During an interview with the UK's BBC, President Ma Ying-jeou discussed such issues as Taiwan's relations with mainland China and the United States, disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, as well as the ROC's presidential election in 2016.
A transcript of the interview follows:
Q1: Currently, mainland China is not only an important trading partner for Taiwan, but also represents a security threat. What are your views on this situation?
A: The distance between Taiwan and mainland China is only about 100 nautical miles. For Taiwan, mainland China presents major threats, but also great opportunities. Any leader of the Republic of China will have to learn how to minimize the risks and maximize the opportunities. Over the past seven years, this is exactly what I have done.
With regard to our economic relations with mainland China, we share many similarities in terms of language and culture. At the same time, the two sides are in different stages of economic development. Over the past few decades, our trade volume with mainland China has increased continuously, and Taiwan enjoys a very large trade surplus. Many of the goods we export to mainland China are further processed there before being sold to Europe and North America. This type of relationship has been mutually beneficial.
The threats posed by mainland China are, of course, military and political. Some people believe that the deepening of trade and investment with mainland China will result in overreliance on it. In consideration of political and military risks, our government’s approach has been to find areas of consensus acceptable to both sides, and shelve differences. With regard to the economy and trade, Taiwan cannot avoid a certain degree of dependence on the mainland. However, since my administration has been in power, we have actually reduced dependence on the mainland compared to the previous administration. We have diversified our markets, as a result of which trade dependence on the mainland has not increased, but, in fact, declined slightly.
Q2: From your perspective, is unification currently an issue?
A: Currently, we have not yet reached a point where we can discuss the issue of unification. We have only recently begun to improve relations with the mainland. This process started just seven years ago. Therefore, there is still a long road ahead. The stage we are in now is one of peaceful development. In this stage, we can expand and deepen bilateral exchanges, but the conditions for discussions concerning unification do not yet exist.
When I ran for president eight years ago, one of the points I put forward was to maintain the cross-strait status quo of no unification, no independence, and no use of force under the framework of the ROC Constitution. That is, we do not discuss unification, pursue Taiwan independence, or resort to military power. This has been a very important policy in ensuring the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
Q3: To pursue my question further, what I meant was, yes or no to unification?
A: At this stage, the vast majority of the Taiwanese people believe the status quo should be maintained. We cannot dismiss the possibility of future discussions on the unification issue, but as of now the conditions for such consultations do not yet exist.
Q4: Since Xi Jinping came to power, the world has been waiting to see whether mainland China will move towards democracy. Do you believe that democratization on the mainland will be a long-term process?
A: Over the past few years, I have consistently reminded mainland authorities that, if they want to narrow the psychological gap between the Taiwanese and mainland people, the core values upheld by Taiwan—freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—are of critical importance. If the mainland is more active in this regard, the gap can be narrowed. If they do not become more active, the gap will naturally widen. Over the past few years, developments concerning this psychological gap have clearly reflected the actual attitude of mainland authorities.
Mainland China has tended to vacillate, sometimes showing a positive approach, and sometimes a negative one. There is still a certain degree of uncertainty.
When I ran for reelection four years ago, people on the mainland were allowed to observe our election events over the Internet, which was a new development. On the other hand, we have also seen that many human rights workers have been arrested, eliciting concern as to whether the human rights situation in mainland China is deteriorating. The impression I have is that the situation on the mainland sometimes tends to get better, and sometimes worse.
Q5: You just mentioned that many human rights workers have been arrested. What is your view on this?
A: I release a statement each year on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Incident, calling on mainland authorities to properly treat dissidents and make amends for the Tiananmen Square Incident. On June 4 this year, I issued the same demands, but the mainland has not responded accordingly. On the contrary, many human rights workers have been detained. These issues are very important to Taiwan. If the mainland does not make improvements in this area, it cannot expect that the Taiwanese people will develop a positive view of the mainland, let alone become willing to consider unification.
