

## **Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee**

**Time:** Thursday, March 27, 2025, 4:00 p.m.

**Location:** Briefing Room, 6th Floor of Yonghua Civic Center, Tainan City Government

**Chair:** Convener Lai Ching-te

**Recorder:** Ministry of the Interior (MOI)

**Attendees:** Deputy Convener Bi-khim Hsiao, Deputy Convener Pan Men-an (潘孟安), and Deputy Convener Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), Advisor Robert Tsao (曹興誠) (on leave), Advisor Huoh Shoou-yeh (霍守業), and Advisor Lin Ming-hsiung (林敏雄) (on leave).

**Committee Members:** Wellington L. Koo (顧立雄), Kuo Jyh-huei (郭智輝), Chen Shih-kai (陳世凱), Chen Junne-jih (陳駿季), Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源), Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), Wang Pao-tzong (王寶宗) (on leave), James Liao (廖英熙), Chen Hsin-liang (陳信良), Enoch Wu (吳怡農) (on leave), Kuo Chia-yo (郭家佑), Tseng Po-yu (曾柏瑜), Liu Yu-his (劉玉皙), Tu Wen-ling (杜文苓) (on leave), Hsiao Hsu-chun (蕭旭君), Yen Po-wen (顏博文) (on leave), Hsiao Ya-wen (蕭雅文), Liu Wen (劉文), Bob Hung (洪偉淦) (on leave), Tina Lin (林雅芳) (on leave), Kenny Huang (黃勝雄) (on leave), Wu Jong-shinn (吳宗信), and Dai Chen-yu (戴辰宇).

**Non-voting participants:** Executive Secretary Chi Lien-cheng (季連成), Executive Secretary Liu Shyh-fang (劉世芳), Deputy Executive Secretary Chang Tun-han (張惇涵), National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Liu Te-chin (劉得金), Deputy National Security Council Secretary-

General Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆), Presidential Office  
Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧).

## **I. Chair's Remarks**

Today, the Office of the President Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee has moved to Tainan to convene its third committee meeting and conduct field exercises based on real-life scenarios. First, I would like to express gratitude to all the advisors and committee members for their participation, and also thank our fellow citizens and friends as we collectively put a focus on the progress of whole-of-society defense resilience efforts.

To address threats such as natural disasters, military intimidation by foreign hostile forces, gray-zone aggression, and cognitive manipulation, Taiwan must continue to enhance its self-defense capabilities while simultaneously strengthening whole-of-society defense resilience. Only then can we respond to the challenges of major disasters and expanding authoritarianism.

At the second committee meeting last December, we conducted tabletop exercises, with central government ministries and agencies and localities using scenarios that reflect real life to verify the preparedness of various government units, from the central to the local level, to respond to extreme conditions.

This morning, the MOI and the Tainan City government expanded upon the tabletop exercises from the last committee meeting by holding field exercises. This allowed our advisors and committee members to participate in the verification process and provide various suggestions for improvements.

These exercises went above and beyond the previous scripted exercises, and involved conducting field mobilization exercises based on real-life scenarios to verify the ability of the government and private sector to cooperate and respond to disasters.

The exercise scenarios involved giving the public advance warning to evacuate before a tsunami arrives, an unidentified explosion occurring within critical infrastructure, the hospital system being hacked, and cognitive warfare and the disruption of public security.

Through field exercises, we can evaluate preparedness in the committee's five key areas and verify our capabilities regarding the deployment and response of civilian forces, neighboring county and city resource integration, and community disaster prevention coordination. From that process, we can also identify problems and continue to conduct reviews and make improvements.

These exercises proceeded from points to lines, and then expanded to planes, a model that Taiwan will actively promote. We have therefore invited observers, so in addition to our advisors, committee members, central government ministries and agencies, and various local governments, we have also included members of the foreign diplomatic corps stationed in Taiwan and domestic and foreign media.

These demonstration exercises have another important objective connected to the upcoming 2025 Urban Resilience Exercises, in that they allow central government ministries and agencies and local governments to readjust the pace of the exercises and use new thinking and strategic approaches to promote the exercises,

thereby enhancing overall local resilience and response capabilities while ensuring that society and people's livelihoods can continue as normal under extreme conditions.

I want to emphasize that regardless of whether it is the central government or local governments, as long as we prepare in advance, execute pragmatically, review repeatedly, and strive to improve our methods, we can maximize the value of field exercises so that whole-of-society defense resilience efforts are steadier and more substantial.

Today's field exercises were completed successfully, and I want to express my gratitude to the committee's three deputy conveners – Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, Secretary-General Pan Men-an, and National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Joseph Wu – for directing the exercises. I also want to once again thank the administrative team, especially the Tainan City government team led by Mayor Huang Wei-che, and all participating partners. Thank you all for your hard work and dedication.

Strengthening whole-of-society defense resilience is currently a core policy for countries around the world to address crises and challenges. Whether it is natural disasters, public health, economic shocks, or even gray-zone aggression, enhancing resilience is the only way to ensure social harmony and stability, as well as continued national development.

In our efforts to enhance whole-of-society resilience, Taiwan will also actively cooperate and conduct exchanges with friends and allies. At the beginning of this month, a Global Cooperation and Training Framework workshop was held in Taiwan, taking

whole-of-society resilience as a theme for the first time, and holding discussions with experts and scholars from 30 countries.

Going forward, Taiwan will continue to work together with democratic countries around the world to consolidate the resilience of global democracy and safeguard regional peace and stability. We will continue to share Taiwan's innovations and valuable experiences with the international community so that countries around the world can better understand Taiwan's efforts and determination.

