Details
2021-11-13
Presidential Office holds press conference following 2021 APEC meetings
On the morning of November 13, the Presidential Office held a press conference on the 2021 APEC meetings, including the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (AELM) and Ministerial Meetings. Joined by Minister without Portfolio John C. C. Deng (鄧振中), Minister of Economic Affairs Wang Mei-hua (王美花), National Security Council Deputy Secretary-General Hsu Szu-chien (徐斯儉), and Director-General Sharon S. N. Wu (吳尚年) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of International Organizations as Senior Official for APEC, Leader's Representative Dr. Morris Chang (張忠謀) briefed the public on the results of this year's APEC meetings and responded to questions from the media.
Dr. Chang discussed the remarks he delivered at the previous day's AELM, a full transcript of which follows:
Prime Minister [Jacinda] Ardern has encouraged us to respond to the question of "How can we work together to accelerate the economic recovery from COVID-19?" Chinese Taipei will respond as follows:
First, COVID-19 is not over yet. The world, including APEC, is still struggling toward what we may consider to be a valid signpost that COVID-19 is behind us: namely, free travel again, without restrictions and quarantines. To get to that signpost, the best medical advice appears to be: sufficiently broad vaccination coverage among the world population. Getting back to APEC, some members do not have enough vaccines while others have surpluses and/or are manufacturers. We believe that the latter should make it easy for the former to obtain sufficient vaccines and implement broad vaccination coverage.
On behalf of Chinese Taipei, I am happy to report that, while I expressed some concern in our special session in July about our vaccine adequacy, that concern has now eased somewhat due to generous donations by the US and Japan, and by several local enterprises and institutions. Also, as perhaps one of the most successful APEC members to control the severity of the pandemic outbreak through digital tools so far, Chinese Taipei repeats our willingness to help other members by sharing our experience with them.
Once we have reached the signpost of free travel, it means we have conquered, or at least neutralized COVID-19. What remains to be our main challenge? Free trade--free trade that is only subject to vital national security needs.
APEC members have thrived during the past several decades through free trade. Chinese Taipei is concerned that, recently, "free trade" seems to carry more conditions and qualifications than it used to. We believe most of those conditions and qualifications are counterproductive. We earnestly believe that free trade, subject to only vital national security needs, is the broad avenue to supply chain resiliency and robust prosperity for each and every APEC member.
Speaking of supply chain resiliency, the recent semiconductor supply bottleneck has often been brought up. The chip shortage is a culmination of an original underestimation of demand, natural disaster, logistical jams, and digital demand spikes.
While a shortage of any critical component is a serious problem, a free market, which includes free trade and free competition, is still the best solution. In fact, the greatly stepped-up building of chip manufacturing capacity in response to the recent chip shortage, is testimony to our belief that the free market is the best solution to shortage or excess problems.
Regional economic integration brings our economic and trade relations closer. Chinese Taipei believes that our economic development depends importantly on APEC regional prosperity. Therefore, we believe in supporting initiatives that deepen economic integration, promote high standards on trade-related rules, and help improve the livelihoods of our people across the Asia-Pacific.
Because of these beliefs, we have applied to join the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), a comprehensive agreement that could generate momentum for the development of the region – liberalizing trade and investment while promoting sustainable growth. Chinese Taipei plays an irreplaceable role in the global high-tech supply chain. We also have a highly transparent market economy, and are able and willing to respect the CPTPP's high standards.
Finally, we thank New Zealand for overcoming all the challenges this year and successfully hosting all the APEC meetings. We believe that the achievements in this year's priority areas will lay the groundwork for the APEC agenda in the future.
We also thank and support the United States' and Peru's offers to host APEC in 2023 and 2024, respectively. We also look forward to the APEC meetings to be hosted by Thailand next year.