Q6: Each year on June 4 you release a statement. Do you believe that in the 26 years since the Tiananmen Square Incident there have been domestic changes in mainland China?
A: It is very difficult to say at this moment. There have definitely been changes over the past 20 or 30 years, but as to whether these changes constitute a fundamental transformation, questions still remain. From the perspective of the ROC, we of course hope that the mainland moves toward freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law. We will use these standards in our engagement with them.
Q7: In 1996, Taiwan held the first popular election for president. At that time, mainland China held military exercises in the waters off Taiwan. Do you believe that we will see a similar situation during the presidential elections next year?
A: So far, we have not seen any signs of this. Over the past seven years, we have strived to improve cross-strait relations, and established official communication channels. Whenever the possibility of crisis emerged in cross-strait ties, we have been able to reach a solution through these channels, and reduced the adverse effects these situations may have caused. This is an extremely important aspect of the establishment of cross-strait communication channels.
Q8: Under the present circumstances, does not being able to meet with Xi Jinping upset you, especially considering all the work you have done in making the cross-strait relationship better?
A: Since I took office, there has been major progress in cross-strait ties in such areas as the economy and culture. A meeting between the leaders of the two sides would therefore seem to be a very natural progression. Over the past two years, we explored the possibility of arranging a meeting at APEC, but regrettably this has not come to fruition. Our current attitude is that we do not dismiss the possibility of a meeting, but we will not actively pursue it.
Q9: Do you think Xi Jinping personally made the decision not to meet with you, and do you believe he is too assertive with regard to the mainland’s relations with Taiwan?
A: Of course, we do not know how their decision-making process works, but we can assume that the final decisions are made by Xi. But the two sides may have different views on certain matters. We believe that, in the development of cross-strait ties, it is inevitable that the two sides cross paths at international forums. However, the mainland does all it can to prevent such situations from occurring, as they are afraid that this will violate the one-China policy. What we want to emphasize is that, in accordance with the 1992 Consensus, both sides maintain there is only one China, but have different interpretations as to what that means. This flexibility allows us to build friendlier relations. But when it comes to international forums, their attitude is unbending.
Q10: When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, outside observers believed that he would lead mainland China on a path toward greater democracy. But over the past two and half years, many people have been disappointed in Xi Jinping. Are you disappointed as well?
A: You just mentioned that when he came to power more than two years ago, many people had high expectations. We did not particularly have such expectations. We know that the Communist Party of China is rather rigid on these issues. As for the possibility that this could change, of course the style may become different, but realizing fundamental adjustments will be more challenging.
Q11: Xi Jinping has said that “the Taiwan problem cannot be postponed indefinitely.” Is that a threat?
A: I think he makes it sound like we have delayed it for quite a while, but in fact, it is only in the past seven years that there have been relatively close and friendly relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. I have often said that seven years can hardly be considered an entire generation; it takes patience to deal with this. After all, the two sides have been governed separately for over 60 years, and this climate cannot be changed overnight. We feel that cross-strait relations must be promoted with patience and diligence so that the results gradually appear.
In fact, the results from the development of the cross-strait relationship over the past seven years have exceeded those of the previous 50-plus years, so this can be considered very fast, but the Taiwan public does not want things to move too quickly, hoping rather for step-by-step improvement in relations.
Q12: Does Xi Jinping’s statement constitute a threat?
A: We do not feel this is a threat, because as I just said, there has been great progress [in bilateral relations] over the past seven years. So we should move forward step by step. In fact, mainland Chinese officials, including the former head of the Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi, have also said the cross-strait relationship should move forward at a steady pace, so that it can go far. That is the way I see it, too.
Q13: Mainland China recently conducted military exercises with the ROC Presidential Office as a simulated target. Does that make you uneasy?
A: According to intelligence we have collected in the past, Taiwan has been a simulated target in their military exercises for quite a while. When we conduct our own military exercises, we often practice defenses against their plans. Their action only serves to remind us that a considerable military threat exists between the two sides and that we must be prepared.
