore, management authorities lack tools that can protect against information security attacks.

- (2) In addition to tabletop wargaming, the government should also conduct technical wargaming, such as a confrontation between a red team and blue team, including simulated attacks designed by experts, so as to actually verify the effectiveness of protective measures.
- (3) At present, small- and medium-sized enterprises and suppliers to the government on the supply chain often fail to invest adequate resources in data security protection, thus resulting in significant hazards of government data leakage. Therefore, improvement measures should be actively developed. In addition, emails issued by the government lack record settings such as Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC), thus making government emails easily forged. Therefore, corresponding planning should be improved and strengthened.

## **(2) Remarks by Committee Members (Government Representatives), Report Presenter, and Executive Secretaries**

### **1. Committee Member, Wellington L. Koo**

- (1) The whole-of-society defense resilience initiative is now in the verification stage. The NSC has incorporated the suggestions made by all committee members into discussions. However, some issues cannot be resolved immediately; therefore, short-, medium-, and long-term solutions must be discussed on an ongoing basis.
- (2) Taiwan in the current era faces a mixture of threats, e.g., conventional, non-conventional, formal, and informal threats. Gray-zone aggression from China is one of these

types. Therefore, the government is now more actively engaging in strategic communication.

- (3) Taiwan has conducted various wargames and reviews in response to various types of threats and aggressions. In terms of the interdependence among various types of critical infrastructure, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) must understand the core critical infrastructure that help maintain military resilience, and then gradually facilitate their improvement.
- (4) In addition, the execution of military missions must be based on a common operating picture (COP), of which the entire government constitutes a part, including: capacity in operating and maintaining critical infrastructure, capacity in emergency medicine, and capacity in maintaining information security, which must rely on public-private collaboration to make the COP complete; only then can we achieve the goal of enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience and combat resilience.

## **2. Committee Member, Chen Shih-kai**

- (1) The Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) is mainly involved in the promotion of key area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection.” Transportation is the main artery for people’s livelihoods and the military, and ensuring its continuous operations in extreme situations is a very important issue. The MOTC has formulated plans for implementing the continuous operations of ground, maritime, and air transport and plans for the inventory taking and preparedness of transport corridors; it has also adopted security measures for strengthening the emergency

response operations of critical facilities as well as electromechanical and monitoring facilities.

- (2) In order to respond to drone intrusions and develop countermeasure capacity, a countermeasure system has been established at Taipei Songshan Airport. The countermeasure system will be established at Taoyuan International Airport and Kaohsiung International Airport, and remote-controlled drones will be procured.
- (3) As for critical infrastructures for ground, maritime, and air transport, the protection of the security of such facilities is to be strengthened continuously, and network technologies are to be strengthened in line with the Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA), including the deployment of satellite terminal equipment in the Highway Bureau, Taiwan's high-speed railway system, Civil Aviation Administration, etc., to enhance resilience preparedness.

### **3. Committee Member, Chen Junne-jih**

- (1) The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) is primarily involved in the promotion of key area 2 “strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution.” First, the scope of impacts from extreme situations and short-term natural disasters are different. Improved methods are therefore proposed as follows:
  - Food inventory and preparedness: We have taken inventory of various types of food stocks. In response to any emergency, a food production plan will be launched. In response to water or power cut offs, response measures include taking inventory of ready-to-eat products, and communicating with production factories and operators to facilitate food preparedness.

- Food storage: There are three levels of storage – the production level, factory level, and field level. First, the government has set up rolling inventory warehouses; second, shopping venues are the best places to stockpile food, and we are now continuing to inventory those locations; the third level is households. In the future, we will strengthen the concept of appropriate at-home stockpiling. In addition, a decentralized concept will be adopted to diversify food stockpiling risks.
  - Food distribution: Existing food warehouses adopt a design for decentralization. Food is distributed from storage sites to supply points, and then to distribution points for further distribution by local governments or integrated retail channels. A hierarchical distribution network has already been established, so food can be systematically dispatched in response to local needs.
- (2) The MOA has implemented plans for food preparedness, storage, and distribution, with inventory taken every month. In the future, the MOA will improve the advocacy for household-based disaster and food preparedness.