Dr. Chang further stated that at this year's AELM, APEC members focused on two important issues, the first of which was vaccines. He said that countries with a vaccine surplus outlined how many doses they have donated and how many they will donate in the future, and noted that APEC members without enough vaccines voiced complaints. Dr. Chang said that Chinese Taipei lies somewhere in the middle, and that while we are not in a position to donate vaccines, the shortage he mentioned in July seems to have eased.
The second issue of common concern, Dr. Chang said, was economic recovery and the question of how to use technology and digitalization to revive our economies in an inclusive way, so that the resulting economic prosperity is not limited to only a minority of people. Other issues discussed included sustainability and climate change.
Dr. Chang then answered questions from the media.
Asked whether other APEC members had responded to his statement during the AELM expressing our desire to join the CPTPP and citing Taiwan's competitive advantages, Dr. Chang said that AELM participants delivered their statements in alphabetical order, with no time allotted in the agenda for responses.
He added that, in regard to our CPTPP accession, he had made clear in his remarks that Chinese Taipei plays an irreplaceable role in global high-tech supply chains, has a highly transparent market economy, and is willing and able to respect the CPTPP's high standards, all of which are strong qualifications for entry.
Dr. Chang was also asked if China had expressed goodwill or sought to clarify its previously stated position that, in order to participate in mechanisms for economic cooperation, Taiwan or Chinese Taipei must do so under the "one China principle." Dr. Chang responded in the negative, saying that China did not bring up the "one China principle" in the meeting.
Dr. Chang was further asked if other leaders had expressed concern about chip shortages or had discussed related issues with him. Dr. Chang responded that none of the other leaders had broached the topic, and that he was the only one to mention it, adding that he brought it up only as a good example of why the free market is the best solution to shortages or oversupply problems. Regarding the chip shortage, Dr. Chang said that, in a free-market environment, the private sector can quickly ramp up production capacity before any government takes action.
Dr. Chang also referred to his statement during the AELM that free trade seems to carry more conditions and qualifications than it used to, citing the US as a longtime free trade advocate which has now suddenly added conditions requiring more domestic production of semiconductors and integrated circuits.
Details
2025-03-13
President Lai holds press conference following high-level national security meeting
On the afternoon of March 13, President Lai Ching-te convened a high-level national security meeting, following which he held a press conference. In remarks, President Lai introduced 17 major strategies to respond to five major national security and united front threats Taiwan now faces: China’s threat to national sovereignty, its threats from infiltration and espionage activities targeting Taiwan’s military, its threats aimed at obscuring the national identity of the people of Taiwan, its threats from united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges, and its threats from using “integrated development” to attract Taiwanese businesspeople and youth.
President Lai emphasized that in the face of increasingly severe threats, the government will not stop doing its utmost to ensure that our national sovereignty is not infringed upon, and expressed hope that all citizens unite in solidarity to resist being divided. The president also expressed hope that citizens work together to increase media literacy, organize and participate in civic education activities, promptly expose concerted united front efforts, and refuse to participate in any activities that sacrifice national interests. As long as every citizen plays their part toward our nation’s goals for prosperity and security, he said, and as long as we work together, nothing can defeat us.
A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows:
At many venues recently, a number of citizens have expressed similar concerns to me. They have noticed cases in which members of the military, both active-duty and retired, have been bought out by China, sold intelligence, or even organized armed forces with plans to harm their own nation and its citizens. They have noticed cases in which entertainers willingly followed instructions from Beijing to claim that their country is not a country, all for the sake of personal career interests. They have noticed how messaging used by Chinese state media to stir up internal opposition in Taiwan is always quickly spread by specific channels. There have even been individuals making careers out of helping Chinese state media record united front content, spreading a message that democracy is useless and promoting skepticism toward the United States and the military to sow division and opposition. Many people worry that our country, as well as our hard-won freedom and democracy and the prosperity and progress we achieved together, are being washed away bit by bit due to these united front tactics.