Q14: The mainland Chinese military and its economy are growing every day, so is the military threat getting more severe?
A: In fact, starting in 2005, the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait has shifted toward mainland China as their defense budget has posted rapid double-digit growth annually, at times nearly 20 percent. We can hardly engage in an arms race with mainland China, so the defense strategy principle we have adopted involves creating a bilateral scenario wherein if either side were to use unilateral and nonpeaceful means to change the status quo, it would have to pay an unacceptable price. This key principle is the only way to prevent military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Peace and prosperity are the goals toward which we have consistently worked.
As I just said, there are many aspects to the cross-strait relationship. We must think of how to reduce the military threat, and then of how to boost nonmilitary cooperation. Thus, while engaging with mainland China, there will always be such differing aspects.
Every year in our Hanguang military exercises we prepare to practice these defensive countermeasures. We cannot reveal the specifics of what we practice in these military exercises. I cannot reveal the details. However, we must prepare in advance for whatever conflict might occur between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Q15: Taiwan’s recent Hanguang exercises did not use Zhongnanhai as a simulated target, so does it anger you that mainland China’s exercises target the ROC Presidential Office?
A: What I am trying to explain is that there are many different aspects to the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Why mainland China would release this footage at this time and whether it has other intentions has been subject to all kinds of analysis and speculation by many people. But to a decision-maker, the Commander-in-Chief of the ROC military, it is certainly not that we are unaware of it, but rather, a matter of what approach can be used to keep it from happening.
As in this case during mainland China’s exercises, when everyone noticed that their exercise seemed to have images of a structure that looked a bit like our Office of the President, our Mainland Affairs Council and Ministry of National Defense issued statements expressing protest and dissatisfaction. That is what we can do about it so far. In any case, our Hanguang military exercises or other military preparations cover all these eventualities.
Q16: Are you personally displeased about this?
A: Of course.
Q17: Mainland China in recent years has continued to increase its military budget, while the US is in a situation of some strategic ambiguity with relation to Taiwan. Do you believe that the US should state its position on Taiwan more clearly, or say that it would support Taiwan under certain circumstances, so as to reassure the Taiwanese people? Would you like to see President Obama make such statements?
A: For the US, this is explicitly stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act. Of course, we cannot rely solely on the provisions of a US law; we must rely upon our own preparations, and these preparations should not consist only of defensive countermeasures. They should also involve political and cross-strait measures to reduce the chance of this situation happening. So, as I just stated, our first line of defense with respect to mainland China is not aircraft or guns, but cross-strait rapprochement. Reducing the chances of conflict between the two sides via cross-strait rapprochement is the supreme strategy, what ancient strategist Sun Zi in his Art of War means when he says, “The highest form of generalship is to frustrate the enemy’s plans.”
Q18: Would you like the US president to state clearly that the US will come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a mainland Chinese invasion?
A: In fact, this problem has existed over the past 60 years. However, over the past seven years, the US has not needed to issue such statements, but peace has still been maintained in the Taiwan Strait. The key to this is that such risk has been reduced since our relationship with mainland China has improved. This is why State Department officials in charge of Taiwan and mainland affairs have repeatedly emphasized that stable development of the cross-strait relationship is an important factor in maintaining a constructive relationship with Taiwan. In other words, we cannot rely only on America coming to fight for us; we have to minimize the risk [of invasion], and minimize potential conflict. This is the ultimate strategy—“the highest form of generalship is to frustrate the enemy’s plans.”
Q19: You said a moment ago that the principle behind Taiwan’s preparedness is to make mainland China clearly understand that the cost of military invasion would be very high. But if the US stated periodically, say once a week or once a month, that in the event of military threat to Taiwan, it stands with Taiwan, the mainland would feel the cost would be even greater. What do you think?