I also want to emphasize that defending democracy requires mustering every bit of strength and building whole-of-society defense resilience. That not only requires cooperation among the central and local governments, but also the vigilance and mobilization of every individual. I hope that the nation and all citizens will work together, unite, and cooperate to enhance Taiwan's resilience.

Today's agenda will first have Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang report on the progress of items listed in the second committee meeting. NSC Deputy Secretary-General Liu Te-chin will then follow with a report on the results of the field exercises held this morning.

Afterward, I ask that our advisors and committee members please offer suggestions regarding the various components of this morning's exercises, or areas where whole-of-society defense resilience could be further strengthened. Together, we are steadily moving toward our common goal.

## **II. Confirmation of the Meeting Agenda**

**Decision:** Meeting agenda confirmed.

### **III. Confirmation of the Minutes of the Second Committee Meeting**

**Decision:** Minutes of the second committee meeting confirmed.

### **IV. Report Items**

#### **1. Status report on items listed in the second committee meeting (omitted)**

(Presented by Executive Secretary, Minister of the Interior  
Liu Shyh-fang)

#### **2. 2025 Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee – Field Exercises Observation Report (Omitted)**

(Presented by NSC Deputy Secretary-General Liu Te-chin)

### **V. Discussion Items (In Speaking Order)**

#### **1. Committee Member Remarks**

##### **(1) Committee Member, James Liao**

1. Today at the exercises, I observed that most of the victims were concentrated in one area, but the self-defense capabilities associated with that area were not demonstrated. Since the disaster victims were concentrated, their self-defense capabilities should be greater, and the enemy should not be treated as a good-natured competitor. In response to the vicious persecution of lurking espionage, our disaster victims must demonstrate their self-rescue capabilities.

2. Every year, more than 200 ambulances, fire trucks, and water trucks are replaced. I suggest that these vehicles could be distributed to villages and towns, such as local schools and township, town, city, and district offices, while maintaining them so that they can be used in times of need. Basic

firefighting training can be scheduled and conducted for experienced drivers so that they can save themselves and others when necessary. This would reduce the workload of regular firefighters.

(2) Committee Member, Chen Hsin-liang

1. For today's exercises, if schools were to participate, the faculty should be allowed to understand the important work promoted by the government, which then could help instill an understanding of crisis in students from an educational perspective, thus helping shape a correct mindset in students from an early age.
2. As an island country, Taiwan frequently faces natural disasters. Our children should be taught how to respond to natural disasters when they are young. Education is a long process. Our education sector has excellent teachers and professors and even excellent schools, which are all important resources for enhancing the resilience of Taiwan and the sustainability of democracy. Not just teaching these concepts, but also applying them practically in our daily lives, in regional and community settings – there are also great resources.

(3) Committee Member, Kuo Chia-yo

1. Overall, the disaster prevention and relief exercises were thorough; however, their communication to the public needs to be strengthened to validate the correctness of the information and avoid confusing the public.
2. Taiwan faces threats from both natural disasters and foreign hostile forces, making the situation relatively complicated; hence, a need for further social communication. It is suggested

to start with education and learn from Japan's experience. For example, in disaster preparedness education for students, teaching materials can be designed according to age and practical ability; and VR disaster response vehicle simulations can be used for better psychological preparedness.

3. Theatre groups or professionals can be invited to participate in future exercises to make the scenarios more immersive and more relevant to the public, thus better achieving the objectives of the exercises.
4. It is suggested to conduct in-depth communication with people at the grass-roots level, village and neighborhood chiefs, and schools for continuous drills and training.
5. It is suggested that news agencies in the public sector continue to integrate information and release the latest news in future exercises to reassure the public. In addition, given that there are as many pharmacies as convenience stores in Taiwan, it is suggested that community pharmacies be integrated into medicine and logistics distribution, and safety maintenance measures for the transportation and distribution can be planned.

(4) Committee Member, Tseng Po-yu

1. In today's exercises, it was noticed that many people were rather unfamiliar with responding to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). As mentioned many times by some committee members, in terms of communication with the public, most volunteers and colleagues felt that government communication was conducted vertically or with various groups, but seldom with the public. I would like to remind everyone especially of the



importance of immediate communication with the public, including communication channels, information verification, and possible occurrences.

2. Strategic communication has been mentioned in past committee meetings and in today's report by Minister Liu. In addition to immediate clarification of messages, we can imagine possible outcomes, e.g., rumors after an explosion, and we can be more proactive in clarifying and preparing for such rumors. As most studies on FIMI indicate, when potential outcomes of incidents are clarified to people prior to the actual incident, they are less likely to buy stories of fake news. Unfortunately, I did not see in today's exercises much preparation on the communication of possible outcomes. Accordingly, we can all think about making an SOP out of clear guidance and response measures?
3. For reports arranged by the committee for future committee meetings, it is suggested that report materials be provided prior to the meeting, which can make the meeting more efficient, allowing issues discussed in the reports, such as FIMI and media, to be given substantive discussion.

(5) Committee Member, Liu Yu-hsi

1. First, I would like to pay tribute to the Tainan City government. These resilience exercises have integrated quite a lot of societal forces. From my on-site observations of the shelter at Nan-ning High School, my comments are as follows: Police forces may be limited during a disaster, in which case civil defense organizations may need to help maintain the public order; however, that will require legal

authorization or operational guidelines, which the government can design in advance.

2. Second, what coordination channels are there between the city government and civilian forces? There may be different channels in normal and emergency times. And do confidentiality and identity verification need to be taken into consideration?
3. Third, social communication before the exercises took place could have been enhanced. I observed that the press release before the exercises did not seem to be clear enough, and the participants from the public did not seem to understand the purpose of the exercises. When it comes to real situations, those involved in the disaster need to fully understand the purpose of the exercises.