In an analysis of China’s united front, renowned strategic scholar Kerry K. Gershaneck expressed that China plans to divide and conquer us through subversion, infiltration, and acquisition of media, and by launching media warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. What they are trying to do is to sow seeds of discord in our society, keep us occupied with internal conflicts, and cause us to ignore the real threat from outside.
China’s ambition over the past several decades to annex Taiwan and stamp out the Republic of China has not changed for even a day. It continues to pursue political and military intimidation, and its united front infiltration of Taiwan’s society grows ever more serious. In 2005, China promulgated its so-called “Anti-Secession Law,” which makes using military force to annex Taiwan a national undertaking. Last June, China issued a 22-point set of “guidelines for punishing Taiwan independence separatists,” which regards all those who do not accept that “Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China” as targets for punishment, creating excuses to harm the people of Taiwan. China has also recently been distorting United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758, showing in all aspects China’s increasingly urgent threat against Taiwan’s sovereignty.
Lately, China has been taking advantage of democratic Taiwan’s freedom, diversity, and openness to recruit gangs, the media, commentators, political parties, and even active-duty and retired members of the armed forces and police to carry out actions to divide, destroy, and subvert us from within.
A report from the National Security Bureau indicates that 64 persons were charged last year with suspicion of spying for China, which was three times the number of persons charged for the same offense in 2021. Among them, the Unionist Party, Rehabilitation Alliance Party, and Republic of China Taiwan Military Government formed treasonous organizations to deploy armed forces for China. In a democratic and free society, such cases are appalling. But this is something that actually exists within Taiwan’s society today.
China also actively plots ways to infiltrate and spy on our military. Last year, 28 active-duty and 15 retired members of the armed forces were charged with suspicion of involvement in spying for China, respectively comprising 43 percent and 23 percent of all of such cases – 66 percent in total.
We are also alert to the fact that China has recently used widespread issuance of Chinese passports to entice Taiwanese citizens to apply for the Residence Permit for Taiwan Residents, permanent residency, or the Resident Identity Card, in an attempt to muddle Taiwanese people’s sense of national identity.
China also views cross-strait exchanges as a channel for its united front against Taiwan, marking enemies in Taiwan internally, creating internal divisions, and weakening our sense of who the enemy really is. It intends to weaken public authority and create the illusion that China is “governing” Taiwan, thereby expanding its influence within Taiwan.
We are also aware that China has continued to expand its strategy of integrated development with Taiwan. It employs various methods to demand and coerce Taiwanese businesses to increase their investments in China, entice Taiwanese youth to develop their careers in China, and unscrupulously seeks to poach Taiwan’s talent and steal key technologies. Such methods impact our economic security and greatly increase the risk of our young people heading to China.
By its actions, China already satisfies the definition of a “foreign hostile force” as provided in the Anti-Infiltration Act. We have no choice but to take even more proactive measures, which is my purpose in convening this high-level national security meeting today. It is time we adopt proper preventive measures, enhance our democratic resilience and national security, and protect our cherished free and democratic way of life.
Next, I will be giving a detailed account of the five major national security and united front threats Taiwan now faces and the 17 major strategies we have prepared in response.
I. Responding to China’s threats to our national sovereignty
We have a nation insofar as we have sovereignty, and we have the Republic of China insofar as we have Taiwan. Just as I said during my inaugural address last May, and in my National Day address last October: The moment when Taiwan’s first democratically elected president took the oath of office in 1996 sent a message to the international community, that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent, democratic nation. Among people here and in the international community, some call this land the Republic of China, some call it Taiwan, and some, the Republic of China Taiwan. The Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, and Taiwan resists any annexation or encroachment upon our sovereignty. The future of the Republic of China Taiwan must be decided by its 23 million people. This is the status quo that we must maintain.
The broadest consensus in Taiwanese society is that we must defend our sovereignty, uphold our free and democratic way of life, and resolutely oppose annexation of Taiwan by China.
