Democratic Taiwan: Challenges and Prospects
National Press Club 'Newsmaker' interview
with President Chen Shui-bian
via Taipei-Washington videoconference
Transcript with translated remarks of President Chen
Office of the President
Republic of China (Taiwan)
May 29, 2006
President Chen Shui-bian was the featured speaker in a "Newsmaker" interview and discussion on the theme "Democratic Taiwan: Challenges and Prospects," conducted today by the National Press Club via Taipei-Washington videoconference. The exchange began with opening messages delivered by NPC President Jerry Zremski and NPC Vice President Peter Hickman, who served as moderator. This was followed by the remarks of guest speaker US Congressman Lincoln Davis (Republican, Tennessee), President Chen's opening remarks, and those of the other guest speakers. The latter included: Therese Shaheen, former chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan; Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies and former chair of the American Institute in Taiwan; Randall Schriver former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council. The President then gave a combined response to the guest speakers' comments and fielded questions from reporters in Washington and Taipei.
Peter Hickman (Moderator, vice chairman of the National Press Club): Mr. President, welcome back to the National Press Club, even if it's just electronically. I say welcome back because President Chen has been here twice before, once as a member of the Legislative Yuan and once as a mayor of Taipei. And I hope that one day you will be here, maybe not as president because your term expires, but those who succeed you, hope they can come when we get certain things straightened out.
President Chen's topic today, as you know, is "Democratic Taiwan: Challenges and Prospects," which covers quite a bit.
Lincoln Davis (US Congressman): It's my pleasure to be here this morning. I had a recent trip to Taiwan to visit with the people in Taiwan, and was very grateful for the open arms and the friendships I was able to make there. I traveled with three other congressmen—Democrats and Republicans. All three of those were from California. I'm from Tennessee. [Jokingly:] So we not only needed an interpreter while I was in Taiwan for the folks who live in Taiwan to understand what I was saying; we also needed an interpreter for what I was saying to the folks from California and what they were saying to me!
But it is my pleasure to be here this morning.
As I traveled in Taiwan—from Tennessee, I have never had a great deal of experience traveling the world. But when I go to other countries, I realize that the world's a whole lot bigger than just the foothills in Tennessee where I live, in the Cumberland Mountains. And when I engage with those, especially in Taiwan, and realize the courage that your people have, the entrepreneurship, the commitment to human rights, and your—for your situation is today on the world stage as a partner with the nations that are free throughout the world, trading in education and academia, in science, medicine, technology, and in trade, has—your place in Central and Asia-Pacific has certainly had a tremendous impact.
And as we engage now in war on terrorism, you've become a much greater friend to America.
So for me, I welcome the president, who will speak in a moment; I welcome those who are here from Taiwan; and thank you for being our friend and tell you that in America, we are glad to be the friend.
President Chen's opening remarks:
It is both a pleasure and an honor to once again accept the invitation of Vice Chairman Hickman with the National Press Club (NPC) in Washington D.C. to join Newsmaker through videoconference today. I recall that, when serving as a legislator and later as Taipei City mayor, the Club invited me to partake in a press conference. At that time I was able to meet you in Washington D.C. in person. But today, to our regret, I can only meet my dear old friends at the NPC through videoconference. I want to express my sincere appreciation and respect to Vice Chairman Hickman and to the NPC for rendering Taiwan your firm support despite China's relentless pressure. I also want to thank you for making this press conference possible. I hope that our friendship will continue to transcend both time and space, and constantly be rekindled.
May 20th marked the seventh anniversary of my inauguration as the President of Taiwan. The following day, we finished reorganizing and swearing-in the new cabinet. Although there is only one year left of my presidency, it doesn't signify the end of an era, but instead, the advent of a new beginning.
Looking back on US-Taiwan relations over the past seven years, I think we can best describe it with the saying: "a friend in need is a friend indeed". Taiwan and the US have enjoyed a solid camaraderie over the years. Forming the crucial bedrock of our relations are our shared values of freedom and democracy, as well as our strategic interests in ensuring security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. In this light, both of us are committed to maintaining and defending Taiwan's democracy and the status quo of peace in the Taiwan Strait, and to preventing any unilateral change.
It is in the long-term interests for both our countries to see to a Taiwan that is growing ever-more free, more democratic, and fully protects human rights, a Taiwan whose national sovereignty is independent from the PRC, and a Taiwan that is committed to enhancing its self-defense capabilities.
In stark contrast, a Taiwan ruled by any political party that upholds the goal of "ultimate unification with China," that heavily leans toward China, that strongly encourages alliance with the Chinese Communist Party to jointly control Taiwan, and that refuses to keep its commitments and does nothing but boycott and set hurdles for the national defense budget would pose a severe challenge and trial to the mutual trust and foundation for cooperation laid by our two countries over the years.
Over the past half a century, the US and Taiwan have engaged in intensive exchange and interaction on a wide range of issues including economy, trade, culture, security and even counter-terrorism. However, the core issues always revolve around ensuring peace in the Taiwan Strait. An increasing amount of substantial evidence indicates the major factors for the intensification and escalation of cross-strait tension do not stem from Taiwan's continued efforts to deepen its democracy, but rather from China's rapid military expansion.