(6) Committee Member, Hsiao Hsu-chun

1. These field exercises were quite thorough, showing sufficient capacity for disaster response and high autonomy among the participating units. During the exercises, one could see that both government agencies and private units clearly understood their respective responsibilities while engaging in mutual assistance and cooperation.
2. Possibly due to the limits in the presentation method for these field exercises, social communication and message delivery were relatively lacking during the exercises, especially when the disaster had just occurred, and the government was unable to confirm the cause of the disaster at the beginning. As such, misinformation and disinformation were easier to spread. It is suggested that future exercise designs include planning for dedicated personnel to collect information, gradually clarify

the situation, record on-site conditions, produce authentic messages, and strengthen social communication to avoid panicking the public.

(7) Committee Member, Hsiao Ya-wen

1. First, each participating unit was quite familiar with each individual exercise, fully demonstrating the Tainan City government's excellent infrastructure, police, and firefighting, its quality medical personnel, and outstanding professionalism. Second, the mobilization of civilian forces to participate in the response was worthy of praise, especially the retired medical personnel who participated in deploying expanded medical facilities, strengthening medical capacity.
2. I have several suggestions for future exercises. First, one of today's scenarios was that an explosion occurred at the tourist information center for an unknown reason, whereas the Harbor Bureau and the critical infrastructure management authority quickly activated its special corps and Taiwan Community Emergency Response Team (T-CERT), including the police's on-site inspections, and the fire unit's quickly stationing in the command center. However, safety awareness seemed to be lacking. At the explosion site, the police failed to confirm whether there were any remaining explosives; and when the paramedics requested to access to the scene, there were no police accompanying them. In recent years, Taiwan has actively promoted training in Tactical Emergency Casualty Care and rescue in high-threat situations; these training achievements should be demonstrated in future exercises.

3. Second, in today's scenario with expanded medical facilities, many personnel from primary care institutions and civilian volunteers were mobilized. There should be no issues in individual rescue techniques. However, with people coming from various counties and cities to assist with the care of many casualties, effectively integrating their work in a short time so as to maximize the effect of their expertise is what should be improved in the future.
4. Third, today's exercises went very smoothly, and the overall command and coordination showed that the government units were all able to implement the SOP step by step. It is hoped that provisional situations can be added at random during future exercises for testing, while making good use of the existing system to achieve objectives.

(8) Committee Member, Liu Wen

Above all, thank you all for your efforts, especially during the critical infrastructure explosion exercises at Anping Port. The medical cooperation among the public and private sectors and police and fire units was very professional. I have the following suggestions related to scenario setting:

1. When a scenario setting is not clear, vertical communication loses coordination. For example, during the exercises at Anping Port and in the square in front of the Yuping Post Office, due to the failure in integrating message delivery methods, it failed to determine whether it was a total power outage. The failure resulted in conveying information through written messages.

2. In the design of the exercise scenario, it should be considered whether the unidentified explosive is a domestic or foreign threat, as the response method will differ.
3. The texts sent through the cellular broadcast system during these exercises failed to indicate the kind of danger, e.g., an explosion or a tsunami. It is suggested that the kind of danger be disclosed immediately so that the public can prepare in advance.
4. In terms of communication strategy, apart from making social communication with the public not present on-site, immediate explanations should be given to the disaster victims and volunteers on-site to prevent panic.

(9) Committee Member, Wu Jong-shinn

1. It is suggested to take aerial photographs at the exercise site with multiple small drones, collecting information on actions from various places on-site and retaining images for future vertical communication.
2. It is suggested that in the future, tools such as small tank-like fire-fighting robots be used to deal with explosives. Such robots are inexpensive and their use can result in fewer people being lost in the line of duty.

(10) Committee Member, Dai Chen-yu

1. Conducting threat model analyses for the exercises helps determine whether threats are related to war or foreign hostile forces. The response measures taken would vary depending on the nature of the threat. Moreover, the type of threats could shift or escalate. Terrorist attacks may be threats from foreign hostile forces. In the face of more complex terrorist attacks,

dedicated radios are required. If it is a war, the internet may be down and information systems could be subjected to electronic interference. Exploring communication methods through scenario transitions can make exercises more impactful.

2. Radios and whiteboards were used for on-site monitoring during these exercises. Although the radios and whiteboards worked well, all policemen and firemen were equipped with body cameras that should be able to immediately transmit images. In addition, there are many livestreams of the scene which can help the command post better understand and control the situation. Currently, with the decreasing cost of drones, Japan and the US have already incorporated them into helicopter operations. Drones could even be dispatched to pursue terrorists. It is suggested that more technological equipment be introduced in subsequent exercises.

## **2. Responses by Executive Secretary, Report Presenter, Committee Members (Government Representatives), and Tainan City Government**

### **(1) Executive Secretary, Minister of the Interior Liu Shyh-fang**

1. Some of what was mentioned about today's exercises by the committee members was related to the MOI and other related government agencies. Let me provide some data. First, for the 921 National Disaster Preparedness Day Exercise in 2024, about one million students from elementary and middle schools across the country participated. This year, we will use the same approach. At the beginning of each school year, students will be made familiar with how to protect themselves in earthquakes.