(1) I request that the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the administrative team do their utmost to promote the Four Pillars of Peace action plan to demonstrate the people’s broad consensus and firm resolve, consistent across the entirety of our nation, to oppose annexation of Taiwan by China.
(2) I request that the NSC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs draft an action plan that will, through collaboration with our friends and allies, convey to the world our national will and broad social consensus in opposing annexation of Taiwan by China and in countering China’s efforts to erase Taiwan from the international community and downgrade Taiwan’s sovereignty.
II. Responding to China’s threats from infiltration and espionage activities targeting our military
(1) Comprehensively review and amend our Law of Military Trial to restore the military trial system, allowing military judges to return to the frontline and collaborate with prosecutorial, investigative, and judicial authorities in the handling of criminal cases in which active-duty military personnel are suspected of involvement in such military crimes as sedition, aiding the enemy, leaking confidential information, dereliction of duty, or disobedience. In the future, criminal cases involving active-duty military personnel who are suspected of violating the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces will be tried by a military court.
(2) Implement supporting reforms, including the establishment of a personnel management act for military judges and separate organization acts for military courts and military prosecutors’ offices. Once planning and discussion are completed, the MND will fully explain to and communicate with the public to ensure that the restoration of the military trial system gains the trust and full support of society.
(3) To deter the various types of controversial rhetoric and behavior exhibited by active-duty as well as retired military personnel that severely damage the morale of our national military, the MND must discuss and propose an addition to the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces on penalties for expressions of loyalty to the enemy as well as revise the regulations for military personnel and their families receiving retirement benefits, so as to uphold military discipline.
III. Responding to China’s threats aimed at obscuring the national identity of the people of Taiwan
(1) I request that the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), and other relevant agencies, wherever necessary, carry out inspections and management of the documents involving identification that Taiwanese citizens apply for in China, including: passports, ID cards, permanent residence certificates, and residence certificates, especially when the applicants are military personnel, civil servants, or public school educators, who have an obligation of loyalty to Taiwan. This will be done to strictly prevent and deter united front operations, which are performed by China under the guise of “integrated development,” that attempt to distort our people’s national identity.
(2) With respect to naturalization and integration of individuals from China, Hong Kong, and Macau into Taiwanese society, more national security considerations must be taken into account while also attending to Taiwan’s social development and individual rights:
Chinese nationals applying for permanent residency in Taiwan must, in accordance with the law of Taiwan, relinquish their existing household registration and passport and may not hold dual identity status.
As for the systems in place to process individuals from Hong Kong or Macau applying for residency or permanent residency in Taiwan, there will be additional provisions for long-term residency to meet practical needs.
IV. Responding to China’s threats from united front infiltration into Taiwanese society through cross-strait exchanges
(1) There are increasing risks involved with travel to China. (From January 1, 2024 to today, the MAC has received reports of 71 Taiwanese nationals who went missing, were detained, interrogated, or imprisoned in China; the number of unreported people who have been subjected to such treatment may be several times that. Of those, three elderly I-Kuan Tao members were detained in China in December of last year and have not yet been released.) In light of this, relevant agencies must raise public awareness of those risks, continue enhancing public communication, and implement various registration systems to reduce the potential for accidents and the risks associated with traveling to China.
(2) Implement a disclosure system for exchanges with China involving public officials at all levels of the central and local government. This includes everyone from administrative officials to elected representatives, from legislators to village and neighborhood chiefs, all of whom should make the information related to such exchanges both public and transparent so that they can be accountable to the people. The MOI should also establish a disclosure system for exchanges with China involving public welfare organizations, such as religious groups, in order to prevent China’s interference and united front activities at their outset.
(3) Manage the risks associated with individuals from China engaging in exchanges with Taiwan:
Review and approval of Chinese individuals coming to Taiwan should be limited to normal cross-strait exchanges and official interactions under the principles of parity and dignity, and relevant factors such as changes in the cross-strait situation should be taken into consideration.