The US Defense Department publishes an annual report titled Military Power of the People's Republic of China. The 2005 edition explicitly pointed out for the first time that the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has tilted in China's favor. The 2006 edition stated that China's military expansion and modernization could then challenge all foreign forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region and that the Chinese authorities should provide a reasonable motivation for its military build-up. The 2007 edition of the report was released just a few days ago, on May 25. It even conjectured that the aim of China's military modernization surpasses the need to resolve a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China has upset the military balance not only in the Taiwan Strait, but also in all of East Asia. It has enabled the People's Liberation Army to launch military activities outside of Taiwan Strait, and could start with activities in its peripheral region. China is marching toward becoming a global military hegemony.
In addition, according to these reports over the years, the number of missiles China has deployed along its southeast coast targeting Taiwan has increased from 725 in 2005, to 790 in 2006, and 900 in 2007. It is estimated that this figure will exceed 1000 next year. Our own intelligence and estimates have reached a similar conclusion. This development not only severely threatens Taiwan's national security, but also causes great concern on the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
In the face of an increasingly tense cross-strait situation, Taiwan is grateful for a number of actions taken by the US government, including: the Bush administration's approval of major arms sales projects in 2001; urging the EU countries to maintain arms embargo against China; listing the Taiwan issue as a "common strategic objective in the US-Japan Security Consultative meeting, the so-called "two plus two" talks"; and insistence on a peaceful resolution, through dialogue, to the dispute across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, on behalf of the 23 million people of Taiwan, I would like to extend our sincere appreciation to President Bush and the US government. And I want to reiterate that my pledges to defending the status quo in the Taiwan Strait remain unchanged.
Apart from increasing its military threat against Taiwan, China has used every possible means to squeeze Taiwan out of the international community. China has adopted a "three all" diplomatic strategy to 'snatch all' of Taiwan's diplomatic allies, 'block all' of Taiwan's lifelines to international politics and 'take all' of Taiwan's leverage in negotiating on an equal footing. China is trying to erase all trace of Taiwan in the global society.
Let me give you two examples. The recent World Health Assembly [WHA] in Geneva and the General Assembly of the World Organization for Animal Health [OIE] held in Paris. In the face of China's unreasonable suppression, Taiwan has long been excluded from participating in the World Health Organization [WHO]. This exclusion has made Taiwan the only gap, indeed a black hole, in the global disease-prevention network. It has also deprived the 23 million people of Taiwan of their health right, a basic human right. To remedy this flaw, nations friendly with Taiwan, including the US and Japan, have supported Taiwan's participation as an observer in the WHA and actively assisted Taiwan's meaningful participation in WHO-held activities and meetings. However, a secret memorandum of understanding [MOU] signed between China and the WHO Secretariat in July 2005 stated that all applications of Taiwanese medical and public health professionals to participate in WHO activities are subject to China's approval. Furthermore, China requires that representatives from Taiwan can only take part in WHO technical meetings in their personal capacities, and that all meeting documents must indicate clearly that these public health experts are from "Taiwan, China." In addition, in the case of an acute public health emergency in Taiwan, the WHO must first gain the approval of China before deciding whether or not it dispatches experts to assist Taiwan. China tries every possible means to downgrade and pressure Taiwan, making Taiwan's "meaningful participation" in fact meaningless.
On the 25th of this month, the OIE succumbed to pressure from China. It passed a draft resolution to downgrade Taiwan's status, from a sovereign country to a non-sovereign regional member. The OIE's rationale was based solely on China's unilateral assertion that the PRC includes Taiwan, and the PRC government is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China. This argument is unprecedented, surpassing and replacing Beijing's past official position, the so-called "three-stage theory on one China"; that is, "there is only one China in the world, Mainland and Taiwan both belong to that one China, and China's sovereignty and territorial integrity admits of no partition."
The reality is that Taiwan has never been under the jurisdiction of the PRC. Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country, and our sovereignty is independent from the rule of China. Taiwan and China are two independent nations on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Neither exercises effective jurisdiction over the other. Taiwan is Taiwan, and China is China; there is one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan currently has official diplomatic relations with 25 countries around the world. Therefore, to include Taiwan as part of PRC not only ignores a historical fact, but also directly challenges the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by attempting to change and damage that status quo.
The international community, especially the free democratic camp led by the United States, Japan and member states of the European Union, should not overlook China's irrational demands and unreasonable behavior simply because of its size and power. History has taught us one important lesson, that appeasement breeds aggression. To maintain lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait and ensure security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the international community must send the right message to China. The world community must actively guide China towards political democratization, and join forces to build a more democratic, freer and safer world.
In today's world, we are confronted with challenges such as water shortage, global warming and abnormal climate change. Taiwan will shoulder our responsibility and obligation as a member of the global society, and find a new equilibrium point, where economic development is balanced with environmental protection. Taiwan is a member of the World Trade Organization [WTO] and is actively bidding for WHO membership under the name Taiwan. However, besides pursuing a sustainable economy and health, we believe that we should go one step further and strive for a sustainable environment. As such, Taiwan is willing to work with other countries from all over the world that share similar visions to propose and push for the creation of a World Environmental Organization [WEO]. By setting up an institution that integrate the strengths of different nations to co-manage these issues on a global level, together we can deal with challenges of the global ecological environment.