2. The exercise scenarios were inconsistent with what the people participating in the exercise had expected them to be, which means that communication could be improved. In fact, one of today's scenarios was originally an unidentified explosion (an attack originating at home or abroad), followed by a tsunami, making it a situation with both man-made and natural disasters, which in turn led to large-scale rescue and evacuation operations.
3. In these exercises, it was unclear whether the medical command system was mainly led by local health departments or large hospitals. Moreover, the vertical and horizontal command chains were not presented in detail, making message delivery and integration mechanisms unclear. I offer this as reference for future exercises.
4. In the future, we need to strengthen social communication so that the public can learn self-rescue and evacuation routes. We also need to consider the level of openness of the announcement mechanism and information disclosure and include them as items in future exercises.
5. The exercises still lacked support for police duty. Currently, the police and fire receive support from volunteer groups, but the coordination and professional training of alternative military service personnel could be improved. This can be provided as reference for the next stage of exercises.

(2) Report Presenter NSC Deputy Secretary-General Liu Te-chin

1. First, to respond to the issue of national security education: national security has its roots in education. On that point, I want to share Singapore's approach. Singapore's national security goals are quite explicit. The goal of national security

education in junior high and primary schools is to educate students in patriotism, to love Singapore. The goal of national security education before university is for students to learn what national security threats Singapore faces. After high school, students are required to serve in the military, where they are taught how to safeguard national security.

2. Second, disaster victim shelters must be equipped with basic vigilance and self-defense capabilities, mainly for the maintenance of internal public order. In addition, shelters should not be areas prioritized for attack by the enemy.
3. Third, whether it is a war or a natural disaster, my personal understanding is that no matter the type of disaster, a disaster is a disaster. Sometimes, even a natural disaster may reach the scale of a war disaster; so, let's plan for the worst and make the best preparations.
4. Fourth, regarding the use of body cameras, I have two concerns. When the country is facing a catastrophe, the bandwidth available for information transmission needs to be considered. If everyone is transmitting images (videos), the network will be paralyzed. In addition, the images from the body cameras may also be used by the enemy as disinformation. Lastly, one committee member suggested keeping decommissioned fire trucks and ambulances in schools rather than scrapping them. While the intention is good, in case of mass casualties, patients will need to be transported directly to hospitals, which may paralyze the hospital's rescue capacity. That is why we need preliminary triage.

(3) Tainan City Mayor Huang Wei-che



1. First, regarding handling of the deceased, today's exercise was just a demonstration. What was simulated in the Yuping square was the activation of a medical command center, not a municipal-level emergency operations center (EOC). In response to the earthquake that occurred on January 21, 2025, in addition to the immediate activation of a municipal-level EOC, the Nansi District Office was also required to simultaneously activate a district-level EOC. The day following the earthquake, Tainan City government immediately activated an incident command post which was stationed in the district-level EOC to conduct horizontal coordination among various bureaus and departments and district offices and to integrate various resources. Taiwan has experience in the handling of the deceased, for instance in the 921 Earthquake in 1999, the February 6 earthquake in 2016, and the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2019. One difference was that in the 921 Earthquake, identities of the deceased had to be obtained, so DNA had to be collected; whereas in the COVID-19 pandemic, the identities of most of the deceased were already known. During the pandemic, a surge of people poured into the emergency room, paralyzing it. It was necessary to set up simple tents (called "rapid test stations" at that time) outside the emergency room to determine whether each patient should proceed to the emergency room or stay outside. A similar practice was also applied to the Yuping square in these exercises, mainly simulating the installation of various medical equipment in the open spaces outside hospitals. The only difference was that these exercises were not conducted on a hospital site.

Moreover, there were negative pressure and positive pressure spaces reserved for surgery.

2. Second, the explosion in the scenario at the Anping Port Tourist Information Center could be due to a terrorist attack, foreign hostile force, or simply an accident. The scenario was an unidentified explosion. Since the explosion occurred on a site under the jurisdiction of the Anping Port Branch Office, the local government's main role was to provide disaster relief support. Tainan City government and the District Office had no way of determining the cause of the explosion immediately after it had just occurred, but they still had to care for the mass casualties. Accordingly, upon receiving the notice, the Tainan City government immediately entered the Anping Port Tourist Information Center to carry out rescue and triage operations; and then it moved moderately and seriously injured passengers to the expanded emergency medical facilities set up at Yuping square. The Tainan City government and District Office were unable to analyze the cause of the explosion; rather, the main responsibilities of the local government were to carry out disaster rescue right after the explosion and move the injured to a safe medical facility for treatment. Lastly, regarding the emergency shelters, all the shelters originally planned by the Nansi District Office were damaged during the January 21 earthquake this year, so we had to immediately look for other shelters without structural damage to accommodate the disaster victims. Plans cannot keep up with changes, so immediate adaptation is necessary.
3. Lastly, why were whiteboard and radio adopted for the exercise? They were adopted because of the limitations in local communications equipment. If the equipment was

damaged, it is necessary to revert to basic methods as alternatives. These exercises made good use of low-earth-orbit satellite receivers to address the network connectivity issue. In the future, the central government could provide more funding to local governments for communications deployment. In addition, the use of drones did require enhanced operation skills and capacities, which can be further strengthened in future exercises.

(4) Tainan City Government Senior Executive Officer Wang Ya-he (王雅禾)

1. One committee member mentioned fostering disaster preparedness awareness from a young age. Every year, in line with National Disaster Prevention Day, the Tainan City government conducts comprehensive training and exercises. We have also set up our civil defense corps, defense corps, and T-CERTs. In schools, about 35 junior high schools and primary schools have set up their own defense corps which undergo training in line with the civil defense corps' training in normal times. In addition, the Tainan City government has a police force of about 4,188 people who also collaborate with civil defense teams for integrated training.
2. Committee Member Kuo mentioned that we can learn from Japan in disaster prevention and relief. Currently in all stages of disaster, namely mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, the Tainan City government has introduced Japan's disaster prevention mechanisms, including the setup of disaster shelters (407 shelters in Tainan City, which can accommodate approximately 240,000 people), the training of Disaster Relief Volunteers (DRVs) (2,075 DRVs trained in

Tainan City as of now), and the concept of whole-of-society disaster prevention.