A: I do not think that doing this would make the situation better than it is now. We ought to adopt a wise approach that allows both sides to seek nonmilitary means to solve our problems, not to stress continually that if you do this, we will do that. Doing so, on the contrary, would simply escalate the conflict. From our past experience in dealing with cross-strait relations, we would not take that approach, as it wouldn’t do any good. The cross-strait relationship has not gotten to that point. If you adopt a nonproportional approach, it is bound to only make the situation worse.
Q20: Tensions among countries bordering on the South China Sea [claimants] are rising. The South China Sea Peace Initiative you have proposed may not be accepted by all parties. What is your view on this?
A: The South China Sea situation is indeed tense, but I do not think that it will lead to the outbreak of military conflict or war, because the adjacent countries all realize that this would not be a positive development for them or for the world. That is why on May 26 I proposed the South China Peace Initiative. So far, the attitudes of the adjacent countries are focused on asserting sovereignty, but the question is how to shelve or deal with sovereignty disputes. So we take a different view, as I stated in the East China Sea Peace Initiative. This is because all sovereignty claims in the region are inevitably intensely nationalistic, making it difficult to resolve them.
On the other hand, if we look at the situation in terms of the resources the different parties are concerned about, there is much less to dispute than there is with sovereignty. For example, the principle of the East China Sea Peace Initiative is that although sovereignty is indivisible, resources can be shared. Using this precept we reached a fisheries agreement with Japan that effectively resolved fishery disputes going back over four decades. Now both sides can enjoy peace without friction. I cannot see why this sort of thinking could not be extended to the South China Sea as well, so I proposed the South China Sea Peace Initiative. Perhaps the disputants at the moment do not fully understand the specifics of our approach, but this concept is very important, and at least with regard to the attainment of peace in the East China Sea, has won considerable affirmation from the US, Japan, Australia, and the European Union. This indicates that our strategy for resolving these issues can provide different ways to reduce conflict.
What is important regardless of whether it involves the East China Sea or South China Sea is that every party must agree to the guaranteed freedom of navigation and overflight, and the collective use of peaceful means to resolve disputes in accordance with international law. Once we have these basic understandings and commitments, the issues will be relatively easy to resolve. To date, it appears that the South China Sea claimants should gradually be able to reach consensus on this topic.
Q21: Your peace initiative calls for all countries concerned to have a mutual understanding and shared position to resolve disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. However, mainland China does not share this position. What is your view on this?
A: Under the present circumstances, I think that all parties should sit down together to consider how to discuss this issue. If each party insists on its sovereignty claims, then a solution will not be possible in the immediate future. However, resources can be shared. Resources are different from sovereignty, which cannot be ceded easily. This is why we have been able to identify an approach toward finding a solution to the East China Sea issue. Of course this requires patience. But the first basic prerequisite is that all parties should agree on the freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the joint settlement of disputes under international law. The focus should be shifted from sovereignty disputes to the sharing and exploitation of resources. Perhaps not all parties agree with this approach, but why not give it a try? I think we should continue to seek a solution using this approach. This is not a simple issue. There are no easy answers in the short term.
Q22: In recent days, Japan has a defense bill going through its parliament which would allow it to send troops to engage in defense or combat missions abroad for the first time since the end of the Second World War. What is your view on this?
A: We are following this situation closely. If there is a cumulative response to the Japanese move on the part of other countries, it might affect relationships within the region. But for now we are still closely monitoring the matter.
Q23: Since you took office as president, what policies or what improvements to people’s lives are you proud of? Do you see policies or approaches that you wish had been done differently? Your approval rating at one point fell to about nine percent. What is your view on this?
A: I have been in office for more than seven years, with less than 10 months to go before the end of my tenure. When I first took office, my vision was to create a free, prosperous, advanced, and just Taiwan. This was our domestic aim. Externally, we aspired to develop peaceful cross-strait relations and a friendly international environment.