In closing, let me thank the NPC and Vice Chairman Hickman for your kind invitation and arrangements. I also want to thank all discussants and friends from the media for your participation. And now please feel free to share your valuable comments and insights. Thank you very much.
Guest speakers' remarks
Therese Shaheen (former chairwoman, the American Institute in Taiwan): Thank you so much, Mr. Hickman, Mr. Zremski, Congressman, thank you so much for your efforts to lead the way in Congress to help balance this relationship. Really, really quite impressive! I've been asked to talk today about US policy. And I would like to start with a few assumptions.
First, the United States and our democratic allies are strengthened when we support democratic processes and democratic systems. Further, it is in the US interest that Taiwan continues as a vibrant democracy. Finally, the potential for misunderstanding between countries, whether they be democratic or otherwise, is inversely proportional to the breadth and depth of public and private sector interaction between the countries. On the basis of these three assumptions, there are areas where US policy towards Taiwan deserves greater attention and focus.
I will start with the issue of transparency. The United States has certain security commitments to Taiwan. The lack of transparency in the underlying relationship suggests a lack of seriousness about those commitments. With respect to the issue of transparency, it's important to consider the US policy on Taiwan in the regional context. I believe that diplomatic, political, and military processes can be established at a level, and with regularity, that would ensure greater transparency in the relationship. I also believe that Taiwan would probably be better able to defend itself, and be less reliant on US commitments, if there were greater clarity into what US security commitments mean and how they might be discharged.
Standing in the way of greater transparency is a reluctance by some policymakers to adopt sensible routines, interactions in the economic, political, and security areas that they deem "provocative" with respect to the PRC [People's Republic of China]. As author and journalist James Mann has so well described, today's status quo has developed through artful application of the terms such as "provocative." Thus, I have been told that some actually believe that US officials that would be attending and listening to events such as these, that this would be provocative to the PRC and would be actually contrary to US policy. James Mann describes this tendency well and I commend it to you.
With this in mind, I'd like you to consider the 2007 US Department of Defense Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China, which President Chen made reference to. In that document, and I quote, "China's actions in certain areas increasingly appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies." That's a direct quote. It is worth mentioning some of the questions that this apparent inconsistency provokes: What is the actual intent of the People's Republic of China? Is there an inconsistency in the declared intent? How seriously should the region, and the United States, take Beijing's declared intent, when the PRC's actions seem counter to those declarations? Thus, I believe, the Chinese actions are themselves provocative.
But I'm here to discuss US policy. I am concerned that US policy towards Taiwan is indeed provocative. But this is not because we do not seek too much, but because we lack the interest in doing what must be done if we mean what we say about our commitments to Taiwan. If you were to substitute the United States for China in the statement I just read from the Pentagon's report, then we provoke similar questions. Now I'm going to use the United States instead of China. The United States' actions in certain areas increasingly appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies.
As I noted, the United States has a declaratory policy in the region that includes a security commitment to Taiwan under certain circumstances. I am concerned about the apparent inconsistency between that declaratory policy and our own actions. That inconsistency provokes these questions: What is our actual intent? How seriously should the region take our declared intent, when our actions seem counter to those declarations? Under what circumstances would the US intervene? What is the nature of the dialogue between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China? How ready are Taiwan forces to defend themselves? How ready are United States forces to assist and operate in a joint and combined way, should that become necessary?
While strategic ambiguity is understandable—and all governments reserve that option—however, I am more concerned, though, about strategic avoidance, and the importance of the questions that we face.
Another area that deserves some scrutiny is Taiwan's defensive deterrent. It is in the United States' interest that Taiwan has a credible deterrent. In fact, United States security commitments depend on a credible Taiwan deterrent. Action by Taiwan on the defense budget is caught up by political posturing by some, so that passage, in their view, might be provocative – there's that word again – by the People's Republic of China and even, some say, to the United States.
Of course, the opposite is true. As President Chen said, appeasement leads to aggression. Weakness is provocative. Taiwan's stalling on the defense budget, for whatever reason or justification, is perpetuating the perception of weakness. This inaction is dangerous to the United States, and a provocation to the People's Republic of China. To address these issues, we need to be provocative.
With respect to the issue of transparency, it is important that we consider US policy towards Taiwan in its regional context. Prior presidents have used informal advisors to examine regional issues. Successive presidents, for example, have appointed special envoys to the Middle East, to the Balkans, the Western Sahara, and other regions. Former President Reagan asked former Secretary of the Interior William Clark to be a special envoy to Taiwan with President Lee Teng-hui. He asked Senator Paul Laxalt to be a special envoy, and President Clinton sent former Congressman Lee Hamilton as an envoy—and he served admirably in that role. I would encourage President Bush to do the same. I believe it would help him gain better visibility into the three-party situation that is possible through the normal interagency process.
Right now, not only can the president, the vice president, the premier, the foreign minister, and the defense minister not meet their counterparts, but down the line, to the working level, they cannot meet each other. Randy Schriver and I were the last ones—I believe Randy was the last one from the Department of State—to meet the foreign minister of Taiwan. So, it's not just the upper levels, it's the lack of communication at all levels. This is a recipe for disaster, when people do not communicate. There's too much at stake and there's too little attention to be paid to this for this to be ignored any longer. Regarding the Taiwan defensive deterrent, one of the Bush administration's earliest actions in 2001 was to approve the military package that has since languished. It is long past time for the United States to more forcefully communicate the urgency—that failure to pass this is provocative and dangerous. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your attention. Thank you very much.