3. In terms of communication with neighborhood chiefs, in principle, comprehensive and adequate communication with the neighborhood chiefs is done in the biannual disaster prevention and response meetings and district-village symposiums organized by the district office. The exercises this time mobilized as many as 1,400 people, including 500 civilians. The Tainan City government had already fully communicated with the civil society, which was why members of the public were willing to participate in the exercises.
4. In addition, in terms of the overall medical system, how can we integrate doctors from different locations with different backgrounds? In these exercises, a medical check-in area was set up in the expanded emergency medical facilities. Appropriate task assignments were arranged during the check-in process. In normal times, each medical doctor's background and expertise are recorded in a directory through the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) system so that effective assignments could be made at the command center.
5. As one committee member mentioned, whether the exercises are conducted with or without power should be confirmed. Under normal power, all disaster relief devices and equipment would be operational and without any problems. However, this does not reflect real-world conditions. Mayor Huang of Tainan City has always emphasized strict adherence to realistic scenarios. He requests district offices to conduct various disaster prevention exercises simulating the most

severe conditions, such as assuming a total power outage, where only paper recording is available. Neighborhood chiefs are requested to help with disaster survey and notification by scooter.

6. Regarding one committee member's reminder about image transmission, in principle, the Tainan City government's fire trucks are already equipped with remote monitoring systems which can immediately transmit videos and images of disaster scenes back to the EOC, allowing the EOC to quickly grasp the disaster situation and the commander to make appropriate decisions, thus effectively enhancing disaster rescue efficiency.

(5) Committee Member, Wellington L. Koo

1. In the Han Kuang tabletop exercises in April 2025, the Joint Operations Command Center and the Central Joint Emergency Operation Center were simultaneously activated to verify intelligence transmission and communication mechanisms. We are also setting up and planning for whole-of-society defense resilience tabletop exercises, transitioning from gray-zone operations through medium- to high-intensity disruptions, and from training to combat or exercises to actual conflict. This will involve coordination with the Taipei, Taichung, and Tainan joint response command centers to integrate military and civilian efforts as well as response mechanisms demonstration by government departments. Maintaining communication resilience among the military, police, fire, and civil society is a very critical matter.

2. Social communication is also a critical matter, and in the future, we are to coordinate with government agencies to build such resilience.

(6) Committee Member, Kuo Jyh-huei

1. During the mobilization implementation stage and in event of a blockade, daily necessities among other supplies are distributed under the supervision of Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), with local governments handling logistics. The locations of all distribution stations are announced on the Readiness TW e-APP.
2. In terms of water use, priority will be given to utilizing wells under the authority of Taiwan Water Corporation and the MOEA's Water Resources Agency. In addition, water can also be supplied from public wells in government agencies and schools as well as private wells. Water trucks can be deployed for water distribution.

(7) Committee Member, Chen Shih-kai

1. It is suggested that during compound notifications, all relevant agencies should be notified immediately and confirmed as having received the notification. However, during the Anping Port exercises, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) and Taiwan International Ports Corporation (TIPC) did not receive the notification until the sixth or seventh actions. This should be noted for improvement.
2. TIPC's defense corps could provide existing real-time information to the evacuees to reassure and calm them.

3. In the future, we will actively cooperate with the MOI to promote T-CERT training to enhance the professional capabilities of the special corps.
4. The MOTC has arranged and deployed low-earth-orbit satellites to meet the communications needs of critical infrastructure and facilities on land, at sea, and in air.

(8) Committee Member, Chen Junne-jih

Regarding the dispatch and distribution of materials in today's exercises, my suggestions are as follows:

1. First, due to the emergency, residents were evacuated to shelters in different areas. As each shelter has varying capacity limits, it is suggested that there be a mechanism for reporting the number of evacuees received at each shelter, so that the allocation can be more efficient.
2. Second, the sheltering exercise failed to examine each shelter's information and descriptions on the default quantity of materials to be prepared, the sources of materials, etc. In addition, with reference to the experience of the 921 Earthquake, it is suggested that when materials arrive at the shelter, security personnel need to be arranged to guard the materials. The above comments are provided as reference for future exercises.

(9) Committee Member, Chiu Tai-yuan

1. In line with whole-of-society defense resilience policy, the MOHW has implemented its program for resilient national medical preparedness since 2024. So far, we have completed the inspection and preparation of petroleum, water, and electricity in 52 critical-level emergency hospitals, and have

conducted exercises for medical resilience under extreme situations. Today's exercises mainly demonstrated, under extreme conditions, the rescue capacity of the expanded medical facilities, as well as the situation of the backup medical surgeon team's treatment of moderately- and seriously-injured patients.

2. Regarding combat casualty care training, 862 surgeons have been trained. Through these exercises, the existing process was assessed to see where it could be bettered, while expanding the number of personnel trained. In the future, medical centers will set up teams to strengthen combat casualty care training and procure equipment for use by the national Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), to allow the national DMAT to quickly reach disaster areas to help with the excessive local medical burden, thus helping restore local medical capacity as quickly as possible. In the future, based on lessons learned from the US and Japan, we aim to improve material warehouse management and upgrade medical capacity.