#### **4. Committee Member, Chiu Tai-yuan**

- (1) Regarding key area 1 “civilian force training and utilization,” in response to emergency medical needs in extreme situations, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) is currently planning to utilize alternative military service reservists organized by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) to assist with first aid stations across the country.
- (2) Regarding key area 4 “social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facility readiness,” in 2024 the MOHW began to formulate a four-year program for resilient national



medical preparedness and promote 10 social welfare and medical care sub-programs, primarily promoting the following items:

- Take inventory of the 52 hospitals with heavy emergency care responsibilities and strengthen hospital water, electricity, and life support systems.
  - Take inventory of the treatment capacities of the 205 hospitals responsible for emergency care and plan first aid station preparedness to strengthen community medical capacities. In the future, the MOHW will communicate with medical associations to incorporate physicians from all primary care clinics nationwide into the resilient healthcare system to enhance local community care capacities.
  - Bring hospital trauma equipment into a state of preparedness and make appropriate plans for the storage and distribution of related drugs, medical supplies, and medical equipment.
- (3) Regarding shelter and relief stations, as of the end of August 2024, the MOHW has completed inventories of approximately 4,601 relief stations, and will gradually enhance the functionality of those stations.

## **5. Committee Member, Kuan Bi-ling**

- (1) The Ocean Affairs Council (OAC) primarily faces five issues: disaster prevention resilience, cognitive warfare, maritime monitoring and reconnaissance systems, digital security for defense purposes, and the security of maritime routes.
- (2) Disaster prevention resilience: In addition to marine pollution disasters and chemical disasters, the government is already paying attention to emerging types of offshore wind power and industrial disasters, as well as marine

accidents and terrorist attacks. The OAC regularly conducts disaster prevention and rescue drills, of which the rescue drills have been most comprehensive. In 2023, for example, the OAC's Coast Guard Administration (CGA), along with local governments, jointly conducted 38 live rescue drills. The area that requires the most improvement is industrial disasters, and drills have already been conducted involving offshore wind farms and coastal units. Furthermore, Taiwan and its allies and partners need to continue to strengthen maritime chemical disaster drills and dispatch personnel to participate in professional training abroad.

- (3) Cognitive warfare: The CGA stands on the frontline facing cognitive warfare and China's gray-zone aggression. Cognitive warfare constitutes a new challenge, and whereas in the past the CGA did very little to raise awareness of this issue, China has continued major external propaganda efforts. Therefore, we must continue to implement policy initiatives and respond in a timely manner. In addition, coastal defense requires a whole-of-society approach. In terms of marine environmental protection in times of peace, the Ocean Conservation Administration's (OCA) environmental protection fleet has already incorporated private fishing vessels, and integrating those vessels into security and defense affairs still requires continued communication and promotion.
- (4) The CGA must continue to enhance its ability to fully understand maritime situations, strengthen digital resilience preparedness, and establish backup systems. In addition, supply planning and maintenance, enhancement of maritime transport capabilities, and maintaining the security of maritime routes will continue.

## **6. Report Presenter, NSC Deputy Secretary-General Hsu Szu-chien**

- (1) Regarding the promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience, the NSC takes a whole-of-government approach, inviting groups from the relevant ministries and agencies to discuss policy formulation and directions for preparation to effectively achieve the objectives of the five key areas.
- (2) To respond to cognitive warfare, it is necessary to achieve consensus through whole-of-society communication, as well as conduct strategic communication with the international community and continue to assist and cooperate with civil society.
- (3) Regarding scenario-based threat analyses, the government has continuously gathered experiences from other countries, and hopes to continue cooperating with civil society groups to jointly complete situation analyses as a basis for making preparations.
- (4) Regarding “civilian force training and utilization,” it is necessary to continue to study, discuss, and promote development at the community level to enhance community self-rescue and mutual aid capabilities during natural disasters or in extreme situations.
- (5) Regarding information security issues, the whole world has experienced similar information security and disinformation attacks. Taiwan will continue to cooperate with allied countries to strengthen the resilience of information and communication networks.

## **7. Executive Secretary, Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng**

The key to full implementation of whole-of-society defense resilience lies in the integration and concretization of resilience efforts from the central government to local governments, and executing such efforts through cooperation among administrative systems so that the policy can achieve concrete results. The Executive Yuan is responsible for the coordination and integration, division of labor, and oversight and assessment functions. There are three important tasks for the future:

- (1) Collaboration with local governments in raising awareness related to whole-of-society defense resilience, and actively establishing consensus and work.
- (2) Nationwide critical infrastructure for petroleum, water, electricity, finance, medical care, transportation, and information and communications systems have already been inventoried to review their protection programs and enhance protective actions. Regarding strengthening cybersecurity: In 2025 offensive and defensive exercises will be conducted targeting critical infrastructure and policy-making organizations. For both categories, the relevant preparedness tasks have already been carried out.
- (3) Planning wargaming and live exercises related to critical infrastructure, and local governments. For tabletop wargaming exercises and unscripted live exercises, by communicating with facility maintenance units and local governments, small-scale unscripted live exercises conducted in small areas will gradually be introduced. It is hoped that through pragmatic wargaming and live exercises, weaknesses can be addressed to boost substantive protection capabilities and speed of recovery.