Richard Bush (director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies; former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan): President Chen, Ambassador Wu, Congressman Davis, ladies and gentlemen: It's a great honor to participate in this event. I'd like to talk for just a couple of minutes about cross-strait relations, where there are some dark clouds, and a few silver linings. On the dark cloud side, China's military buildup has continued and Taiwan's overall ability to defend itself has declined. Competition for position in the international arena is still intense, as President Chen has described. Between the two sides of the strait, there has been no progress in clarifying Taiwan's sovereign character. Indeed, the situation is still very hotly debated. On the island of Taiwan, there is deep division over how Taiwan should face the growing challenge of China. And finally, there has been no political dialogue for eight years—and there should be.
Now, there are a few bright spots, and let me mention them. Economic cooperation between the two sides of the strait has deepened, and that has enhanced the prosperity of both the mainland and Taiwan. Under the leadership of Ambassador Wu in his previous job, the two sides have made progress on expanding passenger and cargo charter flights, and there are prospects for mainland tourists to go to Taiwan that would have positive economic and political consequences. The Hu Jintao administration has shown some creativity on the Taiwan Strait issue, and we can hope that it will fill more. Finally, I would note that cross-strait relations would take place in the context of the broader East Asia region. And, in that regard, whether North Korea gives up its weapons is the key issue facing the region in the weeks and months ahead in the six-party talks. Whether it gives up its nuclear weapons will define the level of peace and stability for years to come.
Now, as the United States seeks to work with China and other countries in the six-party talks to convince North Korea to make this strategic choice—to give up its nuclear weapons, it depends on friends like Taiwan to contribute to a favorable negotiating environment. The United States will not sacrifice Taiwan's interests to ensure China's positive role on North Korea. But Taiwan's constructive contribution can make Washington's job easier. Thank you very much.
Randall Shriver (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs): Morning ladies and gentlemen, and good evening Mr. President. It is a great honor to participate in this forum with you, sir, and I want to congratulate you on your service and your continued service to the people of Taiwan and your support of this relationship.
You know, China is still a very prominent point of discussion and topic of discussion in Washington, and the conversation usually begins with something along the lines of "What remarkable progress!" "What remarkable change!" "All these tremendous developments we've seen in the last decade and a half or two decades in China." But it's important to remember that no less remarkable is the progress and change in Taiwan, and of course this is speaking specifically to the political sphere and Taiwan's transition to democracy.
In fact, I think, when the dust settles and academics, historians, former policymakers have the opportunity to look objectively at the data and the historical record, this may well be the most successful, political transition—transformation—in human history, when you think about how quickly it was accomplished, peacefully, with no economic disruption, and as a continuing constructive participant in not only our bilateral relationship, but in regional affairs—a very, very remarkable record, again, in a very short period of time. And Mr. President, that is a definite part of your legacy, and you deserve great credit for that, not only for your championing of the freedom and democracy as a private citizen, but as the first elected member of the opposition and your service that continues to this day.
I think it's quite obvious why Taiwan's democracy is important to the people of Taiwan. It is their best chance for good governance and responsible governance to meet the needs of citizens there. But I think it's perhaps less obvious, or at least less mentioned—perhaps I should say—that Taiwan's democracy is also important to the United States. And I appreciate the comments by Chairperson Shaheen along those lines. And I think it is important for the US that Taiwan's democracy survives and succeeds; it positions Taiwan, potentially, as a likeminded friend on so many issues of importance to the United States.
President Chen mentioned several of these: the global struggle against violent extremists and terrorists; economic and trade issues; health issues; environmental issues; it was very interesting—the creative proposal put out this morning. But Taiwan as a democracy, I think, better positions us for partnership and cooperation on these issues. It also is an enlargement of the international community of democracies, which I—and I think most academics and scholars—would argue, is fundamentally supportive of global peace and stability. So this is why it's not only important to the people of Taiwan but important to the United States as well.
Now of course, there are challenges that come along with the democratization, and I think I would associate myself with many of the remarks made earlier about how the US can do more to support Taiwan's efforts to deepen and strengthen democracy. But we shouldn't look past, or underestimate, some of the challenges.
I know our former colleagues, who are still serving in the US government, are looking at some very challenging issues coming up in this election cycle. The election periods are always periods of high excitement but also some anxiety. And I think, when you consider the US' challenges, think about how they are probably framing some of these issues. How do you be pro-democracy without being pro-independence, which of course the administration has said they do not support? How do you be pro-Taiwan without being anti-China? And these are not simple, easy questions to work through when you start to get issue by issue and try to figure out objectively how to strike that balance.
So, this is what I think US policymakers will be grappling with into this election cycle. But it's certainly a worthy endeavor because, again, it is important for the United States that Taiwan's democracy succeed. I think we can do more, and should do more. Some proposals and interesting ideas have been put out, and I would certainly associate myself with many of those. But, again, a challenging period, and we're fortunate to have your continued stewardship, Mr. President, through this period. So, thank you very much.