(10) Committee Member, Kuan Bi-ling

1. I admire the efforts of successive mayors of Tainan City in whole-of-society defense resilience; and the results of the large-scale exercises were excellent. However, Coast Guard personnel were not mobilized for the exercises. I hope to see more connections between the Coast Guard Administration (CGA) and local governments in the future. In terms of medical personnel mobilization, the Coast Guard has 1,543 Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) with EMT licenses, including 1,441 EMT-1s, 96 EMT-2s, and 6 EMT-Ps, who can



assist in providing substantive assistance such as maritime or coastal rescue and treatment.

2. The Coast Guard has a role in assisting search and rescue under the overall disaster prevention framework. Routes for evacuation in the event of large-scale maritime disasters have been inventoried based on the locations of CGA's Inspection Office and Coast Guard bases; the evacuation routes were submitted to the National Fire Agency (NFA) via official letter at the end of 2024. In the future, further inventories of road conditions and suitable means of transportation for each evacuation route will be conducted.

3. The Coast Guard can assist with such tasks as public evacuation and search and rescue, vessel control, and the maintenance of maritime and coastal security. Under the framework of whole-society resilience mobilization, the Coast Guard can improve together with other government agencies, establishing a basis for cooperation and shared languages and images. Various land-based exercises are now quite mature, which, if implemented at the grassroots level in villages and neighborhoods, can strengthen overall national resilience. If these land-based exercises are already mature, we could contemplate developing coast-based exercises. To that end, the CGA will conduct relevant studies and prepare in advance.

(11) Executive Secretary, Minister without Portfolio of the Executive Yuan Chi Lien-cheng

1. These exercises in Tainan City marked the first try of the new exercise model which differed from the Min An Exercise model, adopting a field-based, material-based, scenario-

based, operational model. And that exercise model will be implemented in the future. All the questions raised by the committee members today should be summarized and compiled, which can be used as guidance for the counties and cities participating in the exercises.

2. Anping Port, one of the items in these exercises, is also a part of the critical infrastructure. Since 2024, the Executive Yuan has conducted a comprehensive inventory of critical infrastructure, which comprise nine major categories now after food was added to the original eight categories in the beginning of the inventory-taking. In the future, food production factories will be included in critical infrastructure. Furthermore, private power plants, important bridges and roads in northern, central, and southern Taiwan, and submarine cables will all be incorporated into critical infrastructure. We aim to continue to provide guidance and strengthen various protective measures to ensure the maintenance of their normal operational capacities.

### **3. Remarks by Advisor and Deputy Conveners**

#### **(1) Advisor, Huoh Shouou-yeh**

1. In today's exercises, Tainan City demonstrated very good results, thanks to the combination of their past disaster relief experience and detailed planning, which also means that the work of promoting whole-of-society defense resilience has received considerable attention during this period. Subsequently, it is hoped that these experiences can be expanded to other counties, cities, and administrative districts for their exercises, so that county and city governments as well as district offices can adapt to various situations in the

face of typhoons, earthquakes, and floods, as the more familiar they are, the more calmly they can respond to such situations.

2. Taiwan's medical capabilities are both abundant and extensive, but the focus should be on their effective utilization. During normal times, we should take inventory of the capabilities and features of hospitals and clinics in each region, and categorize medical institutions into levels by their ability to handle different scenarios. During emergencies, existing medical institutions can respond, or expanded hospitals can be established if needed. In wartime, battalion-level health platoons and stretcher squads can provide emergency medical treatment. Critically injured patients would first be treated at brigade-level first aid stations and then transferred to hospitals of varying levels based on the severity of their injuries. It is recommended that the MOHW and the Ministry of National Defense Medical Affairs Bureau coordinate medical operations. In each combat zone, the superintendent of the local army general hospital should serve as the senior medical advisor overseeing medical care.
3. It is recommended to start with training exercises focused on handling earthquakes, typhoons, explosions, or similar incidents, then progress to exercises involving terror attacks on critical facilities. Once familiar with these basic scenarios, training can proceed to more advanced situations, such as responding to large-scale warfare, until all personnel have a clearer understanding and improved response capabilities. However, it is crucial to recognize the significant differences between peacetime and wartime conditions. For example, exercises like today's conducted in peacetime may not yield

the same results in wartime due to situations like road blockages, clinic closures with staff having evacuated, power outages, and communications failures.

(2) Deputy Convener, Joseph Wu

1. I extend heartfelt gratitude to the Tainan City government team and the team led by the MOI for their efforts in preparing for today's exercises since January this year. I also extend special thanks to the committee members, who joined us from early this morning to observe the exercises in their entirety, and provided valuable suggestions.
2. Although today's exercises were scenario-based and unscripted, they still felt orderly. However, in the face of high-intensity gray-zone aggression or a compound disaster scenario, the situation could become chaotic or even completely disorganized. Future exercises should aim to be as realistic as possible. We can also consider incorporating livestreaming or other online tools for observation and command. Commanders could direct exercise operations from the command center, issuing reports directly online or instructions in real-time by phone.
3. For social communication, it is recommended to hold press conferences as needed to inform the public about the details of an incident and the corresponding response procedures. In varying situations, public explanations are necessary to assure everyone that the government is addressing the issue and to counter disinformation.

(3) Deputy Convener, Pan Men-an

1. Today, we observed field exercises that included scenarios such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and damage to critical

infrastructure. Through scenario-based, field-based, and situation-based responses, the exercises aimed to verify the preparedness of the central and local governments for large-scale disasters, mass evacuations, resettlement, medical facilities, and other related aspects. Each exercise provides valuable experience. I also thank the committee members and advisors for their many valuable suggestions, which will serve as reference for improving future exercises.