Strict restrictions should be placed on Chinese individuals who have histories with the united front coming to Taiwan, and Chinese individuals should be prohibited from coming to Taiwan to conduct activities related in any way to the united front.
(4) Political interference from China and the resulting risks to national security should be avoided in cross-strait exchanges. This includes the review and management of religious, cultural, academic, and education exchanges, which should in principle be depoliticized and de-risked so as to simplify people-to-people exchanges and promote healthy and orderly exchanges.
(5) To deter the united front tactics of a cultural nature employed by Chinese nationals to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty, the Executive Yuan must formulate a solution to make our local cultural industries more competitive, including enhanced support and incentives for our film, television, and cultural and creative industries to boost their strengths in democratic cultural creation, raise international competitiveness, and encourage research in Taiwan’s own history and culture.
(6) Strengthen guidance and management for entertainers developing their careers in China. The competent authorities should provide entertainers with guidelines on conduct while working in China, and make clear the scope of investigation and response to conduct that endangers national dignity. This will help prevent China from pressuring Taiwanese entertainers to make statements or act in ways that endanger national dignity.
(7) The relevant authorities must adopt proactive, effective measures to prevent China from engaging in cognitive warfare against Taiwan or endangering cybersecurity through the internet, applications, AI, and other such tools.
(8) To implement these measures, each competent authority must run a comprehensive review of the relevant administrative ordinances, measures, and interpretations, and complete the relevant regulations for legal enforcement. Should there be any shortcomings, the legal framework for national security should be strengthened and amendments to the National Security Act, Anti-Infiltration Act, Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong & Macao Affairs, or Cyber Security Management Act should be proposed. Communication with the public should also be increased so that implementation can happen as soon as possible.
V. Responding to threats from China using “integrated development” to attract Taiwanese businesspeople and youth
(1) I request that the NSC and administrative agencies work together to carry out strategic structural adjustments to the economic and trade relations between Taiwan and China based on the strategies of putting Taiwan first and expanding our global presence while staying rooted in Taiwan. In addition, they should carry out necessary, orderly adjustments to the flow of talent, goods, money, and skills involved in cross-strait economic and trade relations based on the principle of strengthening Taiwan’s foundations to better manage risk. This will help boost economic security and give us more power to respond to China’s economic and trade united front and economic coercion against Taiwan.
(2) I request that the Ministry of Education, MAC, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and other relevant agencies work together to comprehensively strengthen young students’ literacy education on China and deepen their understanding of cross-strait exchanges. I also request these agencies to widely publicize mechanisms for employment and entrepreneurship for Taiwan’s youth and provide ample information and assistance so that young students have more confidence in the nation’s future and more actively invest in building up and developing Taiwan.
My fellow citizens, this year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. History tells us that any authoritarian act of aggression or annexation will ultimately end in failure. The only way we can safeguard freedom and prevail against authoritarian aggression is through solidarity.
As we face increasingly severe threats, the government will not stop doing its utmost to ensure that our national sovereignty is not infringed upon, and to ensure that the freedom, democracy, and way of life of Taiwan’s 23 million people continues on as normal. But relying solely on the power of the government is not enough. What we need even more is for all citizens to stay vigilant and take action.
Every citizen stands on the frontline of the defense of democracy and freedom. Here is what we can do together: First, we can increase our media literacy, and refrain from spreading and passing on united front messaging from the Chinese state. Second, we can organize and participate in civic education activities to increase our knowledge about united front operations and build up whole-of-society defense resilience. Third, we can promptly expose concerted united front efforts so that all malicious attempts are difficult to carry out. Fourth, we must refuse to participate in any activities that sacrifice national interests.
The vigilance and action of every citizen forms the strongest line of defense against united front infiltration. Only through solidarity can we resist being divided. As long as every citizen plays their part toward our nation’s goals for prosperity and security, and as long as we work together, nothing can defeat us.