Rupert Hammond-Chambers (president of the US-Taiwan Business Council): Mr. President, so near yet so far! We wish you were here with us in person, and surely that day will come at some point. Welcome! I would, first and foremost—as Randy just did—like to associate myself with the comments of my colleagues: so many succinct points; so much to say, so little time. I think, I'm blessed, today, to talk about an aspect of our bilateral relationship that is on a very sound footing at this time, and one, in my view, that has a very bright future, and that's the economic relationship between our two countries. No doubt, it faces some challenges, but equally, business opportunities between the United States and one of its critical trading partners in the global economy, Taiwan, remain robust; they're increasing; many US and Taiwan companies look to one another to penetrate the world's global markets. And I would suggest to you all that, really, that drives at the very foundation of our relationship, which our countries, two peoples and their economies—that, for me anyway, is very much the glue that binds us together.
The US-Taiwan trade relationship, at this time, is being driven by our trade and investment framework agreement mechanism. That is going very well. President Chen has some terrific colleagues in Taiwan, Chen Ruey-long, Connie Yang, Ho Mei-yueh, to name but three. We certainly regret the resignation of Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen, who provided exquisite leadership in the economic realm. But we no doubt recognize the fact that President Chen's new colleagues in the EY [Executive Yuan] will provide the economic leadership necessary to keep the US-Taiwan bilateral economic relationship moving in the right direction—from the Taiwan end, looking to our own trade negotiators here in the United States also, to keep our trade relationship leaning forward.
Quickly, three areas: firstly, liberalization required, to ensure Taiwan remains a critical partner for American companies—Taiwan's inclusion in regional and global trade liberalization. It is critical the United States provides leadership. The term "free trade agreement" is one we hear a great deal about here in the United States. But Taiwan's bilateral relationship, and the billions of dollars that we associate with that relationship between the US and Taiwan, belies the true significance of Taiwan as a critical partner for the US. From technology to clothing, across the board, we simply cannot afford, as a country, the United States, to see Taiwan's economic interests marginalized. It is inherently not in our country's interests. So, finding a way to involve Taiwan in regional, multilateral, bilateral, and global trade liberalization is critically important. [Secondly,] a robust and aggressive domestic reform agenda for Taiwan—I know President Chen and his colleagues in the executive branch have been working on that. We look for that. And thirdly, increased incremental liberalization of cross-strait trade, certainly along the lines that we have seen over the last 18 months, that is consistent with the security and sovereignty of Taiwan. We know that that is compatible, and we believe that those three areas will continue to position Taiwan as a global power economically.
So, Mr. President, thank you very much for speaking with us today. I wish you Godspeed.
President Chen's combined response to guest speakers
My thanks to all you good friends of Taiwan for the valuable views you just shared. I'd like to express my views on a number of the points you raised, for your consideration and criticism.
Actually, Taiwan's biggest problem at this time is the serious rift in our society regarding national identity. While it is of course true that many newly emerging democracies face a similar situation, it is a more serious problem in Taiwan's case. Inasmuch as we are a democratic nation, it is perhaps only natural that there will be some differences among our people. However, regarding differences in identification with Taiwan as a nation, this has led to great difficulties, as reflected in [legislative opposition to passage of] our national defense budget, particularly with regard to our proposed bill for the procurement of three major weapons systems.
As you all understand, we are very grateful that President Bush and his administration approved a sizeable arms sales program during my term in office, in 2001. In June 2004, following my re-election in March and inauguration in May of that year, we submitted a bill for procuring these arms to the Legislative Yuan. Unexpectedly, however, we have been unable to get the bill passed in the Legislature. We have done all in our power but to date have failed.
The biggest problem is that some believe there's no need to upgrade our national defense. They seem to think that strengthening our defense capabilities will sour interaction between Taiwan and China. So this has become a very serious predicament.
If we have a strong consciousness of national community—of Taiwan as our nation—then, of course, we must rely on ourselves to protect our nation's security. It is only right, therefore, for us to strengthen our national defense and upgrade our self-defense capabilities, and for the Legislature to pass an appropriate defense budget, especially for these major arms procurements. This poses no problem in the case of most nations. But in Taiwan, where some people regard China as their motherland, this is indeed a problem.
It is also highly regrettable that, due to serious differences concerning Taiwan's national identity, when it comes to the dialogue we should be having with China, some people seek to carry on a party-to-party dialogue by means of the so-called KMT-CCP Forums involving the opposition Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, oblivious to the need for genuine Taiwan-China dialogue. The dialogue should be between China's government and Taiwan's democratically elected government.
Things that could never happen in other countries happen in Taiwan and in its relations with China. This is a matter which I must bring to your attention, and is the biggest challenge we now face.
We of course understand China's military threat. It is necessary to clearly recognize that China is carrying out a three-stage strategy for launching a war against Taiwan. They want to establish contingency-response combat capabilities by 2007, build up combat capability for a large-scale military engagement by 2010, and ensure victory in a decisive battle by 2015. These are hard facts. Anyone who still claims that China has no intention of using force against Taiwan is utterly mistaken.