2. Today's exercises in Tainan City introduced several innovative measures. For example, in the emergency medical part, a one-stop station and triage slap band system were designed to expedite triage, medical evacuation, and subsequent tracking. At the scene, I specifically requested that the NFA plan and promote on-site triage methods in the future so that first-line rescue personnel can perform triage easily and effectively allocate medical capacity.
3. I would like to thank Tainan City Mayor Huang's team and the MOI for including local collaborative forces, such as churches, temples, and village and neighborhood chiefs, in these exercises. The Tainan City government's experience with earthquakes and typhoons has built up its capacity for vertical integration and mobilization. To properly respond to and prepare for related disasters, it is suggested that future Han Kuang exercises further enhance disaster prevention training across all regions of Taiwan.

(4) Deputy Convener, Bi-khim Hsiao

1. I extend special thanks to the Tainan City government team, the MOI, and the NSC for their months of preparation to complete these exercises. The overall scenario design

incorporated key elements including the five key areas of whole-of-society defense resilience, division of labor among units, and cross-domain coordination.

2. Based on on-site observations and discussions, several issues require further consideration and improvement. First, responses in peacetime versus wartime differ significantly, as does the level of social panic that may be caused. Second, the preparedness of digital communications also impacts outcomes. These efforts include mechanisms for emerging digital technologies, drones, AI identification, and material distribution. Relying solely on manual processes for these tasks would be highly time-consuming. It is recommended to adopt various emerging technologies during normal times to enhance efficiency. However, preparations should also account for extreme scenarios, such as complete communications failures, lack of connectivity, or power outages, where traditional manual methods would be necessary. Relevant scenarios should be practiced under both conditions.
3. Public communication was also discussed during the earlier opinion exchange meeting. Although we engaged with many committee members and agencies at all levels this time, the government should continue to consider what kind of guidance and explanations are needed to help the public understand the purpose and mechanisms of the exercises. The Tainan City government is requested to collect feedback from participating individuals and groups. These experiences and suggestions will contribute to improving future exercises.

4. Lastly, the process and purpose of all the exercises are people-centered, focusing on caring for and protecting others from a human perspective to maintain national resilience. Many aspects were taken into consideration in these Tainan City exercises – even pet placement. However, the exercises also revealed that building strong coordination requires mobilization and communication during normal times to enhance mutual connections and familiarity. When confronting unique disasters, the power of mutual assistance becomes even more evident.

#### **4. Convener's Directives**

Thank you to all the deputy conveners, advisors, and committee members for your valuable feedback. First, I would like to thank the three deputy conveners again for their assistance in guiding the committee. I would also like to especially thank the MOI for planning the exercises, the Tainan City government for executing them, and the relevant government agencies for their cooperation. Despite constraints in time, budget, and human resources, the exercises were successfully completed, which deserves recognition.

The purpose of these field exercises was to thoroughly verify the coordination and cooperation mechanisms among government agencies, as well as the integrated collaboration model between the government and civil society. It is hoped that through these exercises, we can demonstrate to the public that unity, division of tasks, and cooperation between the government and civil society are the key factors in advancing whole-of-society defense resilience.

I propose the following points and hope we can continue working hard on them together:

First, governments at all levels should proactively conduct field exercises, implement verification, and pursue continuous improvement.

These field exercises in Tainan City are just the beginning. Future exercises conducted by central government agencies, all of Taiwan's 22 counties and cities, and even the 368 townships, towns, cities, and districts should be as field-based as possible to achieve the goal of verification.

I also hope that the MOI and the Tainan City government will actively share the experience gained from conducting these exercises with other government organizations.

We must learn by doing and should not fear learning from mistakes. Only by carrying out exercises pragmatically can we identify shortcomings in our plans and develop corrective measures to build a more resilient nation. This is our important mission.

Second, governments at all levels should actively help strengthen the capabilities of grassroots organizations and harness their energy to respond to disasters.

Many committee members have repeatedly emphasized that, in extreme situations, response measures cannot overly rely on the national military. Therefore, governments at all levels should make good use of civil society resources and enhance cooperation between the government and civil society to build social resilience through self-help and helping one another.



These exercises, encompassing residents voluntarily evacuating from their communities to shelters and emergency rescue operations following a hypothetical explosion at Anping Port, relied on the active cooperation of the public, civil society organizations, and NGOs throughout the process. During these exercises, the Tzu Chi Charity Foundation, the Mustard Seed Mission, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, and Tainan City's Tsung Tsu Temple all played critical supporting roles.

When a disaster occurs, immediate response is critical. Therefore, the government's role should be to support grassroots communities to become proficient in disaster prevention and relief. When formulating disaster prevention and relief plans, expanding civil society participation is essential for establishing a comprehensive response framework.

Third, whole-of-society defense resilience requires breaking through existing cognitive frameworks to enhance collective awareness and capabilities through education and civic participation.

Continuing to strengthen communication capabilities is key to enhancing societal resilience and overall national strategy. Effective communication between the government and the public is an important part of maintaining social order.

All government agencies must continue to build up their strategic communication capabilities through ongoing exchanges with experts and scholars from various fields, while prioritizing the enhancement of whole-of-society defense resilience as a key issue in social communication.

At the same time, targeted communication with different audiences is essential to enhance the reach and impact of

information, prevent misunderstandings and rumors, and maintain social stability.

Working at the grassroots level and laying down roots in neighborhoods is my vision for whole-of-society defense resilience. Today's exercises represent a small step forward. Moving ahead, we will verify additional preparedness efforts for whole-of-society defense resilience through the Urban Resilience Exercises, which integrate the former Wan An and Min An Exercises.