## **8. Executive Secretary, Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang**

- (1) Vertical integration between the central and local governments constitutes an important task in promoting whole-of-society defense resilience. That requires the central and local governments to gradually overcome their conceptual differences, especially as it pertains to strengthening communication between the central and local governments. In addition, regarding the integration of the public and private sectors, when disasters occur, one cannot rely solely on the government, police, and fire departments to maintain social functioning. Civil communities must also gradually develop rescue and self-rescue capabilities. Therefore, in addition to the police, auxiliary police, and auxiliary traffic police, as well as fire fighters and auxiliary fire fighters, the capacities of civil society groups and religious groups must be assessed.
- (2) Regarding training for police and fire fighters, continuous strengthening of international cooperation is now underway, including counter-terrorism awareness and the utilization of new technologies and drones for disaster relief. For example, foreign groups were invited to collaborate on the 921 National Disaster Preparedness Day Exercise and make suggestions for improvements to help Taiwan strengthen its emergency response resilience.
- (3) Regarding the training of civilian forces, after the new administration assumed office on May 20, 2024, it became more active in preparing and training civilian forces, including auxiliary police and auxiliary firefighter training. In the future, assistance will also be provided to village (neighborhood) chiefs and township (town, city, district) offices to gain a better understanding of their respective positions and roles within the civil defense system. At the

same time, there are more than 260,000 alternative service reservists in either “public order maintenance units” or “disaster prevention and rescue units” that will be called up for more intensive training to provide reserve troops with science-based learning and enhance overall emergency response capabilities.

- (4) Planning for exercises tends toward unscripted, decentralized, and small-scale exercises, and through those exercises, directions for improvement are gradually explored. Relevant critical supply system preparedness should be strengthened, and operations personnel for critical infrastructure, in addition to protecting equipment, need to grasp disaster prevention and evacuation concepts.
- (5) Communication with society to promote whole-of-society defense resilience is lacking. If each individual is aware that they still have a role to play in the event of a disaster or extreme situation, then whole-of-society defense can gradually become fully functional.

### **(3) Advisor Remarks**

#### **1. Advisor, Master Jing Yao**

- (1) All of the committee members’ suggestions on the issue of whole-of-society defense resilience are very insightful and I affirm President Lai’s leadership in taking the initiative to undertake disaster relief and social resilience enhancement efforts. In addition, the MOI has actively promoted DRV training and reached out to religious groups, increasing religious groups’ awareness of disaster prevention concepts while building self-help and mutual help capabilities, which is praiseworthy.

- (2) While Taiwan faces many different kinds of disasters with different characteristics, the scourge of war is particularly serious and ruthless. It is recommended that this committee be organized by groups according to the committee members' fields of expertise to facilitate joint discussions on various disaster relief models for extreme situations, with the discussion results to be implemented through government systems.
- (3) As to implementing the idea that all members of society are part of the disaster relief team, everyone is welcome to contribute their knowledge. Based on experiences from the 921 Earthquake and COVID-19 pandemic, mechanisms need to be established to handle the remains of the deceased including body bags, coffins, and cremation equipment. A mechanism must also be established so that when a disaster strikes and there is a widespread sense of panic, religious groups can serve their function of calming the public. Regarding the hoarding and storage of disaster relief supplies, it is recommended that local governments set up disaster relief warehouses. Public welfare organizations should be classified by type and integrated to establish an operating mechanism so that each group can respond immediately when a disaster occurs.
- (4) In addition, road damage from the April 3 earthquake in Hualien this year disrupted local transportation. Yet the roads were made passable in just one night, demonstrating the maturity of Taiwan's disaster relief capabilities. It is suggested to update relevant disaster relief equipment to strengthen post-disaster recovery efforts. The Buddhist Association of the Republic of China raised and donated NT\$5 million to the Hualien County Government, and

NT\$1 million each to households that were hit the hardest. Nevertheless, the people of Hualien still face difficulties in making a living. It is hoped that the central government will guide local governments to assist people from all walks of life to visit Hualien, thus helping economic recovery in the disaster area.