So how are we to avert war? How can we stop war? This is possible only if our war preparedness is strong and powerful—a fact which I take this occasion to emphasize for everyone's due consideration.
It should be understood, of course, that the government of Taiwan by no means wishes to leave the responsibility for its defense to the US or any other country. As I see it, we must increase our defense spending. Besides passing the major three-item arms procurement bill, I hope we can raise our defense spending to 3 percent of GDP by 2008, and in line with that goal, we ought to raise spending in 2007 to 2.85 percent of GDP.
We've drawn up a defense budget proposal in conformance with the major areas of need outlined in our [2006] National Security Report. To our surprise, however, since sending the bill to the Legislature, big cuts have been made [in committee] and we've been unable to obtain full support for defense spending amounting to 2.85 percent of GDP. Though it looks like we may have trouble reaching the goal of 3 percent in 2008, we won't dismiss any possibility or spare any effort to achieve it.
In addition, only a strong and powerful national defense as backup will enable us to confidently engage in dialogue, consultation, and negotiation with China. Without a strong and powerful defense, we will not be in a position to safeguard the hard-won fruits of democracy. Nor will the government and people of Taiwan be able to confidently re-open the door to negotiations with China.
We thank all of you for your comments, especially the issues raised by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schriver: Given that the US government "does not support" Taiwan independence, how does it plan to support Taiwan's democracy? The US government does not oppose China, but how, then, is it going to support Taiwan? We've heard time and again, for example, that it is hoped Taiwan's government and myself will talk more about Taiwan's democracy and limit ourselves to discussing human rights, and not touch on the issue of our nation's sovereignty.
We would like to ask, however: What is sovereignty? What are human rights? Taiwan's desire to participate in the World Health Organization and join the United Nations, our efforts to promote the use of referendums, our desire to get rid of "ultimate unification" as a foregone conclusion inherent in the National Unification Council's Guidelines for National Unification—some people think these are tremendously provocative sovereignty issues. We must point out, however, that they are human rights issues, concerning the health rights and political rights of Taiwan's 23 million people. Be it participation in the WHO or the UN, in fact, it all comes within the purview of human rights. How can these rights be stripped away? How can they be limited?
Similarly, referendum is a universal value and a basic human right. We don't want our people to be limited to a single, predetermined choice, with no other option, when choosing our nation's future. We don't want "ultimate unification" to be the only possible choice, rendering us unable to choose independence. We believe this violates the democratic spirit "sovereignty rests in the people" and is not true protection of human rights.
We feel, therefore, that there are a lot of ways of talking about [what we should and shouldn't do] that are bewildering and leave us at a loss as to how to respond.
Lastly, we strongly agree with Mr. Hammond-Chambers that Taiwan should be included in a regional free trade agreement [FTA]. It is now evident that the ongoing Trade and Investment Framework Agreement [TIFA] talks are just a process, not a goal. If so, then what's the goal? Of course, it's the promotion and signing of an FTA between Taiwan and the US, and only that goal will serve the greatest interests of both nations.
Taiwan is the eighth-largest trade partner of the US. Countries that rank lower as US trade partners have already signed FTAs with the US, so why is Taiwan, which ranks among the top ten, neglected and unable to sign an FTA with the US or be included in a regional FTA? We therefore hope to see great progress in the TIFA negotiations to be held in Washington in July. Once this process has been completed, we hope it will be followed by the ultimate objective of signing an FTA. These are my supplementary explanations. Thank you.
Question and Answer
Q1. Some of your independence goals have been stymied by angry US reaction to episodes, such as the scrapping of the National Unification Council. You've got one year left in your presidency; I was hoping to see what you're going to do to try to move past some of the rhetoric to achieve some of your goals.
A: As Taiwan's president, it is my duty and overarching mission to defend Taiwan's national security, dignity, and sovereignty. As indicated in the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA] of 1979, whenever China alters or damages the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, the question of how to deal with it and carry out commitments under the TRA becomes a very serious issue for the US government. Here, I wish to further clarify and emphasize that, while some people say Taiwan is not a state, Section 4 (b)(1) of the TRA explicitly states that "whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan." Clearly, then, the TRA treats Taiwan as a state. Moreover, Section 4 (d) of the TRA provides that "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization." Hence, according to the TRA, Taiwan of course has the right to participate in international organizations, including the WHO and the UN.
We hope, therefore, to re-evaluate the current situation with the TRA, which has been implemented by the US government for decades, as our point of departure—particularly in view of the great changes that have occurred over the past couple of decades. In the final year of my tenure as president, I must strive to preserve Taiwan's sovereignty, dignity, and security in line with the TRA. In addition to strengthening Taiwan-centric consciousness, we also hope to apply for membership in the WHO and UN under the name "Taiwan." I know these are "missions impossible," but such efforts are completely consistent with the TRA provisions, and I will gladly join with everyone in examining the matter.
Q2. President Chen, you have been president for seven years. You have one more year in office. What do you want to be remembered by? What do you want your heritage of your presidency to be?
A: As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schriver just mentioned, the very fact that I helped bring about Taiwan's first-ever change of ruling parties, the first-ever peaceful transfer of political power, already assures me at least some measure of prominence in history. However, I won't be satisfied with only that.