Judging from the situation today, many of our goals have been realized. In terms of economic development, we have regained our top ranking among the Four Asian Tigers. The gap in our income distribution is the lowest among these nations, as is our unemployment rate, while our competitiveness has increased significantly. Cross-strait relations are at their best in more than six decades. On the international front, although we now have one less diplomatic ally, we are accorded visa-waiver treatment by 142 countries and territories worldwide, and this number is still growing.
In terms of freedom and democracy, the annual surveys by the New York-based Freedom House have classified us as a free and democratic country. In terms of gender equality, we rank among the top-five countries in the world and are first among Asian nations. In many respects, our performance is a realization of the vision I just mentioned—a free and prosperous Taiwan, cross-strait peace, and a friendly international environment. There is still work to be done, but I am pleased that we have completed tasks that serve the interests of Taiwan, the region, and the world. We still have 10 more months to carry out our program. We should not draw conclusions so early. For example, we could introduce long-term care insurance in the future. If we do so, the protection provided to our people would definitely put us on par with any advanced country in the world.
Q24: Your approval rating was once very low. Can you share your thoughts on this?
A: That was two years ago. The rating is now about 30 percent. Of course it is not high, but we have carried out many reforms. When these reforms were first introduced, they may not have been welcomed. But after many debates, people have gradually come to accept them. For example, we have officially introduced a formula for gas and electricity prices. Of course, no one wants these prices to rise. But as we rely on imports for 98 percent of our energy, we have to devote a lot of effort to ensuring that energy does not go wasted.
Q25: Taiwan and mainland China signed a trade in services agreement in 2013. This provoked an occupation of the parliament building. From your perspective, would there have been a different outcome if you had adopted another approach?
A: Because it involved the parliament building, we respected the Legislative Yuan’s decision. However, when protestors tried to occupy the Executive Yuan a week later, we had to act according to the law.
This was an issue that was open to discussion. Before students occupied the Legislative Yuan, we had already held 20 public hearings on the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement at the Legislative Yuan. Of all discussions prior to the adoption of bills by the ROC Legislative Yuan, these were the most transparent. Yet it was called a backroom deal. Many of the criticisms were untrue. We agreed to review the agreement again, but two years have passed without any sign of progress. Students demanded a cross-strait agreement supervisory act. We agreed and submitted a related bill to the Legislative Yuan in April of last year. Today, a year and a half later, again no progress. There are some people, including members of opposition parties, who do not want these agreements to be approved, and who would prefer to see no further progress in cross-strait relations. This is very detrimental to Taiwan’s interests. When people look back at these issues in the future, they will understand that, while some of our efforts might have failed, we were nonetheless committed to serving Taiwan’s long-term interests.
I would like to remind you that the Wall Street Journal published an editorial around that time entitled “Taiwan Leaves Itself Behind.” It was obvious that even foreigners knew that these developments hurt Taiwan. But protestors justified and rationalized their actions with their call to “protest backroom deals.” As I have just said, 20 public hearings had been held on the trade in services pact. How could it have been called a backroom deal?
Q26: Would it be a great irony if an opposition party candidate is elected the next president and the agreement is approved during his or her term in office?
A: It would be great if the agreement could be passed. However, the opposition party’s presidential candidate proposes maintaining the status quo. All opposition parties seek to change the status quo in their election campaigns. But this opposition party does not want to see changes made. In fact, it wants to maintain the cross-strait status quo. It seems to have forgotten that it criticized me constantly in the past seven years for “moving closer to the mainland and selling out Taiwan.” If this is not irony, what is?
Q27: We often see discrepancies between political reality and the judgment of history. Can you predict who is going to win the next presidential election?
A: It is too early to predict the results. But she [the opposition party’s presidential candidate] has said publicly that she would build on our achievements. I keep reminding people that success does not just fall from the sky. One must come up with a concrete policy that promotes cross-strait peace; otherwise, such an outcome will not come about by itself. If the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations” is not accepted, I do not see how cross-strait relations can develop in a peaceful and stable manner in the future.