## **2. Advisor, Lin Ming-hsiung**

- (1) Chuan Lian Enterprise Co. (Chuan Lian) supplies and markets daily necessities in Taiwan, serving approximately 2 million customers daily through its 1,200 branches and warehouses and a comprehensive delivery system. Once a disaster occurs, Chuan Lian makes every effort to help provide the everyday necessities of life.
- (2) During the 921 Earthquake, Chuan Lian provided daily necessities free of charge, and collaborated with the government to deliver supplies to the Puli disaster area in government helicopters. As a distributor, Chuan Lian also regularly assists with the sale and marketing of surplus agricultural products. Chuan Lian is a local enterprise with widespread public support. If society has a problem, or the agricultural sector has a problem, Chuan Lian has a problem, so whenever the nation faces supply problems, Chuan Lian does its best to help.

## **3. Advisor, Huoh Shoou-yeh**

- (1) Although the five key areas proposed to promote whole-of-society defense resilience are quite comprehensive, detailed plans are still needed to facilitate implementation at the grassroots level.
- (2) In 2023, the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) of the MND issued the *All-out Defense Contingency*



*Handbook* to raise awareness regarding all-out national defense among Taiwan citizens. In the past two years, the concept of whole-of-society defense resilience has been emphasized and widely applied to response in general disasters and extreme situations. The government's promotional work plays a key role in making society as a whole aware of the relevant concepts. It is recommended that such promotional efforts focus on educational institutions to cultivate concepts, including disaster prevention, from an early age. For example, the “drop, cover, and hold on” response to earthquakes could be combined with scout training, establishing basic disaster prevention, rescue, and wilderness survival skills. Another recommendation is to have the public sector participate in relevant publicity and educational efforts, thereby influencing society, as well as private enterprises and groups, so that every citizen, family, and acting unit has the relevant knowledge and skills, thus building a resilient society.

- (3) It is necessary to bolster organizational strength, and increase the awareness of existing organizations such as local governments, township (town, city, district) offices, and village (neighborhood) organizations so that they understand how to utilize the relevant disaster relief and response capacities, and integrate civilian forces. For example, people can be mobilized by local governments for annual exercises, and such efforts should continue to be strengthened. Taking the Tokyo subway disaster incident as an example, if a similar incident occurred at Taipei Station or Wanhua Station, how should people respond, and which unit should be responsible? Making appropriate

arrangements for all mechanisms that handle these situations will ensure social resilience.

#### **(4) Deputy Convener Remarks**

##### **1. Deputy Convener, Joseph Wu**

- (1) In the face of changes in domestic and international circumstances, Taiwan needs to respond to new challenges with a new mindset. The concept of whole-of-society defense resilience is a demonstration of that new mindset. When society can continue to function in crisis, the country's overall governance will not be affected. Safeguarding the nation is not solely a matter of national defense, but a task for the whole society and the whole government.
- (2) Crises can be divided into different stages and different levels. The whole-of-society defense resilience concept means the ability to maintain a functioning government and society in the face of gray-zone aggression, major natural disasters, cyberattacks, and even armed conflict. All committee members and advisors are welcome to continue to provide relevant suggestions and recommendations on various key areas to improve the related policy measures.
- (3) Each committee member and advisor has unique professional expertise. Many members of this committee have cybersecurity backgrounds, which shows the importance of building Taiwan's cybersecurity systems and capacities through civil society to improve related behaviors. The government is also actively planning to establish strategic communication systems and capacities, hoping to establish a strategic communication model for the government as a whole. Lastly, the government plans to conduct a tabletop wargaming exercise at the end of 2024

and a live exercise in 2025 to verify whether whole-of-society defense resilience preparedness efforts are sufficient, as well as to enhance preparedness and capacities.

## **2. Deputy Convener, Pan Men-an**

- (1) From my personal experiences with disaster relief during the 921 Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot, I am well aware of the damage caused by disasters and the grief caused by the loss of life. I have also witnessed the resilience of local and central government rescue systems, and the warmth shown by religious groups and non-profit organizations. Only after experiencing earthquakes, typhoons, and floods did Taiwan start to build the resilience and capacities we have today.
- (2) In facing the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan also used appropriate means to prevent the spread of the virus through cooperation among the central and local governments and civil society groups. Addressing geopolitical and cognitive warfare, however, requires more preparation to prevent disasters, and the way to prevent war is to prepare for war.
- (3) To prevent power system failure, I recommend building more resilient power grids such as decentralized power grids and microgrids to avoid the islanding effect. Taiwan will also continue to face challenges due to geopolitical factors, and should continue to strengthen its ability to respond to information warfare, cognitive warfare, and disinformation.
- (4) Lastly, the emotional and spiritual care function of religious groups should be acknowledged. When faced with disasters

or extreme situations, religious groups can, indeed, play a role in stabilizing and comforting the public.