In 2000, when I was first elected president, only 36.9 percent of people in Taiwan said that they considered themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This figure reached 60 percent last year and public opinion polls suggest that it has risen to 68 percent this year. Therefore, with regard to strengthening and further promoting Taiwan-centric consciousness, I hope to see this figure increase to 70 percent, 75 percent, or even 80 percent during my term in office.
I believe that as president of Taiwan, I can concretely raise Taiwan-centric consciousness and thereby resolve some of the internal disputes over national identity. Of course, we won't be able to resolve the problem completely, but I am confident that we will be able to up the percentage of people who consider themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese to 75 or 85 percent. I'm sure we then won't have so much trouble in matters such as approving the arms procurement bill. Likewise, any scheme to take control of Taiwan by joining forces with the Chinese Communist Party in the so-called KMT-CCP Forums will certainly come to nothing.
In the remaining year, we will work even harder. Concerning Taiwan's transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic society, our consolidation and strengthening of democracy, and our insistence on and realization of Taiwan-centric consciousness, we hope that in the future, when people look back on this period of history, they will remember that there was a president called Chen Shui-bian, who was very perseverant and steadfast under all kinds of pressure; remember how he promoted the right of referendum, passage of the Referendum Act, the [2004] "Peace Referendum," and the constitutional amendment empowering the people to ratify constitutional amendments through referendum; remember that he was able to mothball the National Unification Council and Guidelines for National Unification and, in particular, thereby brought an end to "ultimate unification" as a preordained fate, enabling the 23 million people of Taiwan to enjoy the right and opportunity to freely choose their own path. I believe that, thanks to this latter accomplishment by itself, my eight years as the president of Taiwan will not have been in vain.
Q3. You mentioned that discussions under the TIFA with the United States may lead to, or hopefully could lead to, Taiwan's participation in regional trade arrangements. Can you tell us what regional trade agreements would be most receptive if in fact the US stops its block?
A: We all understand that the TIFA is just a process and not an end in itself. We also believe that forceful internal reforms—including further privatization of existing state-run enterprises and liberalization of the electricity and energy sectors—are compatible with the joint interests of Taiwan and the United States. In the TIFA negotiation process, there are still areas we need to work to improve, including intellectual property rights, pricing of pharmaceuticals, and deregulation of the telecommunications sector. But no matter whether we speak of the TIFA negotiations held in Taipei last year or those to be held in Washington this year, we have made great strides. Of course, we still have some way to go before reaching our goal, and we will work hard to do so.
To ensure Taiwan's national security, it is not enough to talk merely about military security. In fact, genuine national security must encompass economic security and trade security as well. Surely, if Taiwan's economy becomes a mere appendage to China and loses its economic independence, and if it is marginalized and weakened, this surely will not be in the best interest of the US either in the Asia-Pacific or in Taiwan itself. This is why we must repeatedly call upon the US government to give further, prudent consideration to the matter of pushing forward with consultations and promotion of measures aimed at establishing a Taiwan-US FTA.
Of course, we are very grateful for President Bush's repeated advocacy of a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific during informal leaders' meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] forum. We hope further discussions and conclusions will be reached at the APEC meeting to be held in Australia later this year. If so, we look forward not only to a US-Taiwan FTA but to being able to participate in an FTAAP, which truly will be in our common interest.
Q4. As you approach the end of your second term, could you give us a prediction: Do you think Taiwan will become formally independent in your lifetime?
A: It may not be possible to realize [the goal of winning recognition of Taiwan's independence in the eyes of the world*] during my term as president. Nonetheless, I believe that in my lifetime it is possible to achieve this goal, which is the fond hope of the vast majority of Taiwan's 23 million people. For instance, 95 percent of people in Taiwan support applying for WHO membership under the name "Taiwan," while 77 percent support applying for UN membership under the name "Taiwan."
As we are all aware, despite the great disparities of views in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan on matters concerning the interests of the ruling and opposition parties, just recently in mid-May, the government received unanimous cross-partisan support for applying for WHO membership under the name "Taiwan." Therefore, we're quite confident that Taiwan will become a WHO member under the name "Taiwan" during my lifetime, though perhaps not next year. We will also apply for UN membership under the name "Taiwan" in September of this year.
I must emphasize that using the name "Taiwan" does not affect my "four noes" pledge in any way. Nor does it involve changing the nation's moniker. We believe that Taiwan is the most beautiful name and most powerful name. It's the name of our motherland and the name everyone is familiar with.
I hope you will all give us your encouragement and support. Though it may seem like a mission impossible, as long as we don't give up but persevere to the very end, and as long as we struggle on year in and year out, we'll finally succeed in my lifetime.
[* EDITOR'S NOTE: It is the position of President Chen and virtually all political leaders in Taiwan that Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is of course already formally a sovereign, independent nation and does not need to "declare" independence.]
Q5. I'd like to ask a question to follow up on a point made by Richard Bush concerning what you might call the larger "regional" or "strategic" interests. I think we'd be interested in hearing your assessment of how the [US] president and the administration can react to some of the goals and some of the contradictions that you've explained so well today, with the need to continue to cooperate with Beijing and to have Beijing's goodwill as we seek a solution to the nuclear crisis with North Korea, and of course at the UN with Iran and the nuclear threat from Iran. These are not obviously directly related questions to you, and yet they are linked at the hip and we'd be interested in hearing how you could advise the president how he could balance these issues.