The MOI is requested to collaborate with relevant government agencies to assess the feasibility of inviting village and neighborhood chiefs to participate in whole-of-society defense resilience seminars held across different counties and cities, enabling grassroots communities to understand the mechanisms and concepts of whole-of-society defense resilience.

Please do not fear shortcomings, but approach the validation of all efforts with the mindset of making each attempt better than the last. Only by doing so can Taiwanese society truly become more resilient in facing unpredictable disasters, ensuring national security and social stability. Thank you.

## **VI. Extempore Motions**

**Motion:** Following the motions of the National Climate Change Committee and Healthy Taiwan Promotion Committee, we forgo payment for participation in this committee to support its operations. We hope for the committee's sustained operations in order to enable all Taiwanese citizens to understand, support, and participate in strengthening Taiwan, thereby enhancing the nation's overall resilience in national defense, people's livelihoods, disaster prevention,

and democracy, while jointly addressing various challenges. (Proposed by Committee Member Wu Jong-shinn and co-signed by the private sector committee members in attendance)

1. **Description of Committee Member Wu Jong-shinn's motion** (Not included in English meeting minutes)
2. **Resolution:** The committee thanks Committee Member Wu and the cosigners for their support during difficult times. The committee will continue to operate.

## **VII. Chair's Closing Statement**

First, thank you all for your active participation today. These exercises featured three “firsts”: They were the first to align with whole-of-society defense resilience policy, the first to incorporate regional compound elements, and the first in which expanded emergency medical facilities were set up.

Through today's exercises, we also validated three key matters: deployment of civilian forces, cross-district integration, and community coordination. Following the previous tabletop exercises and these field exercises, I believe everyone has gained a deeper understanding of the government's preparations.

At the conclusion of this meeting, I would like to share four key points with everyone:

First, our direction is to continue to unite the whole of society by overcoming the challenges of promoting whole-of-society defense resilience step by step.

In today's exercises, we adopted a field-based, scenario-based, and operational approach to closely simulate the real conditions

of a disaster, once again demonstrating Taiwan's determination and capability in facing crises.

Our policies promoting whole-of-society defense resilience must move forward resolutely, as this is essential to safeguarding Taiwan's free and democratic way of life. We must unite citizens across disciplines and generations, transcending partisan divides, to work together.

Last month, I made a public statement that the government would prioritize a special budget to achieve a defense budget exceeding 3% of GDP. Recently, I also announced that the government would increase allowances for volunteer military service members and combat troops.

These policies will not only help enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, but also our overall whole-of-society defense resilience. Moving forward, we must more pragmatically take inventory of relevant needs and plans, propose concrete implementation strategies, and allocate corresponding budgets accurately to ensure the policies are effectively implemented, demonstrating to the public our determination and proactive efforts to protect Taiwan.

Second, we must uphold the principle of unscripted exercises and continue to verify the response mechanisms of governments at all levels.

The purpose of these exercises is to identify issues and gain a more realistic understanding of the current preparedness of units at all levels.

In addition to the content of these exercises, numerous matters remain to be tested in the upcoming Urban Resilience Exercises. These include scenarios such as emergency repairs or backup measures for damaged critical infrastructure involving communications disruptions and transportation gridlock.

Moving forward, all government agencies must uphold the principle of scenario-based, unscripted exercises, continuing to promote relevant exercises while moving away from past models that pursued zero errors and zero risks. When necessary, we should also expand the scale of validation to enhance our disaster response capabilities.

Furthermore, civil society and the government are partners. I kindly request all advisors and committee members to continue their engagement, serving as bridges for public-private collaboration and expanded cooperation.

Third, as the international situation grows increasingly complex, Taiwan's efforts have earned recognition, and we must redouble our endeavors.

This year, the global political landscape has once again undergone significant changes, and many countries are more actively considering their response strategies.

Taiwan's proactive efforts to address challenges have also yielded preliminary results. At numerous venues, many ambassadors stationed in Taiwan and friends visiting Taiwan have commended Taiwan's efforts and determination. This indicates that our hard work has been recognized.

Whether facing natural disasters or geopolitical challenges, Taiwan has long been at the forefront of threats, shaping our unique response system. In the future, we must not only continue learning from the strengths of like-minded countries, but also actively share with our international friends the outcomes of Taiwan's policy initiatives.

Fourth, we cannot afford division. Safeguarding Taiwan's freedom and democracy depends on the commitment of the whole of society.

Faced with an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, Taiwan cannot afford internal division. Only through solidarity can we safeguard our freedom.

Defending our national sovereignty, security, and free and democratic way of life represents the greatest consensus among all Taiwanese citizens and political parties, both ruling and opposition, with no room for compromise.

Therefore, this month, I convened a high-level national security meeting and proposed 17 strategies to respond to five major national security and united front threats. These strategies aim to integrate the strengths of various government agencies, implement proactive measures, and adopt corresponding safeguards to ensure that our national sovereignty is not infringed on, ensure the safety of the lives and property of our 23 million people, and ensure the sustainability of our free and democratic way of life.

Countering united front infiltration and strengthening societal resilience is no easy task. Advancing this effort, we will inevitably

encounter many obstacles, but by persevering, we will achieve good outcomes.

We call on all citizens to join in this collective effort. The government will fulfill its responsibilities and develop sound plans, while also hoping that citizens and political parties, both ruling and opposition, will collaborate closely with the government as we advance together.

I extend my appreciation once again to all the advisors, committee members, civil society organizations, and colleagues from the central and local governments for their contributions. Let us work together to enhance whole-of-society defense resilience and build a robust democratic society. Thank you.