### **3. Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao**

- (1) The Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee was established with the goal of preventing disasters and mitigating damage. From the 921 Earthquake and countless typhoons and floods, to terrorist attacks abroad, cyberattacks by hackers, and the Russia- Ukraine war, past experiences has shown over and over the importance of preparing for danger in times of peace.
- (2) To address disasters and extreme situations, building whole-of-society defense resilience means learning about self-preservation and helping others, and hoping for the best while preparing for the worst. For example, when the 921 Earthquake struck, the public and civil society relief groups showed their self-help and mutual help capacities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, large retail outlets such as Chuan Lian, logistics companies, and mask manufacturers all worked closely together to ensure public safety. These efforts all depended on the joint efforts of civil society groups and the public. But to respond to even greater and more compound challenges in the future, the most critical issue right now is getting government and society to think about how to respond from their respective positions, and how to integrate various government resources to establish a comprehensive government system that effectively incorporates civilian forces.
- (3) Looking at international trends, many countries around the world are promoting whole-of-society defense efforts, using civil society forces to protect their national territories. Taiwan can use those experiences as a point of reference,

and international exchange mechanisms, foreign resources, and experience sharing can all help strengthen the overall resilience of Taiwan's civil society and counterpart institutions.

- (4) During former President Tsai Ing-wen's administration, Taiwan and the United States cooperated relatively closely at both the government and civil society levels. From the initial preparations for whole-of-society defense resilience, to the confirmation of the institutionalization of the five key areas after President Lai took office, as well as the incorporation of civilian forces, and even the introduction of new technologies and the strengthening of live exercises, these have all required continuous promotion and implementation efforts. Making related efforts more organized will rely on the vigorous support and assistance of all committee members and advisors.
- (5) In addition to the government, the promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience efforts also requires human resources from civil society. Therefore, it is very important to establish a database of civilian personnel in plumbing and electrical engineering, network security, medicine, and professional DRVs. Overseas Taiwanese can also play a role in international communication, and through the division of labor among everyone involved, human resources can be effectively utilized to make society safer.

## **(5) Convener's Directives**

In order to enable committee members to fully engage in discussions, they shall be grouped according to Master Jing Yao's recommendation. Deputy Convener Hsiao is kindly requested to serve as the group convener for key area 3 "energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance" and key

area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection”; and Deputy Convener Pan is kindly requested to serve as the group convener for key area 1 “civilian force training and utilization,” key area 2 “strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution,” and key area 4 “social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facility readiness.” Each group is to have monthly exchanges, including discussions on issues such as how to conduct wargaming and local small-scale drills, and how to link the drills to the Han Kuang exercises. Advisors and committee members are kindly requested to join groups of their choice.

Finally, I would like to thank NSC Deputy Secretary-General Hsu Szu-chien for his report, as well as our three deputy conveners, advisors, and the committee members for their valuable suggestions.

The concept of whole-of-society defense resilience is an important guide for Taiwan to propose comprehensive responses to security threats to safeguard our free and democratic way of life, a guide which addresses changes in the international landscape and draws reference from the recommendations and experiences of our international partners, and which is based on Taiwan’s own social context.

Our action plans are to be formulated through the five key areas, namely key area 1 “civilian force training and utilization,” key area 2 “strategic material preparation and critical supply distribution,” key area 3 “energy and critical infrastructure operations and maintenance,” key area 4 “social welfare, medical care, and evacuation facility readiness,” and key area 5 “information, transportation, and financial network protection”.

These five key areas also constitute our chief tasks to ensure that the whole of society can continue to operate when the

country faces a disaster or emergency. Therefore, government agencies must adopt a more open attitude toward these tasks, introduce private-sector human resources, and combine the strengths of the government and private sector so that we may jointly respond to challenges in extreme situations and ensure the safety of our citizens' lives and property.

These are rather tremendous tasks, and before our society as a whole takes action, all government agencies must themselves first take the responsibility to take action. I kindly request that Deputy Conveners Hsiao and Pan invite their group members for discussions, and request that Deputy Convener Wu, leading the NSC, along with our executive secretaries, Minister without Portfolio Chi Lien-cheng and Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fan, continue to coordinate with government agencies to carry out the objectives and spirit of whole-of-society defense resilience.