A: As a member of the community of democracies, Taiwan gives its unwavering support to the US's antiterrorism activities. We therefore stand shoulder to shoulder with the US on the North Korean nuclear issue. We hold that the North Korean nuclear crisis should be resolved peacefully through dialogue, and we hope that the Korean Peninsula can progress toward becoming a region free of nuclear weapons. This is based on truth and is the correct direction to move in. Also, though not a UN member state, Taiwan unequivocally supports and complies with UN sanctions against North Korea.
Taiwan and US are on the same team when it comes to fighting terrorism, and we have made many efforts on this front. Though it would be inappropriate for me to elaborate any further as to what exactly some of these efforts consist of, it is fair to say that the US government will have recognized that Taiwan is absolutely committed to antiterrorism and has achieved concrete results in this field.
By the same token, Taiwan has contributed much to humanitarian aid work in Iran, which has on several occasions elicited the United States' public affirmation and thanks. These are all things that Taiwan's government and people should do. Particularly with respect to medical, health, and humanitarian assistance, we're no less committed than anyone else. We hope to keep up this spirit and join hands in cooperation with the US government.
Q6. How do you characterize the Beijing Olympics? Will it be a good chance for Taiwan to resume direct talks with Beijing? Or do you have any idea whether Taiwan will boycott the Beijing Olympic Games?
A: We certainly won't boycott the Beijing Olympic Games. We not only are happy to see it come about, but extend our congratulations and sincerest blessings. We hope the 2008 Beijing Olympics can be conducted with great success, but we don't want to see Beijing use it to belittle and suppress Taiwan. Even though we can't use our own national moniker to participate in the Olympics, we are still able to take part under the name "Chinese Taipei." Incredibly, Beijing has abused its hosting of the Games by unilaterally changing the name "Chinese Taipei" to "China Taipei." This is not right and shouldn't happen.
Similarly, we of course will be very happy if the Beijing Olympics Torch relay can come to Taiwan, but we don't want to see this become a political tool in China's "united front" war against Taiwan, with Beijing explaining or publicizing the event as a stop along China's domestic route. This is not good and not right, and the 23 million people of Taiwan can't possibly accept it.
Of course, we also realize that the overarching spirit of the Olympics is the spirit of peace, which is why the event is followed by the Paralympic Games. The aim is to avoid the use of force, conflict, and war. So if Beijing wants to manifest the Olympic spirit of peace, it should dismantle the nearly one thousand missiles it has deployed against Taiwan. It should also abandon its plotting and preparations to use military force against Taiwan and find a way to repeal the vicious "anti-separation law" it enacted to legitimize use of force against Taiwan. Only such behavior is in keeping with the Olympic spirit of peace.
Q7. Following the question from Jerry about your legacy, the last year of your second term, I want to focus on the US-Taiwan relationship. What do you think is the best achievement you have made during the past seven years? What issues do you think need to be improved? We know former Premier Frank Hsieh is going to be nominated by the ruling party. What suggestions will you give him on the US-Taiwan issue?
A: As you're all aware, we strongly affirm and are very grateful for the steady maintenance of ties between Taiwan and the US up until today despite some ups and downs over the past seven years. Everyone also knows that when I took office in 2000, many were concerned about what I would say in my inaugural address. In the end, I made the "four noes plus one" pledge, guaranteeing that we would abide by it so long as China does not intend to use force against Taiwan.
Some have criticized this pledge and guarantee, and have even regarded it as a failure. But I must ask: If we had not made the "four noes" pledge, would President Bush have approved such a large one-time arms procurement package so soon after taking office? Likewise, over the past seven years, we've maintained a very good state of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Although there have been some tensions, there has occurred no incident like the one in the run-up to the first direct presidential election in 1996, when China test-fired missiles in the direction of Taiwan, with one of them landing just 55 kilometers off our coast. So we must fully realize that the things we've accomplished, brought about, or put into practice didn't come out of the blue, but rather are the fruit of our great effort.
So, here, I want to once again stress to our American friends, the American government, and President Bush that I most certainly will not alter the pledges and guarantees I've made, and of course I won't change them in the coming year, either.
As for Taiwan's new, future president, regardless of which party's candidate wins the election, the Taiwan-US relationship is something that the next president must strive to cultivate and soundly establish mutual trust. Even if there is no so-called "four noes plus one," there might be a new "four noes." Though the wording might be different, no president of Taiwan can fail to abide by a certain spirit and essential content. It is his responsibility, obligation, and mission to do so.
Q8. Your predecessor has been very active in domestic politics as well as overseas. What do you see as your own role after you step down from office?
A: Concerning the role of an ex-president, let me cite the words of former President Bill Clinton when he met with me during a visit to Taiwan on February 27~28, 2005. He said that although he has critical views of President Bush and his administration, as an ex-president, he cannot publicly criticize them. These words left a great impression on me, and I feel I must keep them in mind. When a new president takes office on May 20 next year, as a former president of Taiwan, I must emulate Mr. Clinton and not try to exert any influence over the sitting president. I feel this is a very important matter. So I'll keep in mind President Clinton's advice and suggestions.