I would also like to remind everyone that the promotion of whole-of-society defense resilience requires the consensus and ample support of our citizens nationwide. In addition to re-examining our response to disasters, the government must also actively explain its policies and communicate with citizens so that they have accurate information and are willing to voluntarily assist in advancing those policies.

I would also like to thank the religious and civil society organizations present at this meeting for their tremendous efforts and contributions toward disaster prevention, disaster mitigation, and related training. The government attaches great importance to and will reference the valuable experiences from the frontlines to continuously improve policy planning.

Taiwan has always faced many challenges, and the government is determined to devote even greater efforts to respond to them.

We are also confident in further ensuring the safety and protection of our people. We must be even more ambitious and work with all citizens to together shape a Resilient Taiwan for Sustainable Democracy, making Taiwan an even safer place and a steady force in the world. Thank you.

**2. Draft Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee proposed for discussion**

**Resolution:** Approved as proposed.

**VI. Extempore Motions:** None.

**VII. Chair's Closing Statement**

Once again, I would like to thank all the advisors and committee members for their support and participation. Over the past eight years, the government has embarked on the inventory-taking of Taiwan's resilience resources.

Moving forward, we must implement whole-of-society defense resilience nationwide so that all Taiwanese citizens can understand, recognize, and participate in the building of Taiwan into a country that is even more resilient and better able to withstand natural disasters and risks of all types.

I would also like to report to everyone that with today's meeting, the three committees of the Presidential Office have now all held their kick-off meetings, and have each collectively produced their preliminary goals.

In the National Climate Change Committee, we reached a consensus to continue to promote energy transition, strengthen Taiwan's ability to adapt to the risks associated with extreme weather, and enable the country's sustainable development. Next, we will foster consensus, seek solutions, and implement Taiwan's new objectives for carbon reduction for 2032.



In the Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee, the overall goals we set are to, within the next eight years, increase the average life expectancy of the population from 79 years to 82 years, reduce the percentage of years spent with illness or disability from 10% to 8% of the average life expectancy, and decrease the child mortality rate from 5.3‰ to below 4‰. Moreover, we must launch the Long-term Care 3.0 Plan early to achieve health equality so that people are healthy, the nation is stronger, and so that the world embraces Taiwan.

At today's meeting, we also set the overall goals of being able to maintain government operations, maintain continued operation of core functions pertinent to society and people's livelihoods, and support military activity as necessary when the country faces a disaster or emergency.

I would like to emphasize that anything that involves our society and people falls within the scope of whole-of-society defense resilience. The Whole-Society Defense Resilience Committee is an action committee which must work at the grassroots level, laying down roots in neighborhoods. We must go to local areas to conduct unscripted, small-scale drills of all types, and stand unafraid in the face of troubles, setbacks, or criticisms.

In the future, we will go to the counties or cities where drills are held, and invite local governments and units to participate. We aim to shape whole-of-society defense resilience across political parties, generations, and fields.

Therefore, our phased goals are: for the second committee meeting in December this year, to conduct a tabletop wargaming exercise; for the third committee meeting in March next year, to hold more than one local small-scale drill; and for the fourth committee meeting in June next year, to run a preliminary drill linked with the Han Kuang exercises.

Although the work is arduous, we must shoulder the burden and gradually implement plans to make Taiwan's society more resilient.

At this first meeting today, I would like to express my gratitude to the NSC for its report and for the report receiving prior approval from Premier Cho Jung-tai before being brought to the committee for discussion, which follows the operational model of the National Climate Change Committee and Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee.

I would like to kindly request Deputy Convener Wu and our executive secretaries, Minister without Portfolio Chi and Minister of the Interior Liu, to closely track our progress in promoting whole-of-society defense resilience policy for future meetings, while coordinating with various units to jointly implement relevant plans.

The quarterly meetings convened by this committee will be a key channel for communication between the government and society, and for helping the public understand how to respond to disasters and develop abilities for self-rescue, disaster mitigation, and disaster relief – the best ways to cope with crises.

Let us work together to deepen the roots of resilience in Taiwan's society. Despite any trials and hardships ahead of us, we have the unwavering determination to safeguard ourselves, safeguard each other, and safeguard the nation. Thank you.

#### **VIII. Meeting End Time: 8:10 p.m.**